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THE WORKER AND THREE PHASES OF UNIONISM: 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF THE WORKER-UNION RELATIONSHIP 
Alfred W. Blumrosen* 
"[T]he organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing 
might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our faces against 
this tendency." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1896).1 
U NIONISM emerged in the American industrial society to pro-tect the economic and dignitary interests of employees. The 
national labor policy, developed in the 1930's, allowed employees 
to use their collective strength, channelled and developed through 
unions, to counter the power of the employers. In this process, 
the power of the labor union as an organization was enhanced. 
This increasing power over the economic destiny of employees has 
created problems not widely envisioned a generation ago.2 For 
union power can be exercised not only against the employer, but 
in cooperation with him; not only for the employees, but against 
them. 
The union affects employees in its performance of three some-
what different functions in our social-economic-political life. First, 
it affects them while it is engaged as a pressure group, asserting legis-
lative demands in the name of the workers, in the national, state 
and local political arenas. Secondly, the union affects employees 
• Professor of Law, Rutgers University.-Ed. 
1 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (dissent). 
2 The legislation establishing the framework of labor relations law is discussed 
throughout the text. For a general background, see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw (2d 
rev. ed. 1958). The various statutes and agencies referred to are as follows: 
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 158-60 (Supp. IV, 1963). It was 
amended and supplemented in 1947 in Title I of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 158-60 (Supp. IV, 
1963). This statute is hereinafter referred to and cited as the NLRA. Its provisions are 
administered by the five-member National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred 
to as the NLRB. 
The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 158-60, 186-87 (Supp. 
IV, 1963), embraces the amendments to the NLRA, and several other new statutory 
features. It is hereinafter referred to and cited as the LMRA. 
The Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 54 Stat. 785 (1940), 45 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-63 (1958), hereinafter referred to as the RLA. It created bodies consisting of 
equal representatives of unions and employers, known as Railway Adjustment Boards, 
referred to hereinafter as RAB. It also creates the National Mediation Board, hereinafter 
referred to as NMB. 
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 
Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV, 1963) hereinafter referred to as the 
LMRDA. 
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who are caught up in internal union politics. The union may be 
a battleground of personalities and economic issues which are in 
constant political turmoil. Thirdly, the union affects employees 
as it performs its economic function in the collective bargaining 
process, making day-to-day decisions in the negotiation and ad-
ministration of collective bargaining agreements. 
This article will examine the extent to which, and the methods 
by which, individual rights are protected in each of these three 
phases of union activity. We will see that the employee is well pro-
tected in his right to oppose political action of the union and has 
considerable legal protection for his rights to engage in internal 
union political struggles, but the employee has received little pro-
tection for his economic interests in collective bargaining between 
unions and employers. A recent decision by the NLRB, which will 
be examined in some detail, suggests that additional protection for 
individual economic rights in the collective bargaining process 
may be in the offing. 
The evaluation of legal relations between union and worker 
in each of these three contexts must be tentative because the social, 
economic and technological foundation of the union-member rela-
tionship is undergoing constant change. Our society is moving 
in the direction of greater organization of economic activity, 
whether in private or governmental hands. In such a society, 
traditional concepts of civil liberties will be inadequate to pre-
serve individual freedom. Civil liberties have been defined as limit-
ations on the power of government over individuals. This concept 
does not protect the individual, either member or non-member, 
against the powerful associations which dominate our society. 
There has been little development of the concept of individual 
freedom in the context of group activity.3 This failure may be 
3 An early modem law review study, well worth reading today, is Jaffe, Law Making 
by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937). Other writings which deal with the 
general problem of the role of the powerful group in modem society include: HoRN, 
GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956); HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY 300-01 (1960); KA.RIEL, THE DECLINE OF All[£RICAN PLURALISlll chs. 1-9 (1961); 
MILLER, PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1959); PRESTOS, THE ORGANIZA• 
TIONAL SOCIETY (1962); Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Pro• 
tection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 
933 (1952); Blumrosen, Union-Management Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J. 
PUB. L. 345 (1961); Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. REv. 331 (1958); Friedmann, Cor• 
porate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 155 (1957); 
Symposium, Group Interests and the Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 429 (1959); Wirtz, Govern• 
ment by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440 (1953). 
Cases which deal with critical aspects of the relation of member to group include: 
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 
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most serious. In the organized society, individual freedom which 
is not protected against group power will lose much of its meaning. 
Unions themselves provide a study in ambivalence on the 
question of individual rights. On the one hand, they are organized 
in accordance with the principle of centralized power. The author-
ity of the union stems from the union's constitutional convention 
and is delegated outward.4 But at the same time, the union seeks 
to act as the democratic interpreter of the interests of the em-
ployees. 5 
The necessity of applying basic values concerning freedom and 
power to the relation between individual and group has been 
recognized in those cases which apply due process and equal pro-
tection concepts to some of the activities of some of the more 
strategically located groups in the nation.6 This, however, has not 
been the direction in which the law of union-worker relations has 
developed. The rules concerning this relationship are developing 
on other than constitutional grounds. Consequently, the relation-
ship provides a laboratory in which the law relating to the indi-
vidual and the group may consciously be tested and developed. In 
this crucible, we may seek meaningful individual freedom as the 
organized society becomes a reality. 
The law with which we are concerned is of recent vintage, 
without the sanctity of age or the certainty of experience. Recent 
judicial decisions control the relation between union and worker 
in the political context. In the area of internal union affairs, the 
basic law was enacted in 1959. In the collective bargaining area, 
judicial decisions going back less than twenty years establish the 
principles governing the relationship. This suggests that the prob-
lems are those of contemporary society, and that, for this reason 
367 U.S. 740 (1961); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); 
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1962); Raymond v. 
Creger, 38 N.J. 472, 185 A.2d 856 (1962). 
4 See LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY (1959). 
5 To state the conflict in this manner is not to suggest that all problems of union• 
worker relations are dealt with similarly by any given union at any given time. The 
complexities involved in the relationship between the organization and its members 
are far too intricate for such a simple characterization. See ETZioNI, A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF Cm,IPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1961), for a discussion of some of these com-
plexities. See also LIPSE'f, TROW &: COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956). Nevertheless, 
for purposes of analysis of legal doctrine it is necessary to simplify the institutional 
problems into types of situations. No harm is done if we recognize that the intricacies 
of each situation will assert themselves on concrete occasions. 
6 St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal 
Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961). 
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also, the area provides an opportunity for wise legal develop-
ment on all fronts-legislative, administrative and judicial. 
To put the clash of individual freedom and group power into 
a proper perspective, it should be noted that the union and its 
members are not usually in opposition. On most matters, most 
of the time, the member agrees with or accepts the union's action. 
As a result, the member's interest can generally be best expressed 
by giving full scope to union power. The focus of this study is 
the worker who opposes the union, not because of the number of 
such cases, but, rather, because his case sharply presents the poten-
tial conflict between individual freedom and group power. 
I. THE POLITICAL SPHERE 
"The notion that economic and political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian 
.... It is not true in life that political protection is irrelevant to, and insu-
lated from, economic interests. It is not true for industry or finance. Neither 
is it true for labor." Justice Felix Frankfurter (1961).7 
In recent years unions have moved with increasing confidence 
between the bargaining table and the legislative halls. Their lob-
bying activities on almost all legislative matters are well known. 
When legislation concerning the permissible scope of union eco-
nomic power comes before Congress, unions mass their political 
strength to preserve and expand their freedom to use economic 
pressure in collective bargaining. The interrelationship between 
union economic activity and union political action is obvious and 
intense. 
As government takes a greater interest in collective bargaining 
activities, its attitude becomes more important. This attitude will 
inevitably be affected by political considerations. Continued po-
litical action thus is essential to the continued ability of the union 
to function in the economic area. Therefore, the union must 
muster all possible organizational strength in key political strug-
gles. Inevitably, some members will disagree with the union posi-
tion on the issues which emerge. The question then arises as 
to the extent to which the union may publicly and formally 
compel conformity with its political views. 
A. Expulsion for Political Action 
The power of a union to expel a member who takes a position 
antagonistic to its political interest was denied in Mitchell v. 
7 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 814-15 (1961) (dissent). 
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International Ass'n of Machinists,8 a case recently decided in 
California. In that case, Mitchell and Mulgrew had been em-
ployed by Lockheed Aircraft for seventeen and six years respec-
tively when they were expelled from the union because of their 
vigorous public campaign in support of a proposed state right-to-
work law. Union leadership in California, as elsewhere, viewed the 
right-to-work laws as a serious threat to union strength. The union 
had publicly opposed such laws and was undoubtedly embarrassed 
by the contrary activities of these two long-time union members. 
After the right-to-work law had been defeated in the 1958 elec-
tion, 0 Mitchell and Mulgrew were tried by the union for conduct 
unbecoming union members, found guilty, and expelled. They 
did not, however, lose their jobs.10 The California District Court 
of Appeals, per Justice Fox, set aside the expulsion. 
In his opinion, Justice Fox recognized that a union is not a 
social club entitled to the kind of minimal judicial supervision 
which the pre-existing common law had accorded "private volun-
tary associations." A large part of a union's power and authority 
is derived from its recognition, under federal legislation, as an 
exclusive bargaining agent. "Further, [unions] are not primarily 
social groups which require homogeneous views in order to retain 
smooth functioning. They are large, heterogeneous groups, whose 
members may agree on one thing only-they want improved work-
ing conditions and greater economic benefi.ts."11 
Additionally, the plaintiffs had a valuable interest to protect 
in their union membership, even though they had not been dis-
charged as a result of the expulsion. Lack of union membership 
might make it more difficult to get other jobs, the union might 
have built up funds in which they could participate only as mem-
bers, and the union might not represent all of the employees 
adequately in dealing with management. 
While the union may expel members for activity directly 
related to collective bargaining, such as serving as labor spies or 
violating no-strike clauses, when the cause for expulsion relates 
to the political action of the members, Justice Fox identified a 
8 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961). 
o In the 1958 elections, right-to-work laws were rejected by voters in five of the six 
jurisdictions in which they were proposed. See the full discussion in Sultan, The Union 
Security Issue, in PUBLIC POLICY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 88 (Shister, Aaron &: Summers 
ed. 1962). 
10 For a report of the aftermath of the litigation, see N.Y. Times, July 29, 1962, p. 60, 
cols. 3-4. 
11 196 Cal. App. 2d at 799, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 815. 
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public interest. "[U]nlimited freedom to express political views is 
the very heart of a democratic body, pumping the life blood of 
ideas without which our system could not survive."12 
The public interest in the free expression of ideas, together 
with the individual's right to speak freely on political matters, 
was held to outweigh the union's interest in presenting a unified 
political front on the issue. It is unlikely that the court which 
decided Mitchell would allow expulsion because of a member's 
position on any political issue, including the repeal of the basic 
labor legislation. The public and individual interest in free polit-
ical debate increases in direct relation to the union's interest in 
unanimity of political support. 
Justice Fox supported his decision with a footnote reference 
to the California Labor Code which prohibits employer discrim-
ination against an employee because of his political views or 
activities.13 California is one of the few jurisdictions in the nation 
which legislatively protects the employee against political demands 
made by the employer. In most jurisdictions, it is possible for the 
employer to demand political allegiance of the employee as the 
price of continued employment.14 The social interest in freedom 
of political debate has been generally subordinated to the employ-
er's interest in securing political conformity. 
In light of the decision in this case, the privilege of the em-
ployer to require political conformity of his employees is open 
to re-examination. There is no reason to allow the employer to 
demand political conformity of the employee if the union is not 
free to take the same action. In the past, the courts assumed 
that employer action reflected the social interest, but union ac-
tion did not. Employers were permitted to act in antisocial ways 
toward their employees, but unions were not.15 The labor legis-
12 Id. at 804, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 818. 
13 Id. at 807 n.7, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 820 n.7. 
14 See Annot., Discharge from Private Employment on Ground of Political Views or 
Conduct, 51 A.L.R.2d 742 (1957). 
15 See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 350-51. Employers have been held entitled to 
discharge employees in the following cases: Odell v. Humble Oil &: Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 
123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953) (for giving truthful testimony while 
under government subpoena in an antitrust suit against employer); Christy v. Petrus, 
365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956) (for filing workmen's compensation claims); Bell 
v. Faulkner, 75 S.W .2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (for refusing to vote as employer directed). 
On the other hand, unions have been prohibited from penalizing members in the 
following instances: Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), 14 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 624 (1960) (for giving of truthful testimony 
before legislative committees); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainmen, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921) (same); Burke v. Monumental Div. No. 52, 
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lation of the past thirty years has destroyed any basis which may 
have existed for this distinction between unions and employers, 
and requires that they be treated similarly. Otherwise, what ap-
pears to be enhanced individual freedom may be no more than a 
disguised judicial preference for employer, rather than union, 
political pressures on the worker. 
By emphasizing the social importance of individual participa-
tion in political activities, the courts lay a foundation for political 
freedom of the employee not only against the union, but also 
against his own employer. Freedom to engage in political activity 
without retaliation is equally important in the employer-employee 
relation. This aspect of the Mitchell case has considerable growth 
potential. The right of employers to discharge for antisocial 
reasons, like the right of the union to expel, is a judicial invention 
which can be judicially modified.16 
In Mitchell the court interpolated values found in the Con-
stitution and in democratic political theory into the relation of 
individual to union. This was a legitimate exercise of the judicial 
law-making function. The same result is suggested, if not impelled, 
by the language of section l0l(a)(2) of the LMRDA.17 Thus, both 
judicial decision and legislative determination have protected the 
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 273 Fed. 707 (D. Md. 1919) (for bringing suit against the 
union in connection with its decision to call a strike); Schneider v. Local 60, United 
Journeymen, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905) (for refusing to follow union suggestions 
while in an official position). For a criticism of these cases giving unlimited freedom 
to the employer, see Blumrosen, The Right To Seek Workmen's Compensation, 15 
RUTGERS L. REv. 491 (1961). The decision in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 
supra, was adhered to, after trial, resulting in a $50,000 verdict. 53 L.R.R.M. 2105 (Cal. 
App. 1963). 
16 The principle that an employment contract is presumed to be at will unless the 
contrary is clearly disclosed was first stated in a legal treatise. ·wooD, MASTER AND SERVANT, 
§ 134 (1877). It was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Martin v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), and spread rapidly. For a collection of 
materials dealing with the development of this doctrine, see BLUIIIROSEN, MATERLU.S 
AND CASES ON THE LAw OF THE EIIIPLOYJIIENT RELATION 190-205 (multilith 1962). 
17 This section reads: "Every member of any labor organization shall have the right 
to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, 
or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candi-
dates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the 
meeting." Commas originally followed the words "members" and "opinions." 
The semicolon after the word "members" was introduced in the following exchange 
on the floor of the Senate, 105 CONG. REc. 6718 (1959); II LEGISLATIVE HISrORY OF THE 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1230 (1959) [hereinafter 
cited as 1959 ACT LEGIS. HISr.]: 
"Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I suggest an amendment, in this part of the amend-
ment, by inserting a semicolon after the word 'members' on line 9 of page 2 of the 
amendment. That is simply a clerical change. There ought to be no objection to that 
modification. 
"Mr. KucHEL. There will not be any objection, and I accept the amendment .... 
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political rights of union members against discriminatory retalia-
tion by the union. 
B. Political Use of Union Dues 
Although the dissenter may not be expelled for his political 
beliefs, may the union use his dues to support political causes 
with which he disagrees? The earlier view was that the member 
was bound by the majority decision concerning the use to which 
union dues would be put.18 The present position of the Supreme 
Court is to the contrary. The leading case is International Ass'n 
of Machinists v. Street,19 which arose under the Railway Labor 
Act. The issue was whether dues collec;ted under a union-shop 
agreement could be used for political purposes over the objection 
of a union member. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against en-
forcement of the union-shop agreement rather than against the 
allegedly improper use of the dues. This raised the question of 
whether the complainants were seeking to get rid of the baby 
rather than the bath-seeking to undermine the union-shop agree-
"Mr. CooPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? 
"Mr. KucHEL. I yield to the able Senator from Kentucky, a distinguished co-author 
of the amendment. 
"Mr. CooPER. I wish to call my question to the attention of the Senator from Arkansas. 
I think it is wise to make some legislative history on the point. I assume the purpose 
of placing a semicolon at that point, is to assure, if there is any question about it, that 
the constitutional safeguards of free speech shall be preserved outside the union hall. 
"Mr McCLELLAN. The purpose is to make certain that union members shall have 
freedom of speech not only in a union hall, but outside. 
"Mr. KUCHEL. I agree." 
A few moments after this exchange, Senator McClellan rose to indicate that the 
semicolon added had been misplaced. He sought, and received, unanimous consent to 
place it after the word "opinion" instead of after the word "members." 105 CONG. REc. 
6722 (1959); II 1959 Acr LEGIS. HIST. 1234. This revision was copied into H.R. 8432, 
as it was engrossed in the House, 105 CoNG. REc. 15883 (1959); II 1959 Acr LEGIS. HIST, 
1693. 
The original language, using commas after the two words, suggested that the statute 
protected freedom to communicate with fellow union members. Inserting a semicolon 
after the word "members," as was originally done, could give rise to the argument that 
the expression of opinion was protected regardless of the composition of the audience, 
However, when the semicolon was moved to the end of the word "opinions," it sug• 
gested again that the communication protected by the act involved other union members. 
The decision to use semicolons in both places was apparently made by the draftsman of 
the Landrum-Griffin bill, H.R. 8400. It is there, without explanation, that the double 
use of the semicolons first appears. The result of all this is that it is possible to argue 
either that expression of views to the general public is protected, which would confirm 
the result of the Mitchell case, or that only expression directed to other union members 
is protected. Senator McClellan's statement does not solve the problem. At times, one 
becomes skeptical of the utility of the process of tracing legislative history at least on 
such matters as punctuation. 
1s DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 175 P.2d 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1946), afj'd, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 906 (1948). 
19 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
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ment as inconsistent with the political rights of the union mem-
bers.20 
If the plaintiffs had hoped to upset the union shop in the name 
of political liberty, they were disappointed. The Supreme Court 
sustained the validity of the union-shop agreement.21 At the 
same time, it held that the dues of the dissidents could not be 
used over their objection for political purposes. The Court tai-
lored a remedy to fit the employees' claim. Their dues were to 
be divided in accordance with the proportion of dues spent by 
the union for political purposes. Plaintiffs were entitled to a re-
fund of that portion of their dues, or to an injunction against 
the expenditure thereof, by the union.22 
Seven Justices concluded that Congress either had not per-
mitted, or could not constitutionally permit, the union to spend 
dues for political purposes over the objection of a member. 
Justices Douglas and Black argued that, since the association 
of member and union was coerced by a combination of the "facts 
of life" and congressional authorization, the union could not 
constitutionally use the dues of dissenters for political purposes. 
Such use of these funds was inconsistent with their political free-
dom under the first amendment. Constitutional standards were 
20 This was Professor Aaron's view of the case as it reached the Supreme Court. 
"Stripped of all its disguises, the Street case thus emerges as simply another attack on 
the validity of the union shop; and the issues it raises are neither novel nor particularly 
significant." Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 Omo 
ST. L.J. 39, 63 (1961). 
21 This decision reaffirmed the holding in Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 
U.S. 225 (1956), that authorization of a union-shop provision was within the scope of 
congressional judgment permitted by the fifth amendment. 
22 Mr. Justice Whittaker agreed with the decision but dissented from what he con-
ceived to be an ineffective remedy. He would have enjoined enforcement of the union-
shop agreement. Mr. Justice Douglas, who believed the union-shop requirement un-
constitutional as applied to the political dissenter, joined the majority to provide a 
decision on the remedy. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to dismiss 
the action although the union offered to make a full refund of all dues to the plaintiffs 
in the case. That court remanded to the trial court so that the latter could formulate 
an appropriate remedy to protect the dissidents via either a reduction in dues or a 
refund. If the trial court was unable to develop a practical remedy, it was to enjoin 
the union from e.'\'.pending any funds for political purposes. 217 Ga. 351, 122 S.E.2d 
220 (1961). This proposed remedy is clearly inconsistent with the views of the Supreme 
Court in Street. See 367 U.S. at 773. See also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
In Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 83 Sup. Ct. Il58 (1963), the Supreme Court 
held that an injunction against the enforcement of the union-shop agreement was not 
a proper remedy to enforce the right recognized in Street. The Court elaborated on the 
the remedial problems involved in the Street decision, holding (1) that the employee 
is entitled to a refund of all dues which have been spent for any political purpose if 
he makes timely objection to the expenditure without specifying the particular political 
use to which he objects, and (2) that relief should consist of a refund of the proportion 
of the dues which reflects the proportion of political expenditures to total union 
expenditures, and a reduction of future dues by the same proportion. 
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applicable because the funds were collected under federal stat-
utory authorization. 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, on the other hand, concluded 
that the connection between governmental and union action was 
"too fine spun" to justify application of the constitutional stand-
ards to the use of dues. Congress had merely p~rmitted, but not 
required, the union-shop agreement. Therefore, constitutional 
standards were not applicable, even if the political use of dues of 
dissenters could be viewed as an infringement on their political 
freedom.23 
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for five members of the Court, 
avoided the constitutional question. He concluded that Congress 
had not intended to allow the union to make political use of the 
dues of dissident members. The legislative history of the 1951 
amendment to the RLA, which permitted the union-shop agree-
ment, did not demonstrate that the dues of dissenters collected 
under such agreements could be used for political purposes. Since 
Congress had been concerned with the rights of dissenters, and had 
not expressed an intention to override their political liberties, 
the statute should not be construed so as to authorize a union 
to use dues collected thereunder for political purposes over the 
objection of a member. 
This opinion was criticized by Justices Frankfurter and Har-
lan on the ground that Mr. Justice Brennan asked the wrong ques-
tion of the legislative history. Union political activity was so well 
known-especially to congressmen who bear the brunt of it-that 
its continuance under union-shop agreements probably was as-
sumed by the legislators. The burden of demonstration from legis-
lative history should have been imposed on those who claimed that 
Congress had not authorized the political use of the dues of dis-
senters. This criticism is unwarranted. Mr. Justice Brennan dem-
onstrated judicial statesmanship of high order when he placed the 
burden of demonstration on those who wished to justify the re-
straint on political freedom involved in the Street case. His ap-
proach simultaneously adjusted two sets of important relationships 
23 For a discussion supporting the Black-Douglas position and opposing that taken 
by Frankfurter-Harlan on the constitutional question, see Blumrosen, Significant Supreme 
Court Decisions Affecting Labor Relations, 1960 Term; Herein of Political Use of Union 
Dues and of Hiring Halls, 16 Sw. L.J. 57, 59-61 (1962). For the opposite view, see Welling-
ton, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 
(1961); Wellington, Machinists v. Street; Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of 
Constitutional Issues, 1961 SUPREME CouRT REv. 49. 
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which converged in Street-the relation between Court and Con-
gress, and the relation between union and member. 
C. Judicial Protection of Constitutional Rights 
on Statutory Grounds 
Judicial control of labor legislation on constitutional grounds 
has not proved satisfactory. Early in this century, economic pre-
dilections led the Supreme Court to invalidate legislative efforts 
to regulate labor relations, but the Court overturned these deci-
sions during the 1930's and the 1940's.24 But then the Court began 
its surveillance of state regulation of picketing under the first 
and fourteenth amendments. By 1957 this approach had withered 
while another basis for restriction, the pre-emption doctrine, 
emerged to limit state action.25 
This rather rapid revision in constitutional law approaches is 
rooted in changing economic and social facts, and in the shifting 
attitudes of the country and the Court. Yet, constitutional de-
cisions under the first amendment and due process clauses seek to 
identify and implement the more permanent values in our system, 
as distinct from those which are merely transitory. To the extent 
that these decisions are given only passing deference by the Sup-
reme Court, their authority is diluted and the protection afforded 
these important values is jeopardized. At the same time, such 
decisions create rigidities in the lower courts which are not easily 
modified. 
As our society becomes more highly organized, constitutional 
decisions which appear well founded by today's standards may in-
hibit or delay important social developments, or fail to protect 
important freedoms. To avoid this, the Court must seek techniques 
24 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), and Adair v. United -'tates, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), 
which invalidated on constitutional grounds legislative attempts to restrict employer 
anti-union conduct, were distinguished, and finally discarded in Lincoln Fed. Labor 
Union v. Northwestern Iron &: Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). The Lincoln decision also 
interred the case of Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 
(1923), which had invalidated a system of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. 
See Rodes, Due Process and Social Legislation in the Supreme Court-A Post Mortem, 
33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 5 (1957). 
25 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), enveloped picketing in the "preferred 
position" given free speech under then current constitutional law doctrines under the 
first and fourteenth amendments. This protection was virtually eliminated in Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
The decline in regulation of state limitations on picketing was accompanied by an 
increase in restraint of state action under the pre-emption doctrine. See Blumrosen, 
The New Federalism in Labor Law, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
Acr OF 1959 (Slovenko ed. 1960). 
1446 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
to accomplish two seemingly inconsistent objectives: the preserva-
tion of the values implicit in constitutional principles, and the 
avoidance of rigidities which often flow from constitutional ad-
judication. Both of these objectives are served when the Court 
interpolates the values protected by constitutional guarantee into 
the construction of statutes. The process of "construction to avoid 
a constitutional question" which protects the asserted constitu-
tional claim is a valuable judicial technique. It might better be 
· termed "construction to protect constitutional values." It preserves 
the values protected by the Constitution, but leaves the legislature 
free to overrule the decision. If the legislature directly rejects the 
Court's judgment on the issues involved, the process of construc-
tion may be repeated, or the constitutional issue may be faced by 
the Court. But, in the interim, the legislative branch will have 
spoken directly on the issue which the Court had faced. This 
legislative judgment will weigh importantly in the ultimate judi-
cial decision on the constitutional question. 
Labor relations law provides several illustrations of the suc-
cessful use of the technique of construction to protect constitutional 
values. The Virginia Electric & Power Co.26 case, requiring that 
employer unfair labor practices be construed in accordance with 
first amendment protection of freedom of speech, and the Steele 
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.21 case both illustrate this point. 
In the Steele case the Court interpreted the Railway Labor Act 
as requiring the union which acted as bargaining agent to represent 
all the employees fairly. The requirement was not explicit in the 
statute, but the Court found it implied through (1) the use of the 
term "representative," (2) a "principle of general application" 
that powers are to be exercised in behalf of their beneficiaries, and 
(3) an analogy of the union to the legislature and the application 
of standards of due process and equal protection associated with 
review of legislation.28 
The Court achieved at least as much, and perhaps more, pro-
tection for individual employees and minoritfos by this construc-
tion as it could have afforded them by holding that the Constitu-
tion applied to union action. It also avoided the thorny problems 
involved in adopting the concept that union action was govern-
20 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. &: Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). 
21 Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
28 See Givens, Federal Protection of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 
FORDHAM L. REv. 259 (1960). 
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mental action.29 As a result, the growth potential of the duty of 
fair representation remains untested.30 It may ultimately require 
the union to admit to participation in union affairs all those whom it 
represents.31 As yet, the duty has not been expressly rejected or lim-
ited by Congress. This approach gives more flexibility and versatility 
than any direct application of the Constitution to trade unions 
could. It is not limited to claims which would rise to the level of 
constitutional demands, nor restricted by the amorphous concept 
of governmental action. It is a viable mechanism for the regulation 
of union action, but at the same time is subject to congressional 
review. It is a good illustration of the infusion of constitutional 
values into the process of statutory construction. 
The saving of congressional power to review and reverse the 
Court assures that the judiciary will not for long frustrate the 
legislative judgment on important questions. This is an important 
aspect of the technique of construction to preserve constitutional 
values. It simultaneously recognizes legislative supremacy and 
liberates judicial energy. The Court may be more willing to 
protect constitutional values within a legislative context than to 
write them "indelibly" into the Constitution. This answers criti-
cisms such as those levelled at the "old" Court that the judiciary, 
by interpolating its own views into the Constitution, was improp-
erly hindering legislative developments. 
While we normally think of legislation as posing issues for 
the courts to decide, the process can and does work fruitfully in 
the other direction, with the courts posing issues for legislative 
acquiescence or rejection. This interaction between legislative 
and judicial process is one of the most important developments 
in the art of governing labor relations. It can be carried on only 
if the Court avoids the constitutional issue and seeks to root its 
decision in the statute. 
This, it seems, is what Mr. Justice Brennan did in the Street 
case. By asking a deceptively naive question of the legislative 
history, he was able, in writing the Court's opinion, to protect 
simultaneously the political freedom of the union member and 
leave the question of the extent of that freedom in the legislative 
!!O On this question, compare Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and 
"Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961), with Note, Discrimination in Union 
Membership: Denial of Due Process under Federal Collective Bargaining Legislation, 12 
RUTGERS L. REV. 543 (1958). 
so See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 358-76, and the discussion in Part III infra. 
31 Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 Omo 
ST. L.J. 21 (1961). 
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domain. The burden has been placed upon those who would 
weaken individual freedom to secure legislation to achieve that 
result. In short, Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion reflects a basic 
sympathy with the attitude of Justices Black and Douglas on the 
question of individual freedom, coupled wiµi an unwillingness 
to fetter the legislature with a decision based on constitutional 
grounds. 
D. Union-Member Relations 
The Street decision bodes well for maximization of individual 
freedom against and within the group in the organized society. 
These groups have demonstrated little interest in protecting their 
members from themselves, save for the enlightened example of the 
United Automobile Workers' Public Review Board.32 More likely, 
the groups will seek legislative action which will increase their 
power over their members. However, legislation which destroys or 
overtly minimizes individual freedoms will not gain popular sup-
port. Individualism is still the language of national political de-
bate, even if the facts of associational life have rendered the con-
cept less meaningful. The result is that the legislature is usually 
immobilized on the issue of individual versus group. Therefore, 
the decisions of the courts, either under the common law or in the 
interpretation of statutes, have more than transient significance. 
In the main, if the courts protect freedoms, the protection will 
stand. If they do not, then the freedoms will receive no legal 
protection. If the Court had held in Street that the dues of the 
dissenters could be used for political purposes, that would have 
ended the matter. The present decision, which for practical pur-
poses is also final, ends the matter by protecting individual freedom 
against all but explicit-and unlikely-legislative restriction. 
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the unions will face 
serious financial problems as a result of the decision. Most union 
members are sufficiently aware of the correlation between union 
political activity and the effectiveness of the union as an economic 
force so that they will continue to pay their dues and allow them 
to be used for political purposes. In fact, the unions may gain 
because the dissenters have an opportunity to withdraw their 
dues, in that the unions can make a more genuine claim to repre-
32 See STIEBER, OBERER & HARRINGTON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC R£vmw (1961); Brooks, 
Impartial Public Review of Internal Union Disputes: Experiment in Democratic Self· 
Discipline, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 64 (1961); Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Rei•iew of Labor: 
Some Reflections, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 55 (1959). 
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senting the authentic political voice of those workers who have 
not withdrawn their dues. Additionally, it is not easy for the dis-
senter to withdraw his dues. He must personally claim a refund. 
The device of class actions proposed in Street was rejected. Thus, 
only the dissenter with the courage of his conviction will gain by 
the decision. 
Mr. Justice Brennan's conclusion in the Street case is support-
able by reference to still other considerations. In 194 7, Congress 
prohibited a labor union from making any "contribution or ex-
penditure" in connection with elections which are subject to 
congressional regulation.33 This statute clearly reflects the desire 
of Congress that union funds not be spent for political purposes. 
Mr. Justice Brennan might have supported his interpretation of 
the union-shop provisions of the RLA by construing them in light 
of this announced legislative policy disfavoring union political 
activity. 
Of course, the constitutionality of the 1947 provision restrict-
ing union political activity is quite doubtful.34 Perhaps this is 
why Mr. Justice Brennan did not utilize the statute as a manifesta-
tion of congressional policy.35 Even if the provision is unconstitu-
tional, however, it suggests the direction of congressional thinking 
about unions and politics. Mr. Justice Brennan may have correctly 
reconciled congressional policies which simultaneously recognized 
the legitimacy of the union shop and sought to minimize the 
union's financial participation in politics. 
Ironically, if we conclude that the dues of the dissenters may 
not be used for political purposes over their objection, it is clear 
that the 1947 statute limiting the political activities of unions is 
an unconstitutional invasion of the right to associate for political 
purposes. The dues used for political purposes become, in a mean-
ingful sense, "voluntary contributions" since the members have 
an option to prevent such use. Consequently, it seems clearly be-
yond the power of Congress to restrain individuals from making 
33 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 62 Stat. 723 (1948), as amended, 63 Stat. 90 (1949), 
a~ amended, 65 Stat. 718 (1951), 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958). See Lane, Political Expenditures 
by Labor Unions, 9 LAB. L.J. 725 (1958), for a discussion of the course of litigation under 
this statute and its predecessors. 
34 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
35 Mr. Justice Brennan did indicate, in 367 U.S. at 773 n.21, that "no contention was 
made below or here that any of the expenditures involved in this case were made in 
violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 •.. or any state corrupt 
practices legislation." 
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such contributions for political purposes through their associa-
tions.36 
Three elements-protection of constitutional yalues on non-
constitutional grounds, implementation of a legislative policy 
restricting the political activity of labor organizations expressed 
in the Taft-Hartley Act, and certain expressions in the legislative 
history of the Taft-Hartley Act37-suggest that the Street doctrine 
is not limited to cases arising under the Railway Labor Act, but 
is equally applicable to union-shop agreements under the National 
Labor Relations Act.38 Thus, the decision protects the right of 
political dissent in all areas regulated by federal labor legislation. 
86 See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). A six-to-three majority refused 
to pass on the constitutionality of the 1947 legislation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated 
issues which might be relevant on the question of constitutionality. One of these issues 
was whether the funds may "be fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis." 
The answer to this question, in the light of the Street decision, is in the affirmative, 
since the dissident can withdraw his support from undesired political activities. 
Justices "\\Tarren, Black. and Douglas dissented, on the ground that the statute was 
an invasion of freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment. 
In view of the Street decision, it would appear that the legislation violates the 
individual rights of the contributors. Hence, it would not be necessary to consider the 
additional proposition, relied on by the dissent in the UAW case, that the statute 
also improperly infringes on the rights of the association, qua association, to engage 
in political activity. On this question in general, see HoRN, op. cit. supra note 3. 
87 Senator Ellender, a supporter of the abolition of the closed shop, indicated that 
he wanted to avoid the result in the case of DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 
31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 906 (1948), in which a union 
member who refused to contribute to a political cause in which he did not believe was 
ousted from the union and prevented from working. See 93 CoNG. REc. 4138 (1947); 
II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 1061 (1948). 
Senator Taft, sponsor of the act, justified retention of the permission for the union-
shop agreement on the ground that it prevented "free riders." He said: "[W]hat we do, 
in effect, is say that no one can get a free ride in such a shop. That meets one of the 
arguments for the union shop. The employee has to pay the union dues." 93 CoNG. REc. 
3837 (1947); II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF' 1947, 
at 1010 (1948). The reference to the avoidance of a "free ride" suggests that the union 
shop was designed to compel payment for collective bargaining activities about as 
forcefully as do similar references in the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act 
union-shop amendment relied on by the majority in Street. 
38 Wellington, in Machinists v. Street; Statutory Interpretation and the .Avoidance of 
Constitutional Issues, 1961 SUPREME CoURT REv. 49, concludes that the Street decision 
is inapplicable to the NLRA's union-shop provision because under the NLRA, as dis-
tinguished from the RLA, Congress was not cutting back on the freedom given to 
dissenting employees, and the unions regulated under the NLRA have been interested 
in union security. Id. at 70. 
However, the materials cited in note 37 supra suggest that, on the level of legislative 
history, an argument analogous to that advanced in Street can be made. More im-
portantly, if the consideration~ discussed in the text supply the basis for the Street 
decision, they are equally applicable under the NLRA. Hence, the decision is properly 
treated as final under the present federal labor legislation, both under the RLA and the 
NLRA. 
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"[T]raditionally democratic means of improving their union may be freely 
availed of by members without fear of harm or penalty. And this necessarily 
includes the right to criticize current union leadership and, within the union, 
to oppose such leadership and its policies ..•• The price of free expression and 
of political opposition within a union cannot be the risk of expulsion or other 
disciplinary ai;tion. In the final analysis, a labor union profits, as does any 
democratic body, more by permitting free expression and free political opposi• 
tion than it may ever lose from any disunity that it may thus evidence." Judge 
Stanley H. Fuld (1958).39 
Prior to 1959, legal protection for the union member's right 
to engage in political activity within the union had been devel-
oped by the courts in a series of cases dealing with the expulsion 
of members. The theories with which the courts regulated the 
internal political affairs of unions-contract, property, natural 
justice or public policy-were discussed with devastating clarity by 
Professor Chafee in his classic article in the Harvard Law Review 
in 1930.40 To him, the underlying basis for judicial interference 
in union affairs was not expressed by any of these doctrines. 
"The member's relation to the association is the true subject 
matter of protection in most cases where relief is given against 
wrongful expulsions. The wrong is a tort, not a breach of 
contract, and the tort consists in the destruction of the rela-
tion rather than in a deprivation of the remote and conjec-
tural right to receive property."41 
The application ·of common-law principles relating to private as-
sociations to the union-member relationship has been ably charted 
by Professor Summers.42 By 1958, the courts had finally articulated 
the policies which had led them to protect the union-member rela-
tionship in connection with internal union politics. The key deci-
sion was Madden v. Atkins,43 with the quotation that appears at the 
beginning of this section. The New York Court of Appeals held in 
Madden that the union member had a right, protected by the law 
of torts, to engage in political activity within the union. A scant 
year later, the problems of fitting common-law principles to the 
30 Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 640 
(1958). 
40 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv. 993 
(1930). 
41 Id. at 1007. 
42 Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1951); 
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 
175 (1960). 
43 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d '73, 1'74 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958). See Summers, The Law of 
Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, '70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960). 
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new economic institution of unionism were submerged by the 
adoption of far-reaching federal legislation. Titles I to VI of the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195944 (here-
after referred to as the LMRDA) regulate, in a mass of detail, many 
of the facets of internal union affairs. The rights of individuals to 
participate in the political processes of the union are treated by 
Titles I and IV of the LMRDA.45 Title I guarantees to the union 
member the right to attend membership meetings, to speak on 
subjects relating to union activity without discrimination, to nomi-
nate candidates, to vote in elections, and to participate in the 
affairs of the union. Title I also protects an individual against 
retaliation by the union because he institutes an action in a court 
or a proceeding before an administrative agency. It requires that 
disciplinary action be taken only upon notice, opportunity to pre-
pare a defense, and full and fair hearing. 
Title IV, in dealing with union elections, guarantees the right 
of a member to be a candidate and to hold office, and to vote for 
and support the candidacy of others. It seeks to insure the regular-
ity of elections, guarantees that the candidate shall have certain 
rights to inspect membership lists, to distribute literature by mail 
and not to be disadvantaged in connection with costs of the elec-
tion by the incumbent. Elections are required to be by secret 
ballot. Enforcement of the election provisions of the act is vested 
in the Secretary of Labor. 
The scheme for enforcement and implementation of the legis-
lative policy appears to be all-embracing. But the statute has three 
major defects which minimize the protection it affords against 
discrimination or retaliation by an antagonistic union leadership. 
A. Membership 
First, the statute does not entitle all employees represented 
by the union to membership.46 Yet, all such employees are directly 
44 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
45 For general discussions of the LMRDA, see Aaron, The Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 1086 (1960); Smith, The 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 195 (1960). 
46 The definition of "member" which determines entitlement to protection of the 
act is found in § 3(o), 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(0) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
"Member" or "member in good standing" includes "any person who has fulfilled 
the requirements for membership in such organization and [who has not withdrawn or 
been properly expelled]." This language was held sufficiently broad to entitle a member 
of one local (and the international) to be admitted to another local. Hughes v. Local 
11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961). 
But the section has been held not to require the admission of a person with no previous 
union connection when one of the "requirements for admission" is a vote by the 
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affected by union decisions in negotiation and administration of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Elementary principles of 
democratic organization entitle those directly affected by the 
union's activities to participate in the formulation of the policies 
under which they will work. Notwithstanding this congressional 
inaction, the courts may require the union to admit, as to those 
aspects of union activities which relate to collective bargaining, 
all of the employees who are represented by it.47 This result can-
not, however, be based on the legislation of 1959 which was silent 
in regard to the ability of the union to determine its own member-
ship. 
B. Candidacy for Union Office 
Second, the rights of members to speak and deliberate, discuss 
and vote, are guaranteed in Title I of the act, which affords a civil 
remedy for violation of these rights in suits brought in a federal 
district court. But a key to political participation in the affairs of 
the union is the ability to hold union office. The right to be a 
candidate is not recognized in Title I at all. It is found only in 
Title IV. Title IV is administered by the Secretary of Labor, but 
only after an election. The act provides no express protection 
against union action prior to an election which improperly ex-
cludes a candidate from the ballot or otherwise discriminates 
against him. A pre-election challenge to such actions must be 
based on the member's right to enforce the constitution and by-
laws of the union, a right which existed under state law prior to, 
and independent of, federal law. Since the right is defined by 
state law, it is subject to no uniform national standards, and 
enforced by no administrative agency. 
Thus, in regard to the critical period during which the polit-
ical rights of the union member may be frustrated, the LMRDA's 
provisions are silent. This particular gap in the legislation is im-
portant. No post-election remedy can make whole a candidate 
whose name has been removed from, or prevented from appear-
ing on, the ballot. The vigor of his campaign may have been dis-
sipated in ways beyond repair once the election is over. 
Either of two constructions of the statute would partially 
correct this defect. If the right to be a candidate were subsumed 
membership. Moynahan v. Pari-Mutual Employees Guild, 53 L.R.R.M. 2154 (10th Cir. 
1963). 
47 See Blumrosen, supra note 31, for a more extensive discussion of this problem. 
See also Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUllr. 
L. REv. 563 (1962). 
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under Title I, a federal district court could protect that right 
prior to the election. While the right to be a candidate is con-
spicuous by its absence from Title I,48 the right to nominate and 
vote for a candidate is expressly protected. Since the right to 
nominate and vote is hollow if the nominated candidate has been 
denied a place on the ballot, this right should be read as including 
a right to have the nominee on the ballot. The member, rather 
than the candidate, would have to initiate legal action to protect 
the candidate's appearance on the ballot, but this scarcely seems 
to present a major difficulty.49 
A second line of analysis has been developed by Professor 
Summers. He argues that Title IV may be fully enforced in 
state courts prior to an election, and after the election only by 
the Secretary of Labor.50 If his argument were to be adopted, the 
objection to the legislation would be obviated. It is difficult, how-
ever, to see why Congress would allow only the state courts to act 
in this area, since, in virtually all other areas regarding members' 
48 The partial overlap between Title I and Title IV has been explored by a number 
of courts in suits by disgruntled candidates for union office. The cases decided thus far 
suggest that the post-election remedies under Title IV not only foreclose other post-
election remedies, but also prevent the district courts from protecting any of the candi-
dates' rights prior to an election under § 102. The courts assume that Title IV gives 
all the protection to a candidate that Congress intended, and that the candidate cannot 
protect his rights before an election under Title I. See Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 
304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962), which discusses the cases. 
Mamula involved an attack on an election which had been conducted before the case 
was decided by the court of appeals. In a similar case, decided less than a month after 
Mamula, the same circuit held that once an election had been conducted, the exclusive 
post-election remedies of Title IV foreclosed further judicial action. The court felt that 
its opinion "would be advisory and of no immediate consequence to the parties," and 
dismissed the case. However, the court reserved the question of "whether a federal court 
can grant relief under the Act before an election is held." Colpo v. Highway Truck 
Drivers, 305 F.2d 362, 363 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). Colpo thus casts 
considerable doubt on the vitality of the decision in Mamula, since it seeks to reserve 
judgment on issues which had been previously resolved in Mamula. 
49 One of the bases of the decision against the union in Mamula v. United Steel-
workers, 198 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1961), was that the procedure involved in selecting 
nominees for district director of the union was in violation of the right to nominate a 
candidate for union office because the system favored the incumbent officers. The court 
of appeals reversed, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962), stating that plaintiff had "ample 
opportunity to nominate candidates." Id. at 113. This suggests either that the court 
of appeals disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the nomination process 
was not meaningful, or that the court of appeals had refused to inquire into the 
significance of a nomination if the right to nominate was formally recognized. The 
continuing validity of the Mamula decision is questioned in note 48 supra. 
The argument that the Title I right to nominate and vote for a candidate includes 
the right to have the nominee on the ballot was rejected in Jackson v. International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962). 
50 summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 
22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119, 135-40 (1961). 
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rights, a federal cause of action was created. For this reason, such 
an analysis does not seem convincing. 
In any event, the process of interpretation will not provide 
the candidate with pre-election protection of as high a quality 
as that available under the post-election remedy. Post-election 
complaints are handled through the administrative process within 
the office of the Department of Labor, while pre-election com-
plaints must be handled through the judicial process, with all 
of its limitations in terms of counsel fees, inexpert counsel, judges 
unfamiliar with labor relations problems, and the absence of the 
informal investigative and settlement procedures available to 
administration. Only congressional action vesting pre-election as 
well as post-election supervision in the Secretary of Labor can 
provide complete protection. 
C. Right To Sue 
The third weakness in the statutory scheme lies in the com-
plexity of the statutory language relating to the right of the union 
member to sue his union. Section 10l(a)(4) provides that a mem-
ber "may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures 
(but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such or-
ganization before instituting legal or administrative proceedings 
against such organizations or any officer thereof .... " 
It has been argued by Solicitor General Cox that Congress, by 
the passage of this section, added a statutory requirement of ex-
haustion of remedies to the existing common-law exhaustion re-
quirement. Under this construction, the statute gives a union the 
right to demand compliance with internal procedures for a maxi-
mum of four months, at the end of which time a court may 
require further exhaustion by reference to the common-law prin-
ciple. Such a construction reflects more confidence in the internal 
review procedures of the union than Congress manifested.51 It 
51 Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 103-06 (1960). The real!Oning which 
led Professor Cox to his construction of the section may be set out as follows: (1) The 
language of the section refers to union actions which limit the employee's right to 
sue, not to the judicial doctrine of exhaustion. Section IO(a)(4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 
U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1963) reads, in relevant part: "(4) Protection of the Right 
to Sue.-No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute 
an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective 
of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or re-
spondents in such action or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such 
action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a 
witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any 
legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member 
may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-
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has not been adopted by the courts. They have considered the 
statutory exhaustion requirement to be in lieu of the common-law 
requirement. The courts may not require the member to exhaust 
union remedies for more than four months. 52 The union may re-
quire what it will in its constitution, but unless a reasonable 
hearing procedure can be followed within four months, exhaustion 
is not required. In any event, when four months are up, the statu-
tory exhaustion requirement is satisfied. 
The correctness of the courts' view that the statutory exhaus-
tion requirement is in lieu of rather than in addition to the 
common-law requirement becomes evident upon a consideration 
of the different functions of the common-law and statutory require-
ments of exhaustion of internal union remedies. 
month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative 
proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof •••. " 
Cox's argument has merit insofar as it applies to the introductory sentence of the 
statute. But, the language which contains the four-month limitation is found in the first 
proviso. This proviso is not clearly directed at either union action or at judicial action. 
If it is assumed that the section is directed at union action, it can only be implemented 
by the judiciary and may be viewed, as may any law, as a direction to the court not to 
honor internal union remedies beyond the four-month period. 
(2) The exhaustion doctrine applies in state courts, and it "seems unlikely that 
Congress would so lightly sweep aside state rules of judicial administration." Id. at 105. 
(Emphasis added.) But Congress was legislating to protect employee access to the courts. 
If this access was being unwisely blocked by a judicially invented doctrine of exhaustion, 
Congress could limit that doctrine. In any event, Congress was explicitly dealing with 
employee rights in the federal courts-see § 102-and is perfectly free to regulate the 
federal use of the doctrine of exhaustion. The question of whether the rights secured 
by § 101, in an action in the federal courts under § 102, may also be secured by an 
action in state courts is one which need not be dealt with when construing § I0I(a)(4). 
That problem need only be faced when § 101 is asserted in state courts. The meaning of 
§ 101 should be determined without regard to considerations of federal-state relations 
since a federal action is contemplated by § 102. 
(3) If the section applies to the exhaustion doctrine, perhaps the courts must allow 
the union to require exhaustion of internal remedies for four months, regardless of cir-
cumstances, and thus may delay access to the NLRB for the purpose of filing charges 
under the NLRA. These conclusions lack persuasiveness. The statute uses the permis-
sive may in describing the four-month rule, and the courts can apply their good sense 
to the questions of when the rule will be applied and when immediate access to ju-
dicial or administrative tribunals will be permitted. There is no reason to assume that 
they would read the section as limiting, in any way, employee access to the NLRB. 
(4) The application of § 101(a)(4) to the judicial doctrine of exhaustion may overturn 
the rule prohibiting employees from suing for breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment without exhausting contractual remedies, and may either interfere with contracts 
which provide that the individual's right is confined to arbitration or upset adjustments 
of grievances negotiated by union and employer. This criticism attributes too much 
meaning to § 10l(a)(4). The section does not affect other rules of judicial self-restraint 
which are rooted in considerations other than those relating to internal union affairs. 
It has no direct bearing on the other questions raised by Professor Cox except to sug-
gest, in a most general sense, a more active role for the courts in these matters. 
52 The leading case is Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 36_!> U.S. 929 (1961). 
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I. The Common-Law Exhaustion Concept 
The common-law doctrine requiring the union member to 
utilize internal review procedures before seeking equitable relief 
against an expulsion was adopted against a background of confusion 
as to the basic legal theory regulating the relation of union and 
member.53 The doctrine has been defended on three grounds.54 
The first justification is that judicial effort may be conserved in 
those cases which can be satisfactorily disposed of by internal 
union action. This conservation may, however, be illusory, since, 
at common law, the exhaustion requirement was applied only 
after the court had heard the merits of the case.55 Secondly, 
it has been contended that the processing of a member's case 
within the union might shape the issues and the evidence so as 
to enable the court to handle the matter more wisely. But union 
procedures are normally so informal that they do not provide a 
record of sufficient clarity and definiteness either to shape the issues 
or permit a limited scope of judicial review.56 This leaves only the 
third justification, the promotion of the democratic values of self-
government and private decision-making, to be considered. This 
justification is intimately related to the theory that the union-
member relationship is governed by a contract voluntarily entered 
into between union and member. Since the parties have decided by 
contract to utilize internal review proceedings before resorting to 
courts, this expression of their wishes should be honored. 
The attempt to justify the exhaustion doctrine on contract 
53 See text at note 40 supra. See also Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Disci-
pline, 64 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1049, 1086-92 (1951); Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Rem-
edies, 2 I.An. L.J. 487 (1951); Annot., Exhaustion of Remedies Within Labor Union as 
Condition of Resort to Civil Courts by Expelled or Suspended Member, 168 A.L.R. 1462 
(1947); Note, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L.J. 
369 (1956). 
114 See the discussion in Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 
79 (2d Cir. 1961). 
55 See Note, supra note 53. 
li6 Summers, supra note 43, at 186-87. However, see Phillips v. Teamsters Union, 
209 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1962), where a member, suspended for riotous conduct at a 
union meeting, was afforded a trial de novo before the union trial body pursuant to 
a stipulation entered in his action under Title I of the LMRDA. He was found guilty 
after this trial and subsequently sought to secure a de novo hearing of the facts in the 
federal district court. The court, however, refused to apply a more stringent review 
standard than that applied to a trial court or an administrative agency. It even sug-
gested that the union decision might have finality. On review of the record, the court 
held that the union decision was amply supported by evidence. Since the case did not 
involve allegations that the member was suspended for exercising rights protected by 
the LMRDA, but rather that he had not done the acts which, if proved, would have 
justified the suspension, it is of course not authority for the scope of review when a 
violation of LMRDA rights is alleged. 
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principles is inadequate because the terms of the contract-the 
constitution and the bylaws of the union-are beyond the control 
of the individual union member. He has no choice but to accept 
them or remain outside the union. The union-member "contract" 
is as much a contract of adhesion, with the terms already set and 
beyond bargaining, as is the typical automobile sales contract.57 
It is incumbent upon the courts to interpret, construe and apply 
this "contract" so as to preserve those interests of the weaker party 
which are entitled to judicial protection. Thus, even under a 
"contract" analysis, the application of the exhaustion of remedies 
requirement is subject to judicial policy considerations. 
On a more abstract level, the argument which supports the 
exhaustion requirement, as a means of preserving private decision-
making, must face the fact that unions have not generally devel-
oped independent judicial machinery.58 Consequently, the exist-
ing union decisional machinery does not inspire confidence that 
the merits of a case will prevail. Furthermore, if the member has 
sued without protecting his right to proceed internally, a denial 
on exhaustion grounds may entirely terminate his claim, since 
many union constitutions limit the time for appeal. 
For these reasons, the courts were reluctant to apply the ex-
haustion doctrine if the member was, on the merits, entitled to 
prevail. This, I think, explains why the courts initially heard 
the merits of every case, even those ultimately dismissed on the 
ground that internal remedies had not been exhausted. 
Prior to the LMRDA, then, the courts usually handled union-
member disputes in the following manner: (1) The court would 
hear the merits of the case.59 (2) If, after hearing the merits, the 
court concluded that the member was entitled to prevail, it 
would avoid the exhaustion requirement by applying an excep-
tion. 60 (3) If the court did not believe plaintiff was entitled to 
57 See Grodin, Legal Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, in PUBLIC POLICY AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 182, 189-90 (Shister, Aaron &: Summers ed. 1962). For a discussion 
of the law in the automobile contract situation, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness 
for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 493, 540 (1962). 
58 See BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONS 29-35 (1959); Summers, Disciplinary Proce-
dures of Unions, 4 IND. &: LAB. REL. REv. 15 (1950). 
59 See Summers, supra note 43, at 207-12; Note, supra note 53, at 385. 
60 This point is made clear in connection with procedural matters in Annot., Ex-
haustion of Remedies Within Labor Union as Condition of Resort to Civil Courts by 
Expelled or Suspended Member, 168 A.L.R. 1462, 1469 (1947): "[T]he rule as to exhaus-
tion of internal remedies presupposes a legal and regular proceeding for suspension or 
expulsion." 
In discussing the principle that, "if the action of the union is without jurisdiction, 
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prevail, it would apply the doctrine and leave the member to the 
judgment of the union tribunal.61 The decision to require ex-
haustion of internal remedies was a clear expression of the court's 
view of the merits of the case. It was a procedural way of stating 
a substantive conclusion. 
2. Exhaustion of Remedies Under the LMRDA 
Under the LMRDA, the function of the exhaustion of remedies 
doctrine is vastly different. Congress took seriously the contention 
that democratic values require that the union be allowed a genuine 
opportunity to correct its own mistakes. The statutory exhaustion 
of remedies doctrine is designed to provide a time period within 
which this purpose might be achieved. Its nature is purely proce-
dural. The exhaustion concept has been drained of the sub-
stantive implications which it had at common law. The basic dif-
ference between the statutory and common-law exhaustion 
concepts is that the statutory exhaustion doctrine may be applied 
or is without notice or authority or not in compliance with the rules or constitutional 
provisions, or is void for any reason," the exhaustion doctrine does not apply, Professor 
Summers, supra note 43, at 210, stated: "It is apparent that this exception is capable 
of completely swallowing the rule, for it is applicable to every case in which the dis-
ciplined member has a meritorious claim. Contrary to the other exceptions, it has no 
visible roots in any of the policies underlying the rule, but under the thin verbal dis-
guise of 'no jurisdiction' and 'void' it repudiates the rule and its policies. This excep-
tion, like other exceptions, is not consistently applied, but it is used frequently and is 
always available for courts to use when they feel the need to grant relief." 
61 Professor Summers, who has investigated this problem more extensively than any-
one else, has produced two sets of interesting statistics on the role of the exhaustion 
doctrine. 
In Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1092 (1951), 
after examining all the reported decisions, he stated: "The general repudiation of both 
the exhaustion rule and its underlying policy is clearly revealed by a brief tabulation 
of the court decisions. Out of about 200 cases in which exhaustion of remedies was a 
potential issue, it was actually mentioned in 98. Out of these 98 cases, the courts used 
exceptions to excuse exhaustion in 60, and in 16 others discussed the merits and found 
the discipline entirely proper. In only 22 cases out of 200 did the courts rely on the 
exhaustion requirement as the principal ground for refusing to grant relief." 
In 1960, Professor Summers reported on his extensive examination of cases which 
had been decided in the state of New York in a ten-year period. Summers, supra note 43. 
After discussing the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, Professor Summers concluded: 
"These multiple exceptions have obviously removed the requirement of exhaustion as 
an insuperable obstacle to judicial intervention. Systematic study of the cases shows 
that by applying the exceptions courts have sapped the rule of almost all vitality except 
in random cases. Out of more than 100 discipline cases, the rule has been applied in 
20, but even this may exaggerate its importance. In seven of those cases, the court's 
opinion makes clear on its face that the plaintiff's case had no merit or was proce-
durally defective, and that failure to exhaust was added only as a makeweight. In six, 
suit was brought even before the union trial body had made a decision, and in none 
of these was there any clear error shown in the proceedings. The remaining seven 
cases ••. are not all of one piece." Id. at 210. 
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by the court on the moving papers without reaching toward a 
decision on the merits.62 
The LMRDA allows the courts, at their discretion, to disregard 
the requirement of exhaustion. But the courts can protect the 
value of internal union decision, and also protect the member, by 
granting temporary relief while the member pursues his remedy 
within the union. With such temporary relief to protect him from 
immediate harm, the union member should be required to pursue 
his internal remedy, if such a remedy is clearly available.63 Thus 
the court need not pass on the merits during the period in which 
exhaustion of internal remedies is required. 
D. LMRDA Standards Governing Union Action 
This reading of section 10l(a)(4) gives the union greater free-
dom from judicial supervision during the first four months after 
62 Three state courts have recently held that a union member who sues the union 
alleging improper handling of an internal matter must plead either that he has ex• 
hausted his internal remedies or has been excused therefrom. Knox v. Local 900, UA,v, 
361 Mich. 257, 104 N.W.2d 743 (1960); Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 
161 A.2d 603 (1960); Kopke v. Ranny, 16 Wis. 369, 114 N.W.2d 485 (1962). One lower 
state court has gone farther and held that a general allegation of exhaustion of internal 
remedies is not sufficient. The member must indicate with particularity the remedies 
he has utilized. Local 2, Int'l Org. of Masters v. International Org. of Masters, 50 L.R.R.M. 
2167 (Pa. C.P. 1962). 
On the other hand, one federal district court has held that the plaintiff need not 
plead exhaustion of internal union remedies to survive a motion to dismiss, but that 
the factual basis for the exception to the exhaustion requirement must await trial on 
the merits. Deluhery v. Marine Cooks Union, 49 L.R.R.M. 2756 (S.D. Cal. 1961). If, 
as a matter of substance, the federal courts under § 10l(a)(4) limit themselves to granting 
temporary relief within the four-month period, the important allegations in the plead-
ing should deal with the question of whether temporary relief should be granted. The 
pleadings should disclose facts relating to exhaustion. Thus, the state pleading cases 
cited above seem more consonant with the substantive law which limits federal courts 
to temporary relief within the four-month period. 
Another approach which satisfies the mandate of § 10l(a)(4) was adopted in Light 
v. Erskine, 47 L.R.R.M. 2276 (W.D. Mich. 1960), where the court stayed an action under 
the LMRDA pending the expiration of the requisite period. 
63 In Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
366 U.S. 929 (1961), the court of appeals reversed a dismissal for failure to exhaust 
internal union remedies, stating: "[\V]here the internal union remedy is uncertain and 
has not been specifically brought to the attention of the disciplined party, the violation 
of federal law clear and undisputed, and the injury to the union member immediate 
and difficult to compensate by means of a subsequent money award, exhaustion of union 
remedies ought not to be required." Id. at 81. The case was remanded with instruc-
tions to grant a temporary injunction against the disciplining, which, in that case, con-
sisted of blacklisting the member in the union's publication. 
After the temporary injunction was issued by the district court, defendant union filed 
an answer raising a number of issues not presented to the court of appeals, including 
the question of plaintiff's status as a dues-paying member in good standing. Plaintiff 
moved to make the injunction permanent and for an assessment of damages, but the 
district court denied the motion, pending further development of facts relative to the 
defenses and the disposition by the Supreme Court of a petition for certiorari. 48 
L.R.R.M. 2652 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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disciplining a member than did the common law. Thereafter, 
union decisions are subjected to a more extensive judicial scrutiny 
than was the case at common law. The federal courts are required 
by the LMRDA to measure the union discipline against two stat-
utory standards, procedural and substantive. 
Procedural. The procedure by which the disciplining was im-
posed must have afforded the member notice, opportunity to pre-
pare a defense, and "full and fair" hearing under section IOI(a)(5). 
All union disciplinary action must meet this standard, whether or 
not it infringed on any other rights of the member.64 In deciding 
whether a full and fair hearing has been given by the union, the 
courts must necessarily examine the evidence presented before the 
union tribunal. The scope of this judicial review is now being 
established by the courts. If the substantive claim of the member 
is that his rights under the union constitution or bylaws have been 
infringed, the courts may continue to apply the "substantial-evi-
dence" test developed at common law.65 How significant this stand-
ard is as a limitation on judicial action is difficult to determine. 
Professor Summers believes that the courts have not in fact been 
limited by this formulation.66 
The courts are free to adopt standards of review in these cases 
which will encourage the union to develop impartial internal re-
view channels, such as those found in the UAW's Public Review 
Board, and in the Upholsterers' Union. 67 If the courts were to 
give more deference to decisions of such tribunals than to deci-
sions emanating from the usual union appellate process, the de-
velopment of impartial review machinery might be promoted. 
64 See, e.g., Rekant v. Shocp.tay-Gasos Union, 205 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
ms For a discussion of the substantial-evidence test, see Summers, supra note 53, at 
1084; Summers, supra note 43, at 185. For a case applying the test under the LMRDA, 
see Phillips v. Teamsters Union, 209 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1962). 
In Robinson v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 52 L.R.R.M. 2703 (W.D. Wash. 
1963), the court said: "[T)he1e was evidence on which the trial body could have relied 
in support of its findings and conclusions, and it is not the function of this court to 
evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses in order to substitute 
its own judgment for that of the trial body as to the sufficiency and weight of the 
evidence." The union action was upheld. In Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 
52 L.R.R.M. 2872 (D. Conn. 1963), the court stated the other side of the coin: "[I)n 
determining whether a full and fair hearing has been granted, it is within the province 
of the Court to satisfy itself that the findings and conclusions of the presiding trial 
hearing officer .•• are sufficient as a matter of law to sustain a finding of guilt. ·where 
the record clearly indicates that the rule of law upon which conclusions were reached 
was in error, then such findings and conclusions should be set aside." The discipline in 
this case was set aside. 
oo Summers, supra note 43, at 185. 
07 For a discussion of the functioning of the Public Review Board, see material 
cited in note 32 supra. 
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This approach would satisfactorily resolve the dilemma created 
by the LMRDA requirement of a "fair hearing," unaccompanied 
by a requirement of an impartial tribunal. 
Substantive. The second type of standard against which union 
disciplining must be measured under the LMRDA is substantive 
in nature. Rights to participate in union activities are protected 
by Title I from union retaliation and discrimination. The 
LMRDA, in implementing this protection, imposes absolute limits 
on the power of the union to take disciplinary action. Transgres-
sion of these limits may be the subject of a federal district court 
action. 68 Since the opportunity for union self-correction is equally 
important in cases involving alleged violations of LMRDA sub-
stantive rights, the statutory exhaustion principle applies in this 
area also.69 However, the responsibility of the district courts at 
the expiration of the four-month period is different in these cases 
from those involving rights claimed under the union constitu-
tion and bylaws. Where substantive rights protected by the 
LMRDA are involved, application of the "substantial-evidence" 
test would allow the union tribunal to determine if the union 
had violated the LMRDA. Therefore, a de novo consideration of 
the facts by the district court is required. It is nonetheless useful, 
for two reasons, to require the member who claims a violation of 
LMRDA substantive rights to exhaust his intra-union remedies 
during the four-month period: first, settlements may be possible; 
and secondly, the LMRDA, in some cases, requires the court to 
judge the reasonableness of the union's conduct. This judgment 
can be facilitated if the union has developed the case from its 
perspective through the internal union processes. The cases in 
which reasonableness must be evaluated include: 
68 "Sec. 102. [29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. IV, 1963)] Any person whose rights secured by 
the provisions of [Title I] have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring 
a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunc-
tions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be 
brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the alleged 
violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located. 
"Sec. 103. [29 U.S.C. § 413 (Supp. IV, 1963)] Nothing contained in this title shall 
limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State 
or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and 
bylaws of any labor organization .... 
"Sec. 609. [29 U.S.C. § 529 (Supp. IV, 1963)] It shall be unlawful for any labor or-
ganization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organ-
ization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of 
its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this 
Act. The provisions of section 102 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section." 
69 Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
366 U.S. 929 (1961). 
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(a) Cases in which the employee claims his LMRDA rights 
were violated while the union claims he was disciplined for some 
permissible reason other than a violation of his statutory rights. 
In these "dual motive" cases, the courts may well be influenced 
in their decision by a well-developed record within the union 
review channels. 
(b) Cases in which the exercise of LMRDA rights is limited 
by reasonable qualifications which may be imposed by the union. 
In these cases, the development of a record by union tribunals 
may be important to an accurate judicial determination of whether 
the disciplining imposed was within the area of discretion left 
to the union. 70 
The common-law and statutory concepts of exhaustion of 
remedies serve different ends and cannot be considered as com-
plementary. The courts have correctly treated the statutory ex-
haustion requirement as a legislative substitute for the common-
law exhaustion requirement. 
E. The Approach of Counsel 
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine is a rule of administrative 
convenience which, in one sense, is addressed to lawyers whose 
belief that there is only one correct road to relief requires that 
they choose between the internal union remedy and going into 
court. Plaintiff's counsel in many cases need not make any such 
choice. To avoid being trapped by the doctrine of exhaustion in 
uncertain situations, it is proper to proceed simultaneously within 
the union and to begin a judicial proceeding. It is better to pursue 
the various alternative than to lose the case because the alternatives 
exist. 
An additional dimension of the problem of protecting the 
union member involves the role of counsel. Today, most of the 
members of the bar who understand the intricacies of labor 
relations represent either management or unions or both. These 
attorneys may be hesitant to take an individual's claim against 
either union or management, and the individual may be reluc-
tant to retain them. The individual then must seek counsel from 
among general practitioners who are neither attuned to labor 
70 The "equal· rights" to nominate, vote, attend and participate in union meetings 
guaranteed under § lOl(a)(l) are subject to "reasonable rules and regulations." Freedom 
of speech for union members protected in 10l(a)(2) is subject to "published and reason-
able rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings," and the right of the union to adopt 
and enforce "reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the 
organization •••• " See Phillips v. Teamsters Union, 209 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1962). 
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relations nor well versed in the law relating to internal union af-
fairs. This imbalance in representation aggravates the weaknesses 
of the statute. The answer to this problem may lie, as it has in 
other areas, in having an administrative agency act as counsel for 
the employee. The seeds of this idea are present in the NLRB 
proceedings and in the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor over 
union elections. Alternatively, it is possible that the answer may 
lie in a legal profession more adequately prepared to represent 
the individual. 
The employee has his greatest protection against union action 
in the general political realm. He is now reasonably protected in 
the realm of internal union affairs. But the contrast between both 
of these areas and the law relating to employee rights concerning 
economic matters is sharp and startling. In connection with eco-
nomic matters, the union-particularly when it acts in conjunc-
tion with the employer-has heretofore been allowed to exercise 
nearly absolute power over the claims of the individual employees. 
Ill. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
"The task of this Court to maintain the balance between liberty and authority 
is never done, because new conditions today upset the equilibriums of yesterday. 
The seesaw between freedom and power makes up most of the history of gov-
ernments ••.• " Justice Robert H. Jackson (1950).71 
Collective bargaining has brought prestige, power, respect-
ability and authority to the labor union movement.72 Unions have 
checked the arbitrary will of the employer, and substituted a rough 
rule of law governing employment activities; they have improved 
the economic position of the employees they represent both in 
direct wage increases and in an impressive array of fringe benefits 
and devices to protect the jobs of the workers. Collective bargain-
ing has become an accepted institution in many industries and 
with many employers. 
Various forces at work in the bargaining process have worn 
down the harsh edges of antagonism and produced a variety of 
methods of accommodation between labor and management rep-
71 American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950) (con-
curring opinion). 
72 For a variety of reasons, unions are now losing ground, at least in the sense that a 
smaller proportion of the labor force is unionized than was true in earlier years. See U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1962, TABLE No. 319, 
at 241 (1962). For discussions of this diminution of relative union power, see BARKIN, 
THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1962); BERNsrEIN, LABOR'S POWER IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY (Univ. of Cal. Inst. of Ind. Rel. reprint No. 112, 1962). 
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resentatives.73 While the spirit of accommodation may give way 
at negotiation time to the spirit of conflict, in in~reasing numbers 
of "stable relationships" the parties have learned to accept one an-
other, to iron out their differences, and to submit the irreconcil-
able points either to an arbitrator or to occasional tests of bargain-
ing strength.74 
The very success of the collective bargaining process has created 
new problems for the relation between the union and the employee 
whom it represents. For the union's interests are now partially 
shaped by a desire to accommodate to management's needs, and 
vice versa. When union and employee interests correspond, the 
spirit of accommodation is of undoubted value to the employee. 
But, where union and employee in-erests differ, as they may on 
occasion, the spirit of accommodation-the success of collective 
bargaining-spells difficulty for individual rights of the employees. 
A. Factors Limiting the Significance of Individual Claims 
On many matters, the union hierarchy may be forced to choose 
between the competing claims of different union subgroups, for 
the union consists of men with disparate interests; differences in 
age, health, marital status, aspirations, skills, and departmental 
outlook mark the union membership. The internal union political 
process provides the forum in which many such decisions are 
initially hammered out. A basic reason for internal union democ-
racy is to allow the full interplay of interested groups in develop-
ing the union's bargaining policy. 
73 There is now a rather extensive body of literature discussing this aspect of col-
lective bargaining. Perhaps the best discussion can be found in BELL, THE END OF IDE-
OLOGY ch. IO (rev. ed. 1961), entitled "The Capitalism of the Proletariat; a Theory of 
American Trade Unionism." For an analysis of how the use of the grievance procedure 
leads to accommodation in day-to-day bargaining activities, see Ryder, Some Concepts 
Concerning Grievance Procedure, 7 LAB. L.J. 15 (1956). See also KE:RR, UNIONS AND UNION 
LEADERS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING 8-9 (1957), where it is stated: 
"If freedom is defined as the absence of external restraint, then unions reduce free-
dom, for they restrain the worker in -many ways. They help to establish formal wage 
structures, seniority rosters, work schedules, pace of output, and the pattern of occu-
pational opportunities, all of which limit his freedom of choice. They decide when 
he shall strike and not strike. They are-and this is one of the essentials to an under-
standing of unionism-disciplinary agents within society. They add to the total network 
of discipline already surrounding the workers through the practices and rules of the 
employer. They too insist upon order and obedience. It is inherent in their very exist-
ence. Two bosses now grow where only one grew before." 
Sec KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SE'ITLEMENTS (1961), for vivid descriptions of the 
workings of the bargaining process in the administration of the labor agreement. 
74 Sec Ross 8c HARTMAN, CHANGING PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT (1960). The 
general decline of the incidence of strikes in the United States since 1946 is charted in 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1962, TABLE 
No. 323, at 243 (1962). 
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Because the position of the union will reflect not only a desire 
to accommodate to management, but also some accommodation 
between the various claims within the union, there is an increas-
ing likelihood that a given individual or group claim will be 
rejected by the union. The individual or group is hard put to 
find an alternative method of securing protection for such claim. 
A change in membership from one union to another is be-
coming more difficult for an employee because of the widespread 
existence of "no-raiding" agreements.75 In fact, only those unions 
outside the AFL-CIO umbrella, such as the Mine Workers and 
the Teamsters, provide a haven for employees who are dissatisfied 
with their union's decision-making. Craft severance of part of a 
bargaining unit is also difficult;76 and the mandatory settlement 
of jurisdictional disputes further reduces the choice of a labor 
organization open to employees.77 
This reduction in alternatives is not the result of selfish power-
seeking by the unions; it is the consequence of the increasing 
bureaucratization and centralization of society in the interests of 
technology and efficiency. These interests demand that the union 
be given power commensurate with its responsibilities-the power 
to agree with the employer in such a way as to bind the employees. 
This power is exercised within a structure which may make 
recognition of individual or minority claims difficult. Union 
policy decisions, in connection with the negotiation of new con-
tracts, may be made at a high level within the union, away from 
the field in which any small group might significantly influence 
the decisions.78 Administration of the labor agreement, on the 
other hand, is most often done by the union at the local level, and 
the minority or individual may be in a better position to make his 
judgment felt. But with the closeness of the relation between 
officer and member comes the increased possibility that officers 
may abuse their power by acting on the basis of personal senti-
ments rather than the merits.79 
All of these factors have coalesced to make the union decision 
in any aspect of collective bargaining the critical one so far as the 
75 See Cole, Union Self-Discipline and the Freedom of Individual Workers, in LABOR 
IN A FREE SocIETY (Harrington 8: Jacobs ed. 1959). 
76 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 792 (1959). 
77 NLRB v. Radio Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961), 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1142, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 221. 
78 Beach, The Problem of the Skilled Worker in an Industrial Union: A Case Study, 
in CORNELL INsrITUTE OF LABOR RELATIONS REsEARCH 8-15 (Fall-Winter 1961). 
79 E.g., O'Brien v. Dade Bros., 18 N.J. 457, 114 A.2d 266 (1955); Kuzma v. Millinery 
Workers, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953). 
1963] WORKER-UNION RELATIONSHIP 1467 
employees are concerned. For if that decision is adverse to their 
claims, the likelihood of the employees' securing protection in 
the judicial forum is slight. At least four types of problems con-
front such employees: 
(I) Union and employer acting jointly represent important 
and influential segments of our social-economic system. When they 
have agreed on a point, it requires a clear understanding of pos-
sible limiting principles, as well as some judicial courage, to dis-
regard their jointly expressed desires. 
(2) The union and employer, in their agreement, are claim-
ing to further the collective bargaining process. Since the national 
labor policy strongly prefers union-employer agreement to union-
employer conflict, the need for careful articulation of limiting 
principles is again apparent. 
(3) The employee's claim in most cases rests on a collective 
agreement negotiated by the union and the employer.80 His com-
plaint is either that they have negotiated away rights previously 
established through collective bargaining, or have administered 
away rights under presently enforceable agreements. He now con-
tends that they are disabled from modifying their agreement so 
as to deprive him of its benefits. Such a claim often produces the 
response that, since plaintiff's rights were created by agreement 
between union and employer, they can be terminated by the same 
process.81 Of course, this view is valid only if one assumes that 
expectations, which arose once the rights were created, are not 
entitled to protection. But this is the precise point at issue. If 
we assume that seniority or other contractual rights can be de-
stroyed only by a showing of justification by union and manage-
80 There appear to be two exceptions. Union action may unfairly affect employees 
outside of the bargaining unit, as in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 
U.S. 768 (1952). The second exception lies in the case of a discriminatory seniority 
system negotiated into an initial collective bargaining agreement. If the classification 
is unreasonable, the union and employer must correct the situation, even if this means 
improving the position of the group which was initially discriminated against. This 
question has most often arisen in connection with racial discrimination. See Richard-
son v. Texas &: N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 
F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956), discussed in Cox, The Duty of Fair 
Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 157, 176 (1957); Blumrosen, Union-Management 
Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J. Pun. L. 345, 358-62 (1961); Sovern, The National 
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 563, 578-87 (1962). 
81 See Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938), 
in which the union reduced seniority rights of married women in negotiations with the 
employer. An action was brought, on common-law principles, by an aggrieved employee. 
The court said, in denying relief, "The brotherhood had the power by agreement with 
the railway to create the seniority rights of plaintiff, and it likewise by the same method 
had the power to modify or destroy these rights in the interests of all the members." 
Id. at 206, 277 N.W. at 887. 
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ment, then they cannot be destroyed as freely as they were created. 
Thus, the statement that contract rights can be destroyed in the 
same manner as they were created implicitly denies legal protec-
tion for these rights without an analysis of the problem. 
( 4) There is a tendency to seek limitations on union-manage-
ment agreement in the collective bargaining contract itself. Since 
the employee's rights arise from that contract, it is argued, they 
are limited by it. But this search is usually futile, because most 
collective bargaining contracts provide that the union, not the 
employee, determines the extent to which a claim of violation will 
be pressed through the grievance and arbitration procedures.82 
Employee rights must be found in obligations imposed on union 
and employer, not by their agreement, but by law independently 
of their wishes. 
Professor Cowan has dramatically described the difference as 
one between contract and tort law: 
"The fundamental purpose of contract is to create private 
legislation. The parties consciously try to put limits on their 
undertakings, to restrict their liability to what is assumed or 
normally to be implied from their actions .... The object 
of the agreement is theirs alone, and the legal incidence of 
their agreement is limited by the expression of their intent. 
So much for the theory of contract. Contract looks to the 
future, however fleetingly, and attempts to contain it within 
the bonds of legal form. Of paramount importance to it, 
therefore, is legal certainty and security. And it is not accident 
that the prime legal methods for obtaining certainty and 
security, namely rule and form, are peculiarly appropriate to 
contract. Here, as in certain other branches of the law, it is 
often more important to fix the rule than to fix it right. 
"Tort law serves other purposes. Briefly, these are to adjust 
inadvertent, not consciously envisaged, losses, and to enforce 
general standards of careful behavior. The ideal of tort law 
is reasonable conduct. When reasonable expectations comport 
with planned undertakings all is well. Tort and contract both 
are satisfied. What happens when this is not the case? The 
answer in the long run is that planned undertakings must 
accommodate themselves to reasonable expectations. Contract 
82 See Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). The contract 
analysis is sometimes pressed by plaintiff's counsel. See Terrell v. Local 758, Int'l Ass'n 
of Machinists, 150 Colo. App. 2d 24, 309 P .2d 130 (1957); Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 249 
Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957); Cabral v. Local 41, Int'l Molders Union, 82 R.I. 178, 106 
A.2d 739 (1954). 
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must yield to tort. But this is far from true in the short run. 
Tort does not always conquer contract."83 
B. The Duty of Fair Representation 
The "tort principles" operative to protect individual rights 
were spelled out by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & 
Nash1.1ille R.R.84 In that case, arising under the Railway Labor 
Act, union and employer attempted to destroy seniority rights 
of Negro employees by cutting off channels of promotion and 
continued employment which had previously been established 
by collective bargaining. Union and management argued that 
their power to change the terms of the collective bargaining rela-
tionship was plenary-not subject to legal restraint. The argu-
ment was that, by mutual agreement between union and employer, 
the employee could be treated just as arbitrarily as the employer 
could have treated him before the collective bargaining process 
was adopted. The employee was free from arbitrary employer 
action only to the extent that the union chose to protect him. 
If the union agreed with management in an action which was 
arbitrary, there was no recourse under the statute. 
The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court 
held that the statute required the union to represent all the 
employees for whom it bargained fairly.85 It could not arbitrarily 
destroy seniority rights of some of those employees. The employer 
was also bound by this duty and could not rely on a contract 
entered into in violation of the duty.86 Such a contract was ultra 
83 Cowan, Rule or Standard in Tort Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 141, 152-53 (1958). 
84 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
85 See the discussion in text at note 27 supra. Since the duty of fair representation 
flows from the principle of exclusive representation, it is implicit in the National Labor 
Relations Act as well as the Railway Labor Act. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 
(1955), reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 
(1953). 
The considerable number of discussions of the various aspects of the duty of fair 
representation include: Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 
22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests; Union-
Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631 (1959); 
Blumrosen, supra note 80; Cox, supra note 80; Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 
69 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1956); Givens, Federal Protection of Employee Rights Within 
Trade Unions, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 259 (1960); Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collec-
tive Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959); Howlett, Contract Rights of Individual 
Employees as Against the Employer, 8 L\B. L.J. 316 (1957); Summers, Individual Rights 
ill Collective Agreements-A Preliminary Analysis, 12 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LAB, 63 
(1959); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. 
REv. 362 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Re-
sponsibilitj• in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958). 
80 "The representative which thus discriminates may be enjoined from so doing, 
and its members may be enjoined from taking the benefit of such discriminatory action. 
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vires. Thus, the Court imposed, on union and employer, limita-
tions which arise from values other than those underlying collec-
tive bargaining, which are not rooted in contract and which can-
not be bargained away by union and management. In 1947, 
Congress legislated on one aspect of the duty of fair representation 
-discrimination based on membership or non-membership in the 
union.87 Otherwise, the matter has rested in judicial and admin-
istrative hands. 
The lower federal and state courts have not willingly protected 
individual rights under the duty of fair representation. Some courts 
initially assumed that the duty was operative only in cases of 
racial discrimination.88 It has become clear, however, that it covers 
improper discrimination against other types of minority groups,80 
and even discrimination against an individual because of his per-
sonal characteristics. 90 The courts have given the unions broad 
discretion to select those claims which they wish to present. This 
principle of discretion, which the Supreme Court guardedly an-
nounced in a case involving the negotiation of a contractual pref-
erence for returning World War II veterans,91 has been applied 
with vigor by courts to union decisions in the administration of the 
collective bargaining agreement, without apparent realization 
that the problem of union discretion is different in this latter situa-
tion.92 
No more is the Railroad bound by or entitled to take the benefit of a contract which 
the bargaining representative is prohibited by the statute from making. In both cases 
the right asserted, which is derived from the duty imposed by the statute on the bar-
gaining representative, is a federal right implied from the statute and the policy which 
it has adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful the Brotherhood's 
conduct." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1944). 
87 Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958), of the LMRA makes it an unfair 
labor practice for a union to cause, or attempt to cause, the employer to discriminate 
against an employee because of membership or non-membership in a labor organization. 
Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958), makes such discrimination by the employer 
an unfair labor practice, except where the employer is enforcing financial obligations 
properly imposed under a valid union security agreement. See Radio Officers Union v. 
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), for a discussion of the sweep of these sections. For a consid-
eration of their application in cases where the employer has allocated all, or part, of 
his hiring functions to the union, see Local 357, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 
U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). The problem of 
the scope of NLRB jurisdiction created by these clauses is discussed subsequently in text. 
88 See Alabaugh v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222 F.2d 861 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
839 (1955). The Alabaugh case was overruled in Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping 
Car Porters, 52 L.R.R.M. 2881 (4th Cir. 1963). 
so See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Ferro v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961), clearly extends the protection of the duty to 
any minority group within the union. 
oo See Nobile v. Woodward, 200 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1962), and cases cited therein. 
01 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). 
92 See, e.g., Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). The concept 
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In addition, the courts have created numerous procedural 
and technical barriers which tend to restrict effective protection 
of employees. They have insisted on technicalities of pleading,93 
have applied doctrines restricting the suability of unions,94 have 
imposed an exhaustion of contract remedies requirement where 
such remedies seemed unavailable,95 and have hesitated to allow 
the employee to protect his interest in arbitration.96 
The result is that, in the area of economic activity, the em-
ployee who is injured as a result of the combined action of union 
and employer has little chance of receiving protection from the 
courts. Recently, the NLRB suggested that it may provide him 
with some protection.97 With the possibility that the duty of fair 
that the duty is similar in negotiation and administration has been suggested in Co)(, 
Rigllts Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 622 (1956). 
93 E.g., Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
371 U.S. 920 (1962) (complaint which alleged union action was arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable held defective in that it failed to allege that union had bad faith motive, 
intent or purpose); Wilson v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 368 Mich. 61, 117 N.W.2d 184 (1962) 
(misjoinder of claim); Carlini v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 71 N.J. Super. 101, 176 A.2d 266 
(App. Div. 1961), cert. denied, 37 N.J. 133, 179 A.2d 569 (1962) (plaintiff's affidavits charg-
ing unfair representation not allowed to expand pleadings). 
In Britton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 303 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1962), Negro employees 
complained that their jobs had been abolished by contract and the work turned over 
to whites. The district court, construing the pleading as relating to the interpretation 
of the collective bargaining agreement rather than as alleging a breach of the duty 
of fair representation, dismissad on the grounds that contract interpretation under the 
Railway Labor Act is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Board. 
The district court then denied leave to amend the complaint. The court of appeals 
affirmed the dismissal, but awarded leave to amend to allege illegal discrimination which 
is not subject to the RAB jurisdiction but is cognizable in the courts. 
94 The doctrine prohibiting partners from suing co-partners for wrongful acts of 
mutual agents has been applied, incredibly enough, in the modern period, to prohibit 
suits by employees against their union. See text at note 148 infra. 
95 See Widuk v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 367, 369, 117 N.W.2d 245, 247 
(1962). Employee testified that the union official "said I might just as well forget it 
[the grievance]; I had gone as far as I could; it was final." The court held that this 
did not justify the inference that the union would refuse to represent her, or process 
her grievance fairly, or that further processing of the grievance would be futile. There-
fore, the employee was not justified in failing to pursue further the contract grievance 
procedure. 
In Larsen v. American Airlines, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 258 '(S.D.N.Y. 1962), afj'd, 313 F.2d 
599 (1963) plaintiff, an airline pilot, was discharged for negligence incident to the crash 
of one of defendant's planes at Midway Airport in Chicago. Plaintiff requested a hear-
ing before company officials under the grievance procedure of the contract. The hear-
ing was begun, but adjourned before completion. Three weeks later the company noti-
fied him that his hearing was forfeited. Plaintiff alleged that defendant thereby refused 
him a proper hearing. The court held that, under the exhaustion requirement of New 
York law, plaintiff was not relieved of his obligation to use the grievance procedure even 
if the airline refused him a full hearing, but should have gone on to the next stage in 
the procedure. 
96 In re Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960). 
U7 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962). 
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representation may be enforced by the NLRB comes the question 
of whether the jurisdiction of that agency is exclusive, precluding 
judicial enforcement of the duty. This development will be dis-
cussed separately. The following discussion assumes that the 
judicial forum is available, but much of it is applicable to enforce-
ment of the duty by the NLRB. 
The individual's interest in the employment relationship 
should be protected by law to the fullest extent compatible with 
the continued effectiveness of the collective bargaining process. 
This value judgment has its roots in the concepts of individual 
liberty first formulated in connection with governmental action, 
and in the ideals of individual economic and dignitary interests 
which initially prompted the growth of legal protection for labor 
organizations. It assumes that the collective bargaining process is 
sufficiently mature to bear the weight of some conflicting indi-
vidual employee claims, but it rejects the use of individual claims 
to frustrate the process of collective bargaining. It would restate 
the union's duty of fair representation so as to require the union 
to maximize individual employee rights in the bargaining process 
to the extent consistent with the legitimate claims of the group. 
Under this view, protection of individual claims becomes a pri-
mary, rather than an incidental, function of the union. Admittedly, 
this view has not been widely accepted by the lower courts, with 
the possible exception of those in Wisconsin and New Jersey.08 It 
is, however, consistent with three cases decided by the Supreme 
Court on the matter,99 as well as with suggestions in some recent 
lower court decisions and a recent NLRB opinion. 
98 Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); O'Donnell v. Pabst 
Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961); Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 
2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 100 N.W.2d 317, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 
962 (1960). See also Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 363-68 (1962), which vividly contrasts the law of New York and 
Wisconsin. 
In a number of southern states, the courts are still treating the employee as a third-
party beneficiary entitled to a damage action for wrongful discharge under the collective 
bargaining agreement. See Woodward Iron Co. v. Stringfellow, 126 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1960); 
Dufour v. Continental So. Lines, Inc., 219 Miss. 296, 68 So. 2d 489 (1953); Mountain v. 
National Airlines, Inc., 75 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Scott v. National Airlines, 150 So. 2d 
237 (Fla. 1963); Martin v. Southern Ry., 240 S.C. 460, 126 S.E.2d 365 (1962). This view 
apparently stems largely from the Supreme Court decision in Moore v. Illinois Cent. 
R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941). Rather than reflecting protection for employees within col-
lective bargaining, these decisions seem to reflect an unwillingness to recognize the im-
portant role of the union in the grievance process. 
99 See Elgin, J. &: E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), afj'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 
661 (1946). Cf. the extended discussion of the justification for modifying seniority rights 
in favor of returning veterans in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The 
discussion occupies four pages of the official report and draws on congressional, execu-
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C. Individual Rights Within the National Labor Policy 
The law governing individual rights in the collective bargain-
ing process must be developed in a manner compatible with national 
labor policy. This requires the rejection of decisions which were 
based on the common-law concept of the union as a voluntary 
association.100 The union is now an institution with statutory 
authority and responsibility. The law concerning this responsibil-
ity must be worked out within the framework of national labor 
policy, much as the law concerning collective bargaining agree-
ments is to be developed under the general statutory mandate of 
section 301 of the LMRA.101 
"Judicial inventiveness" is required in both situations because 
Congress has not dealt in detailed legislative fashion with these 
problems. In 1947, during the formulation and passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, Congress operated on the assumption that union 
and employer were in perpetual conflict, and that the employer 
would be happy to protect the employee against oppressive union 
actions if he were given the tools to do so. Thus, the employer 
was made the watchdog of union security agreements, 102 and was 
allowed to process individual employee grievances under section 
9(a) of the NLRA, regardless of union wishes.103 The 1947 Con-
tive and collective bargaining policy. In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the dis-
crimination was based on race and no extended discussion was necessary. 
100 Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938), jus-
tifying discrimination based on sex, is a prime example of such a case. See Blumrosen, 
supra note 80, at 367; Hanslowe, supra note 85, at 44-45. 
101 Section 301 [29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958)] provides simply that "suits for violation 
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . • • may be brought in 
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties," regardless 
of amount or diversity. On the basis of this language, the Supreme Court in Textile 
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), held that the courts were to develop 
a substantive law of the collective bargaining agreement, utilizing statutory language 
and policy to accomplish the task. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Summers, supra note 98, at 370-76. 
102 See International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 307 F.2d 679 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 936 (1962); NLRB v. Die & Tool Makers, 231 F.2d 298 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). 
103 Section 9(a) [29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958)], after establishing the principle of ex-
clusive representation of the union designated by a majority of employees, provides that: 
"[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time 
to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without 
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not 
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in 
cfkct: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity 
to be present at such adjustment." 
This section h~ been held to_ p~~t, but not to require, the employer to process 
a grievance at the instance of an md1v1dual employee rather than the union. See Black-
Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962), and ma-
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gress was unaware that it was actually legislating for a system of 
industrial relations in which union and management might co-
operate extensively, sometimes to the detriment of the employee. 
In 1959, congressional legislation concerning internal union 
affairs was grounded on another erroneous assumption. Congress 
assumed that there were two separate areas of activity: one deal-
ing with internal affairs generally, and the other dealing with 
collective bargaining, and that it could legislate on the one with-
out touching the other.104 The impossibility of maintaining such 
a separation will be discussed shortly. 
Congress thus never squarely faced the issue of legal protection 
for individual rights in the collective bargaining context, and the 
law in this area must be fashioned from statutory materials not 
drawn with an eye to the problems.105 Policy considerations loom 
terial cited in the court's opinion. On the difficulties of implementing the proviso, see 
Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 731 (1950). 
The policy of the proviso has been used as the basis for an argument that the 
employee is entitled to utilize all grievance channels created in the collective bargaining 
agreement, including arbitration. See Summers, supra note 98, at 376-85, 399-404. This 
argument has been recently adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Donnelly v. 
United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). Donnelly and Black-Clawson, supra, 
are in opposition on the question of the effect of § 9(a). 
On legislative intent, one commentator has said: "It seems probable that the members 
of Congress who were active in promoting the Taft-Hartley Act did not consider that a 
situation could arise whereby an employer would refuse to listen to an employee and 
adjust a meritorious grievance." Howlett, supra note 85, at 318. 
104 Section 603(b) of the LMRDA [29 U.S.C. § 523(b) (Supp. IV, 1963)] provides, in 
relevant part: "[N]or shall anything contained in [Title I] be construed to confer any 
rights, privileges, immunities or defenses upon employers, or to impair or otherwise 
affect the rights of any person under the National Labor Relations Act." 
"Person" includes labor organizations, within the meaning of both the LMRDA, 
§ 3(d), and the NLRA, § 2(1). The right of the union to bargain collectively under the 
NLRA includes, in § 8(d), the "negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder." Hence,. textually, it would appear that, under § 603(b), the LMRDA is 
not to affect union collective bargaining activity either in negotiation or in adminis-
tration of the contract. This interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history. 
Language similar to § 603(b) appeared in the Kennedy bill, S. 505, 86th Cong., I 1959 
Acr. LEGIS. HIST. 74. Senator Kennedy analyzed this provision as specifying "that Titles 
I, II, III, IV and V are not to be construed as affecting in any way rights or obliga-
tions under the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act," II id. 972. 
The language of the statute appeared in § 502 of S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 
as introduced, but became § 603(b) by the time it was passed by the Senate. I id. 388, 
573. Of this, Senator Kennedy stated that Titles I-VI "are not to be construed as super-
seding, impairing, or otherwise affecting the Railway Labor Act, or any obligations, 
rights, benefits, privileges or immunities thereunder, or as affecting in any way rights 
or obligations under the National Labor Relations Act." II id. 1262. Representative 
Griffin believed that the language insured that union responsibilities under the NLRA 
would not be reduced. Id. at 1521. 
105 Mr. Justice Rutledge, who dealt with the basic problem of the relation between 
union and employee under the R'?-1-way Labor Act in Elgin, J. &: E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 
U.S. 711 (1945), faced the same difficulty under that statute. "Congress was concerned 
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large in any such development. The following analysis suggests 
that, within the existing statutory framework, protection for in-
dividual rights may be maximized without sacrificing the values 
of the collective bargaining process. 
The national labor policy concerning collective bargaining 
has partially evolved through legislative, administrative, executive, 
arbitral, and judicial decisions. Most importantly, however, its 
development has resulted from the decisions of the parties. It 
envisions that the basic terms of the collective bargaining rela-
tion will be periodically re-examined by the union and employer, 
with both utilizing the full range of economic pressures available 
to them.100 The outcome of such a reassessment is an agreement 
which crystallizes the terms of employment for a definite minimum 
time, 107 and provides that disputes over the application of those 
terms shall be administered through a grievance procedure termi-
nating finally in the decision of an arbitrator.108 Such disputes 
which are not subject to arbitration are to be decided by the 
courts.109 
D. Negotiation Versus Administration 
Thus, the national labor policy considers that problems of ne-
gotiation of the agreement are to be treated differently from prob-
lems of administration. More flexibility is afforded the parties in 
negotiation than in administration. The analysis of protection 
given individual rights must begin with this distinction.11° 
Obviously, the distinction is artificial. Negotiation looks to 
the future, but may settle matters which have been raised in the 
past. Administration deals with existing disputes, but may also 
establish a pattern for future settlements. Both processes are part 
of a spectrum of methods of dispute settlement which ranges from 
primarily with differences between the carrier and the employees, not with differences 
among the latter or between them, or some of them, and the collective agent. The 
statute therefore was not drawn with an eye levelled to these problems." Id. at 738 n.37. 
The attempt to deal legislatively with this problem in § 9(a) of the NLRA is discussed 
in note 103 supra. 
100 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' lnt'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
101 See § 8(d) of the NLRA. The contract bar doctrine of the NLRB, and the pro-
hibition against most stranger picketing during the term of a contract, NLRA, § 8(b)(4) 
and § 8(b)(7), and the presumption of majority status, are all aimed at providing sta-
bility in the contractual relationship, as is § 301 of the LMRA itself. 
10s United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
100 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
110 See Blumrosen, supra note 80, at 362-66, for additional considerations relevant 
to the distinction between negotiation and administration of the labor agreement. Sum-
mers, supra note 98, at 396-97, applies this distinction. 
1476 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
formal contract negotiations, on the one hand, to informal griev-
ance settlement, on the other. The fact that all such activities are 
on a single continuum does not require similar legal treatment of 
individual rights all along the continuum. 
The basic distinction between negotiation and administration 
lies in the fact that the individual employee's claim in the latter 
area is rooted in a .collective bargaining agreement, while in the 
former case his claim rests on generalized expectations. The re-
fusal to protect generalized expectations need not lead to a refusal 
to protect specific claims under specific contracts. The differences 
at each end of the spectrum, as they relate to employee claims of 
unfair treatment, may be indicated graphically: 
Negotiation 
I. No objective standard for 
judgment. Interests are 
pressed to limit of bargaining 
power. Expectations of em-
ployees rooted in hopes for 
improved treatment. 
2. Negotiation policy often 
developed at high union level, 
adjusting many conflicts with-
in the union. 
3. Consequence of finding 
that the union should press a 
given claim may mean a strike 
which affects many interests 
not otherwise involved. 
Administration 
1. Contract language and re-
lations of the parties supply 
standard for evaluating the 
claim of the employee. Ex-
pectation of employees rooted 
in the contract. 
2. Administration p o 1 i c y 
often made at the local level, 
with no apparent broad im-
plications for other interests. 
3. Consequence of requiring 
the union to press a claim 
may most often be no more 
than an additional arbitra-
tion. 
With this distinction in mind, it should be clear that only the 
most important interests of the employees are entitled to protec-
tion in the negotiation of a new contract. The ordinary incon-
veniences or disadvantages to some of the employees should not 
be allowed to overshadow the dominant purpose of the bargain-
ing process by delaying or deterring agreement between union and 
management. In the case of administration of the labor agree-
ment, however, considerations relating to the stability of contrac-
tual rights dictate that the balance be struck more favorably to 
the employees. 
E. Negotiation and Seniority Rights 
The protection of accrued seniority claims in the negotiation of 
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collective bargaining contracts is a minimum requirement if indi-
vidual rights are to be meaningfully secured. Union and employer 
should not be allowed to dilute seniority claims of employees ac-
quired under previous agreements without adequate justification 
rooted in the national labor policy. The importance of protection 
of seniority claims based on prior collective bargaining contracts has 
been recognized by the Supreme Court. The Court has recognized 
that dilution of seniority rights may be justified as a matter of 
national policy in favor of returning veterans111 but may not be 
justified on grounds of preferring one racial or union group over 
another.112 
In earlier lower court decisions, the union was allowed to bar-
gain away accrued seniority rights on the ground that it was a pri-
vate voluntary association113 whose members were entitled to only 
minimal legal protection. As it has become clear that the union 
is an institution vested with power and responsibility by govern-
ment, the courts have begul) to shift the basis of their decisions 
in seniority cases. In the recent cases, the use of more stringent 
standards in reviewing union decisions curtailing seniority rights 
suggests that the courts are becoming more sensitive to their 
importance. 
In O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co.114 a seniority problem arose 
after the Pabst Brewing Company had purchased the assets of 
111 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). 
112 Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 
U.S. 248 (1944). 
The problem of racial discrimination and the duty of fair representation is discussed 
in Blumrosen, supra note 80, at 358-62; Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion 
from Union Activities, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 21 (1961); Sovern, supra note 80. 
The problem of discrimination against workers by union and employer because of 
their union membership was not directly treated by the ·wagner Act of 1935. There-
fore, the NLRB developed two techniques to protect the employees from such discrimi-
nation. One was the finding that the employer committed an unfair labor practice 
when he participated in such activities. See ·wallace Corp. v. NLRB, supra. The other 
was the device of revoking the certification of the bargaining agent. Larus &: Bro. Co., 
62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). In the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, § 7, 
§ 8(b)(l)(A) and § 8(b)(2), Congress made discrimination to encourage or discourage union 
membership an unfair labor practice on the part of both union and employer. See 
Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). The NLRB has continued to claim, 
and to exercise sparingly, the power to revoke certification for "conduct unbecoming a 
certified union." See A. 0. Smith Corp., II9 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957); Nathan Warren & 
Sons, Inc., ll6 N.L.R.B. 1662 (1957); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953). The 
most recent development, in which the NLRB has claimed power to enforce fully the 
duty of fair representation, is discussed later in the text. 
113 Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950); 
Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934); Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. 
Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938); Hanslowe, supra note 85. 
114 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961). 
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Blatz, and had decided to close the Blatz plant and thereafter brew 
Blatz beer in the Pabst plant employing such Blatz employees as 
were needed. When the Blatz plant was closed, Pabst employees 
wanted the Blatz men placed at the bottom of the Pabst seniority 
list, while Blatz employees wanted the lists dovetailed, or inte-
grated, on the basis of individual hiring dates with the respective 
employers. There were 925 Pabst and 940 Blatz employees in-
volved. The union officials recommended dovetailing of the lists, 
and submitted the matter to a vote at the union meeting. Some 
3,000 Milwaukee area brewery employees voted. The vote was 
2,595 to 502 in favor of dovetailing. Some Pabst employees sued 
the union and the employer to prevent the dilution of their sen-
iority rights which would result if Blatz employees were allowed 
to dovetail into the Pabst seniority list. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court considered the voting procedure to have been fair because, 
as it stated: 
"To submit the question to only Pabst employees would have 
been unfair to the former Blatz employees; it would undoubt-
edly have resulted in a vote to give themselves preference. To 
limit the vote to Pabst and Blatz employees would have given 
the Blatz employees the advantage, since they were in the 
majority and could be expected to express their own self-
interest. "115 
Submission to the entire membership "would be much more likely 
to reflect an objective view than either of the alternatives men-
tioned."116 "The overall consideration," said the court, "is whether 
the bargaining which resulted in the [ decision to dovetail the lists] 
was in good faith and reached a fair and reasonable solution of the 
merger problem."117 
While the court went on to indicate that there remained a 
range of discretion within the limits of this test, it preferred the 
dovetailing decision over the proposals of the plaintiffs, which 
would have subordinated the seniority claims of the Blatz em-
ployees. The importance of the decision lies in the willingness 
of the court to evaluate the solution on its merits and in its recog-
nition that the political processes within the union would be likely 
to reflect primarily, if not exclusively, the economic self-interest 
of the affected employees, and might not take fair account of all 
relevant factors. 
115 Id. at 500, 107 N.W.2d at 489. 
116 Ibid. 
111 Id. at 501, 107 N.W.2d at 490. (Emphasis added.) 
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The inadequacy of the intra-union political process in protect-
ing seniority rights was fully recognized in Ferro v. Railway Ex-
press Co.118 The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad discontinued its 
New York-to-Baltimore run which had originated at the Commin-
paw Terminal of Railway Express in Jersey City, New Jersey. 
Railway Express rerouted the traffic which formerly used the 
B. & 0. service through other terminals in the metropolitan area 
and substantially reduced or terminated employment at Commin-
paw. Comminpaw employees sought to "follow the work" to these 
other terminals under the collective bargaining contract. The rail-
road argued that there was no "work" to follow, that the employees' 
jobs had simply been abolished and that there was no contractual 
right protecting them.119 A settlement was negotiated whereby 
sixty-five jobs were created for Comminpaw employees in the Penn-
sylvania Railroad Railway Express Terminal, on Long Island. The 
remaining Comminpaw employees were not protected. 
Comminpaw employees who were not among the favored sixty-
five sued, claiming that their contractual rights to follow the work 
had been ignored by the union in deference to a politically power-
ful local at the Pennsylvania Railroad terminal. The court of 
appeals construed their pleadings and affidavits as establishing a 
violation of the duty of fair representation. The decision suggests 
that plaintiffs must establish the following elements if they are to 
succeed: 
(I) They are entitled to seniority rights, either by virtue of a 
prior collective bargaining agreement, as in Ferro, or by virtue of 
a discriminatory initial agreement.120 (2) Dilution or destruction 
of such rights by negotiation or other agreement between union and 
118 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961). 
110 Since plaintiff's claim was based on the collective bargaining contract, its reso-
lution involves the interpretation of that contract. Under the Railway Labor Act, con-
tract interpretation questions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Ad-
justment Boards, and not within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. But 
actions for violation of fiduciary duty are within the courts' jurisdiction. Ferro holds 
that this jurisdiction persists even though the interpretation of the contract is an 
integral element of the cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation. 
An analogous situation can arise under the National Labor Relations Act if inter-
pretation of contract is normally within the province of the arbitrator. A case of 
breach of fiduciary duty may require interpretation, but is not for that reason beyond 
the jurisdiction of the court or agency. The court may engage in the interpretation 
itself, or might order arbitration of the disputed issue of contract interpretation, and 
then resolve the remaining controversy with the arbitrator's judgment in view. 
1:::0 Compare Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961), 
with Trotter v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. Employees, 309 F.2d 584 (6th 
Cir. 1962), in which the plaintiff employees sought unsuccessfully to establish that the 
union violated its fiduciary duty by failing to negotiate a more favorable seniority 
clause. There was no prior seniority agreement on which they could rely, and no basis 
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company.121 (3) Such dilution or destruction was in violation of 
the union's duty of fair representation. In Ferro, the basis of the 
claim of unfair representation was that the union negotiated the 
settlement in order to protect a politically more powerful local 
against the politically weaker Comminpaw local. The pith of the 
opinion of the court of appeals, reversing a dismissal of the com-
plaint, stated: 
"A bargain which favors one class of employees over an-
other is not necessarily prohibited as a hostile discrimina-
tion. . . . However, it is not proper for a bargaining agent 
in representing the employees to draw distinctions among 
them which are based upon their political power within the 
union .... "122 
In this statement, the court removed the political element as 
a basis for union choice between conflicting claims, and required 
that the union decision be based on "rational standards" alone. 
Decisions subsequent to Ferro have implemented this approach by 
emphasizing the requirement of rationality in the choice of the 
union.123 Ferro effectively destroys one basis by which broad union 
discretion in collective bargaining can be justified; that is, that 
the union represents a melange of political forces and should be 
was alleged on which the union could be required to create seniority rights for them. 
See, on this point, the material cited in note 80 supra. 
121 In Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 
371 U.S. 920 (1962), it is difficult to determine from the opinion how the employees wen: 
harmed when the seniority base was broadened retroactively from a divisional to ~ 
system-wide basis. Similarly, the identification of the harm is difficult in the following 
cases: Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1963); Fiorita 
v. McCorkle, 222 Md. 524, 161 A.2d 456 (1960); Gainey v. Local 71, Int'! Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 252 N.C. 256, 113 S.E.2d 594 (1960); Bailer v. Local 470, Int'l Teamsters 
Union, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 343 (1960); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 
A.2d 882 (1960). 
In Division 14, Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Leighty, 298 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962), plaintiffs argued, not that the union had been unfair, but 
that the international had no right to negotiate any settlement relating to seniority 
with the employer. The court was able to characterize this as a representation question 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board. 
In Bolt v. Dining Car Employees, 50 L.R.R.M. 2190 (S.D. Fla. 1961), afj'd, 50 
L.R.R.M. 2194 (5th Cir. 1962), although faced with a "clean hands" problem, plaintiffs 
failed to assert the "political basis" contention of the Ferro case when their seniority 
claims were downgraded by a vote of 220 to 20. These cases all emphasize the importance 
of counsel in the initial presentation of the case against the union and the employer 
to the courts. In the Ferro case the elements of the claim were made out only by 
reading together the complaint and affidavits opposing summary judgment. 
122 296 F.2d at 851. 
123 See Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
371 U.S. 920 (1962). 
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allowed to exercise political judgments.124 Ferro represents a long 
step toward effective protection of seniority claims in the area of 
negotiation of collective bargaining contracts by requiring that 
such cases be decided on their merits. Both Ferro and O'Donnell 
presage a more searching examination of the union decision to 
negotiate away seniority claims than has been undertaken in the 
earlier cases. This, coupled with decisions in other contexts recog-· 
nizing the importance of seniority claims,125 suggests that the courts 
are coming to see the importance, in this time of rapid technolog-
ical and business change, of giving older employees a reasonable 
degree of protection for their accrued seniority. 
Despite this trend, there are limitations on the protection which 
may be afforded seniority rights under the Ferro-O'Donnell line 
of decisions. Seniority rights are circumscribed by the economic 
and technological forces at work in the establishment in which 
seniority is claimed. If the employer determines to make changes 
in his operation which will inevitably entail alteration or reduc-
tion of seniority, and the union cannot prevail against that deci-
sion, then job security for some employees may be lost. The loss 
of seniority in these cases is viewed not as a failure of the union, 
but as resulting from larger economic forces for which the law 
does not hold union and employer responsible. Protection of em-
ployees thus laid off must come from general programs which are 
now in the process of formulation. The obligation to provide 
employment is one which falls on the federal government, not 
upon enterprise.126 
The concept of seniority, although it centers on length of serv-
ice, may embrace other considerations such as skill, ability, former 
position, industry-wide experience and the like. Thus, even from 
the perspective of a rational decision-maker attempting to mini-
mize the impact of a situation which requires the alteration of 
some seniority rights, there may be several possible decisions which 
124 Cox, supra note 92, provides a vigorous presentation of this position in connec-
tion with the administration of the labor agreement. 
125 UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 
288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability 
of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962), and Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and 
Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 l\IINN. L. REv. 505 (1963). 
126 COMMITTEE FOR EcoNO!IUC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NATIONAL 
LABoR Poucy 122-27 (1961); Armour Automation Committee, Progress Report, 48 LAB. 
REL. REP. 239 (1961); Report of President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management 
Policy, 49 LAB. REL. REP. 245 (1962). See also Manpower Development and Training 
Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 23, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2571-2620 (Supp. 1962); Employment Act of 1946, 
60 Stat. 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1958). 
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can claim equal validity.127 In such a situation, there appears no 
justification for judicial intervention. 
Aside from seniority claims, and perhaps pension rights of 
retired employees,128 the principles of collective bargaining estab-
lished by the national labor policy dictate broad flexibility for 
union and management in rearranging the conditions of employ-
ment to meet their good faith needs. 
In summary, the duty of fair representation should allow the 
union, in good faith, to negotiate changes in conditions of employ-
ment as to all matters except seniority rights. To justify an abridg-
ment of seniority rights, the union must show not only that it 
exercised an honest judgment, but also that it made an appropriate 
decision, one based on objective factors, which would persuade a 
rational decision-maker, and not compelled by the internal politi-
cal make-up of the union. By thus structuring the duty of fair 
representation, protection can be afforded to crucial individual 
rights of job security while leaving the collective bargaining proc-
ess otherwise free of substantive limitations. 
F. Individual Rights in the Administration 
of the Labor Agreement 
The relationship between individual and union in the ad-
ministration of the labor agreement must also be developed with 
reference to the national labor policy. This policy favors the settle-
ment of disputes which arise under a collective bargaining agree-
ment by a process which has two phases. First, disputes are dis-
cussed between union and employer representatives through a 
grievance procedure at progressively higher levels of the bureauc-
racies involved, looking toward an acceptable adjustment. Secondly, 
disputes which are not resolved in the grievance procedure are 
s~ttled by arbitration.129 
127 For example, in O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W .2d 
484 (1961) [see text accompanying note 114 supra], if the union had decided to inte-
grate the seniority lists on the basis of original hiring date in the industry instead of 
the original hiring date with the previous employer, the result would have seemed as 
rational as the one reached, and probably would have been upheld, even though it 
might produce different results in particular instances. 
Compare the approach of the union involved in Gavigan v. Bookbinders Union, 
406 Pa. 508, 178 A.2d 567 (1962), with that involved in Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224 
(D.C. Cir. 1960). For a graphic description of the variety of methods used to integrate 
seniority lists in one industry, see Mater and Mangum, The Integration of Seniority 
Lists in Transportation Merge,-s, 16 IND. &: LAB. REL. REP. 343 (1963). 
128 See Aaron, supra note 85. 
129 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). "Arbitration is a stabilizing influence 
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This policy limits the employee's right to sue to protect his 
expectations under a collective bargaining contract. To permit 
employee suits without limitation would weaken the grievance 
procedure, and would reduce management incentive to settle with 
the union because the settlement would lack finality. It would 
also make union officials more reluctant to settle disputes with 
management for fear of embarrassment if the settlement were later 
upset by a court.130 
Recognition of an employee's right to sue in all cases would 
also weaken the arbitration process. For, in an employee suit, the 
court, rather than the arbitrator, would decide the meaning of the 
agreement; finality of the arbitrator's decision would thus be de-
nied.181 Consequently, the national labor policies supporting the 
grievance and arbitration processes require that the employee not 
be permitted to sue in every case in which he claims that his rights 
under the collective bargaining agreement have been violated.132 
In addition, control of the grievance and arbitration machinery is 
usually vested by contract in the union.133 The employee, there-
only as it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise under the 
agreement." Id. at 567. 
130 Protection of the grievance channels is the basic explanation for the require-
ment, nearly universally imposed, that the employee exhaust the grievance procedures 
before being allowed to sue for violation of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., 
Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958); Rowan 
v. McKee, Inc., 262 Minn. 366, 114 N.W.2d 692 (1962); Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 
25 N.J. 541, 138 A.2d 24 (1958); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 
(1960); Kopke v. Ranny, 16 Wis. 2d 369, 114 N.W.2d 485 (1962). 
181 This is the basis for holdings that, even if contract remedies are exhausted or 
waived, the employee may not maintain an action for breach of the collective bargaining 
agreement against his employer where the agreement provides that questions of breach 
of contract are referable to arbitration. See Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. 
Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), afj'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960); 
Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 130; Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 
N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959). See also Belk v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d 
513 (2d Cir. 1963), interpreting contract in light of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 
U.S. 195 (1962). 
182 Summers, supra note 98; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: 
A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 239 (1959); Report of the Committee on 
Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, in PROCEEDINGS oF THE 
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS I.Aw 33 (1954), reprinted in 50 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 143 (1955), suggest that ultimately the individual should be entitled to press 
any claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement to a determination before 
an impartial tribunal. This analysis was adopted in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 190 
A.2d 825 (N.J. 1963). 
133 Until recently, t!Ie question of control of the grievance procedure has been 
considered a matter of contract. If t!Ie agreement clearly allowed t!Ie individual to 
process his own grievance t!Irough arbitration, the courts would honor this agreement. 
See Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. ll7, 139 A.2d 6ll (1958). If t!Ie contract 
language was ambiguous on t!Ie question of who could control the grievance procedure, 
it might be interpreted eit!Ier to protect individual employee interests, as in In re Nonvalk 
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fore, is not entitled to arbitration of his claims in his own right.m 
The result of this combination of contract provisions and labor 
policy is to vest in the union officials unlimited discretion to de-
prive the employee of any job right by simply agreeing with man-
agement to do so. 
Yet, concern for individual rights within the collective bar-
gaining process requires that this power be exercised for and not 
against employees. The Supreme Court has held that it must be 
exercised consistently with the duty of fair representation.185 In 
addition, Congress has in three instances adopted policies which 
affirm individual rights in the administration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. These are: (1) the expression in section 9(a) 
of the NLRA that the individual may present his own grievance 
under specified conditions;136 (2) the provision of the LMRDA, 
in sections 10l(a)(4) and 10l(a)(5), that the individual is entitled 
to judicial review of union disciplinary action, which action must 
meet the statutory due process standards;187 (3) the congressional 
desire, expressed in section 301 of the LMRA, that the collective 
bargaining agreement stabilize the employment relationship.138 
While these statutory standards do not dictate where the line 
is to be drawn between individual and collective judgments, they 
do reflect congressional concern with sufficient protection of the 
individual employee in the administration of the union-employer 
agreement. 
Thus, the two possible extremes in the relationship between 
union and employees in the administration of the agreement are 
foreclosed by the national labor policy. The employee cannot 
be given a judicial right to enforce every claim under a collective 
bargaining agreement, but neither can he be treated as having 
no rights against an adverse union-management judgment. A line 
Tire &: Rubber Co., 100 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951), or to allow the union freedom of 
action to control the grievance process, as in Procter &: Gamble Independent Union v. 
Procter &: Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1962). 
In Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 
1962), the court came perilously close to holding that, as a matter of national labor 
policy, employees would not be recognized as having rights under contracts to process 
grievances to arbitration. The court reasoned that such a construction was necessary 
to avoid chaos in collective bargaining. On this matter, see note 162 infra and accom• 
panying text. The court held that the employee has a right to process a grievance only 
if the employer and union expressly give him one. 
134 See notes 131 and 133 supra. 
135 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
136 See note 103 supra. 
137 Cf. text accompanying note 39 supra and note 182 infra. 
138 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
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must be drawn between those claims which the union may dispose 
of in good faith, and those which must be heard-in some forum 
-on their merits. The good faith discretion test does not ade-
quately protect the employee's basic relation to his job. Discharge 
and seniority cases involving critical job interests should be heard 
on their merits in some impartial forum. 139 The employee should 
be allowed to prove that his claim is meritorious. The union would 
then be required to demonstrate why it rejected his claim, in light 
of its decisions to process other claims.140 This pattern of proof 
might make the duty of fair representation more meaningful. It 
is consistent with the proof pattern in cases of prima facie torts. 
Plaintiff proves the infliction of harm by the defendant, and the 
defendant is then required to justify his action.141 
Thus far, such protection for critical job interests has not de-
veloped. Although this area is one where we might expect the legal 
system to afford effective protection to rights under a written 
document, employees have received little genuine legal protection. 
While several courts have indicated that an employee may re-
cover damages against a union which fails to represent him fairly, 
this remedy is subject to two defects. The Supreme Court, as we 
will discuss shortly, has cast nearly fatal doubts on state court 
jurisdiction to provide such a remedy. But the other difficulty is 
that the damage remedy against the union may not meet the em-
ployee's basic need: the continuation of the employment relation-
ship, or its advantages. This need can only be meaningfully 
protected if the employer is subject to suit. But the employer is 
130 Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Au-
tonomy 1'ersus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631 (1959). A bare majority 
of the NLRB seem willing to undertake the task. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 
No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962), discussed in text at note 196 infra. 
140 f'or a clear illustration of this process, see Undezwood v. Neuhoff Packing Co., 
51 L.R.R.M. 2182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962). Plaintiff was discharged for absenteeism. The 
union processed her case through the grievance procedure and then dropped it. The 
court held that the employer had properly discharged her. Since the contract had not 
been breached, the union had not violated its duty of fair representation. A similar 
approach was taken in Stewart v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 294 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1961). 
The failure to treat a complaining employee the same as similarly situated em-
ployees was the critical allegation which led the court in Thompson v. Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters, 52 L.R.R.M. 2881 (4th Cir. 1963), to recognize that a valid federal 
statutory complaint had been made against the union. Conversely, a showing that the 
union handled other similar situations in a like manner has been accepted as a justi-
fication for refusal to issue a charge of violation of § 8(b)(l)(A) of the NLRA by the 
general counsel of the NLRB. See Adm. Ruling S.R. 1761, 49 L.R.R.M. 1756, Feb. 6, 
1962. For other cases in which the court has passed on the merits of employees' con-
tentions, see Blumrosen, supra note 139, at 657-58. 
141 Sec Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 7 (1957); 
Comment, 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 503 (1952). 
1486 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
not directly subject to the duty of fair representation. He is pro-
hibited from benefiting from an agreement which violates the 
duty of fair representation. But the force of conventional legal 
analysis plus the availability of section 301 has led to the wide-
spread use of an additional theory which will subject the employer 
to liability. The most convenient theory available is that of con-
tract. The employee claims that the employer breached the collec-
tive bargaining agreement by discharging him or denying him 
other benefits due under the agreement. He seeks relief as a third-
party beneficiary. 
Thus the "tort" duty of fair representation can be effectively 
implemented only by joining the employer under a "contract" 
theory. But when this is done, the terms of the particular collective 
bargaining agreement are brought into sharp focus. These terms 
may and often do deal with the right of individual employees to 
enforce the contract in court or to utilize the grievance and arbi-
tration procedures under the agreement. The Supreme Court has 
held that the right of employees to sue under section 301 of the 
LMRA depends upon whether the contract under which he claims 
gives finality to the decisions made within the contractual frame-
work in grievance processing or arbitration. If the contract accords 
finality, then the employee cannot sue for breach of contract.142 
Contracts containing grievance and arbitration procedures 
often permit the inference that control of the process rests in the 
union, not the employee, and that the decisions in that process 
are final. Under an agreement so interpreted, the individual could 
not sue under section 301 because the parties intended finality to 
attach to their decisions, and could not use the grievance-arbi-
tration procedures himself because their control rests in the union. 
However, the identification of the intention of the parties in 
the construction of these agreements is not a simple matter. Most 
contracts can be interpreted as ambiguous on the question of the 
right of the individual to press his own grievance. The resolution 
of this ambiguity will turn, in the last analysis, on judicial policy 
in connection with individual rights in the collective bargaining 
agreement. From contract considerations we have returned to legal 
policy as the basis for resolving the question of individual rights 
in the collective bargaining process. This being the case, the 
"contract-tort" analysis has been of little utility. It might have been 
more profitable had we phrased the question initially as the extent 
142 General Drivers Union v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963). 
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to which both parties-union and employer--are bound by the 
duty of fair representation. However, the courts have adopted the 
"contract" approach and have taken three discernible positions on 
the question of individual rights to enforce the contract, or to in-
voke its grievance and arbitration provisions. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the view of Pro-
fessor Summers that section 9(a) of the NLRA permits the employee 
to press his claims through the grievance and arbitration proce-
dures under the contract without the assent or assistance of the 
union. That court said, in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.: 
"If the protection of those employees' interests is left wholly 
to the unlimited discretion of the union, then in a particular 
situation an important part of the security the employee 
hoped to gain by union membership, and which on the face 
of the bargaining contract he appeared to have gained, might 
be lost without a fair opportunity to defend himself or to 
realize upon the benefits granted to him by the contract. And 
such loss would occur even though the union acted in good 
faith in declining to use the grievance procedure to contest 
the validity of his discharge from employment .... 
"It is true the employee is not a nominal or formal party 
to a collective bargaining agreement. But the rights, duties 
and benefits of his employment are so created and controlled 
by the agreement made in his behalf by his statutory repre-
sentative, the union, that for some purposes, at least, he ought 
to be regarded as a third-party beneficiary in substance as well 
as in spirit, or as possessing independent rights under section 
9(a) of the Labor Management Relatiom Act ... which ought 
to be considered as part of every such contract by operation of 
Jaw."H3 
An intermediate approach which seems to have been adopted 
by the Maryland courts, and which I have elsewhere espoused, 
would permit the employee to pursue his action against the em-
ployer in those cases where the union breached its duty of fair 
representation. This view most closely relates the "contractual" 
action against the employer with the "tort" action against the 
union. It allows the union and employer to dispose of non-meri-
14s Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 190 A.2d 825, 835-36 (N.J. 1963). Professor Summers' 
articles are cited in notes 85 and 132 supra. Donnelly did not benefit from the solicitude 
for individual rights expressed by the New Jersey court, because he had failed to 
indicate that he wished to press his grievance "pro se" without union help. This, the 
court held, deprived him of the right to do so. The insistence on this rather technical 
demand by the individual worker, in the context of a decision favoring his claim, is 
incongruous. 
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torious grievances, but would allow the individual to press those 
claims which the union should have asserted under its duty of fair 
representation. In Jenkins v. liVm. Schluderberg-T. ]. Kurdle Co. 
the Maryland court explained its position on this question: 
"Conflicts of interest may exist or develop in many instances 
in grievance matters as between individuals or groups of em-
ployees represented by the same bargaining agent. It seems 
desirable that the bargaining agent should have power to deal 
with such problems. It is possible that even the discharge of 
a single individual might have wide repercussions in employer-
employee relations, though usually this would not seem prob-
able. 
"Possibilities of indifference, favoritism, discrimination 
and of trading off the interests of one group or member for the 
benefit of another group or member, of course, exist. Yet, 
possibilities of abuse of trust and confidence exist, in many 
fields .... Courts will redress misuse of power. In the case of 
trusts they may take over the direction and control of the 
administration of the trust in greater or lesser degree, but 
ordinarily they do not do so and leave the trustee free to 
exercise the discretionary powers which the trust instrument 
confers upon him. In corporate affairs, the courts do not 
undertake to take over the functions of the board of directors, 
though they may grant relief when the board abuses its powers, 
as by favoring the interests of one stockholder or group of 
stockholders at the expense of others .... 
"[A]s a general rule grievance procedures provided by a col-
lective bargaining agreement should be a bar to suits by indi-
viduals against the Employer based upon alleged violation of 
the agreement, but that such suits are not barred if the Union 
acted unfairly towards the employee in refusing to press the 
employee's claim through to, and including, arbitration under 
the collective bargaining agreement."144 
A third approach has been adopted by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. The court, construing an ambiguous con-
tract provision as not permitting the employee to process a 
grievance concerning his discharge without union assistance, was 
unimpressed with arguments based on section 9(a) of the LMRA. 
Basing its decision in part on its view of sound labor relations, 
the court stated, in Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of 
Machinists: 
144 Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 574-75, 144 A.2d 88, 
98 (1958). See Blumrosen, supra note 139. 
1963] WoRKER-U NION RELATIONSHIP 1489 
"Chaos would result if every disenchanted employee, every 
disturbed employee, and every employee who harbored a dis-
like for his employer, could harass both the union and the 
employer by processing grievances through the various steps 
of the grievance procedure and ultimately by bringing an 
action to compel arbitration in the face of clear contractual 
provisions intended to channel the enforcement remedy 
through the union. "145 
The risks implicit in this position are most vividly demonstrated 
by a case arising in the Sixth Circuit. 
In Union News Co. v. Hildreth,146 the company operated a 
lunch counter in the Michigan Central railroad station in Detroit,. 
where it employed approximately a dozen workers. It became 
clear that either money or food was being stolen when food costs 
rose significantly in relation to gross sales. The company could 
not identify any particular culprit, and wished to discharge all 
of the employees. The union objected. Prolonged union-manage-
ment negotiations followed. The company convinced the union 
that a pattern of theft existed. A compromise was reached between 
the union's desire to protect the employees and the company's 
desire to discharge them all. Half of the employees would be laid 
off and replaced with another group. If the ratio of the cost of 
food to income then improved, this would signify that the theft 
had ceased. The layoffs would then be converted to discharges. 
Otherwise, the employees would be reinstated. 
The layoffs resulted in a remarkable improvement. The in-
come of the lunch counter went up 250 dollars a week, and the 
ratio of cost of goods to gross income returned to a normal level 
almost immediately. The union then acceded to the discharge of 
the laid-off employees. The union had not acted out of malice or 
evil intent. Management had acted out of legitimate motives. 
Gladys Hildreth, who had worked as a waitress for ten years~ 
was among those discharged. There was no proof of her guilt in 
the theft. The contract provided that no employee would be dis-
charged except for just cause. She sought the support of the union 
in challenging the discharge but was, of course, rebuffed. The 
union honored its agreement not to press such a grievance. The 
company refused to process the grievance outside of the channels 
controlled by the union. Plaintiff sued the company. 
146 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1962). 
146 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). Adhered to after trial, when reviewed in light of 
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1963). 
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The initial planning problems facing plaintiff's counsel in 
such a case are extraordinary. Most of the potential procedural 
obstacles in the Hildreth case were not raised. But in analogous 
cases they have so plagued the litigation that the merits were never 
reached. The procedural problems include: (1) Indispensable 
parties. The union has been held to be an indispensable party in 
an action against an employer for breach of the collective bargain-
ing contract on grounds of its involvement as the other signatory 
to the agreement.147 (2) Amenability of the union to suit. It has 
been suggested that no cause of action may be stated against the 
union for breach of its fiduciary duty because the injury was caused 
by the mutual agent of the employee and his co-principals.148 The 
inapplicability of this defense is clear.149 Where the union 
breaches its fiduciary duty, it is not acting on behalf of the injured 
employee. Furthermore, th~ duty stems from the federal statute, 
not from the fact of membership, and the defense based on mem-
bership is technically irrelevant.150 The defense prevents enforce-
ment of this federal statutory duty and is invalid on simple prin-
ciples of federal supremacy.151 (3) Lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Given the plethora of tribunals active in the area of labor 
law, the hydra-headed concept of exclusive jurisdiction plagues 
every type of action. As applied to the action for breach of fidu-
ciary duty, it takes three forms: (a) The courts defer to the griev-
147 Nix v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 264 F.2d 875, rehearing denied, 264 F.2d 879 (3d 
Cir. 1959). 
148 See Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952), which was over-
ruled by Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). 
149 That the union is a juridical entity subject to suit is almost too clear to require 
elaboration. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. 
Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960); United States 
v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958); LMRA, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1958); 
Comment, Unions as Judicial Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712 (1957). Marshall v. International 
Longshoremen's Union, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962), contains 
a dispositive exposition on the point. See also Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., supra note 
148. 
150 See note 86 supra. 
151 If any further demonstration of the invalidity of the doctrine is necessary, the 
incongruity of applying it and the principle of Nix v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 264 
F.2d 875, rehearing denied, 264 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1959), at the same time, might be 
illuminating. Nix holds that the union is an indispensable party in an action by the 
employee against the employer for breach of the labor agreement. But under the 
Marchitto rule the union is not amenable to suit by the employer. But if the union 
is not amenable to suit, then an action could not proceed against the employer. The 
result would be that the employee may never obtain a hearing on the merits of his 
contention of maladministration of the labor agreement, even though his substantive 
rights in the matter are clear-and all because a partner may not sue his co-partners 
for the wrongs of a mutual agent! 
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ance procedures under the collective bargaining contract. The 
requirement that contract remedies be exhausted as far as possible 
is rigorously applied. Any failure to press the claim as far as the 
grievance and arbitration procedures permit leads to dismissal.152 
(b) The principle that arbitration awards are subject to minimal 
judicial review has sometimes been applied to foreclose full hear-
ing on an allegation that the award was rendered in violation of 
the union's duty of fair representation.153 The principle that ar-
bitration awards are virtually non-reviewable was developed in 
cases in which the union vigorously contested managerial action.154 
It has no application to cases in which it is alleged the union vio-
lated the duty of fair representation. Evaluation of such a claim 
requires full scrutiny of all the facts by the court.1515 The two is-
sues should not be confused lest the finality principle dominate 
the question of whether there has been compliance with the duty 
of fair representation. (c) The pre-emption doctrine requiring ju-
dicial deference to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB has 
been applied by some courts even when there was no indication 
that the NLRB would, or could, assert jurisdiction to define and 
enforce the duty of fair representation.156 The present status of 
the pre-emption problem in light of recent decisions is more fully 
treated subsequently. 
Defendant in the Hildreth case did not rely on any of these 
procedural defenses, but went directly to the merits of the case. 
The employer had, in good faith, entered into an agreement with 
the union to solve a difficult labor relations problem. It claimed 
the right to rely on this agreement as providing immunity from 
an action by a disgruntled employee. 
1152 See notes 130 and 131 supra; Blumrosen, supra note 139, at 642-65. The special 
problem under the Railway Labor Act of the jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment 
Board is discussed in note 119 supra. 
153 Palizzotto v. Local 641, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters, 67 N.J. Super. 145, 170 A.2d 
57 (Ch. Div. 1961), affd, 36 N.J. 294, 177 A.2d 538 (1962). 
154 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
ms As in Moore v. Local 89, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962), 
cert. granted, 371 U.S. 966 (1963); Underwood v. Neuhoff Packing Co., 51 L.R.R.M. 
2182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). In General 
Drivers Union v. Riss & Co., 298 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1962), remanded, 372 U.S. 517 (1963), 
the court of appeals distinguished between a grievance procedure and an arbitration 
award, and refused to attach to a decision of the former-type tribunal the finality that it 
was required to give to the latter. The Supreme Court remanded on the ground that 
"finality" was to be determined by interpretation of the contract. 
156 Compare Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. Employees, 369 
P.2d 1006 (Idaho 1962) (no pre-emption of action claiming breach of fiduciary duty of 
fair representation), with Baker v. Shopmen's Local 755, Int'! Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 
403 Pa. 31, 168 A.2d 340 (1961) (pre-emption of similar action). 
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied legal pro-
tection for Gladys Hildreth's claim because her discharge had been 
assented to by the union in good faith, and such assent was per-
mitted under the contract. The court believed that this result was 
called for by the contract and by the national policy of promoting 
the collective bargaining process. 
The case poses a dilemma. Group fault was established; indi-
vidual fault was not. The court recognized that there was no basis 
for inferring that any of the laid-off employees were more guilty 
of theft than those who remained at work. There was simply no 
proof of individual guilt. The contract prohibited discharge with-
out just cause and provided for arbitration. In labor arbitration 
the burden of proof of just cause is normally on the employer. 
When a criminal act is alleged, this burden is substantial.157 In all 
probability, an arbitrator would not have sustained the discharge 
of these employees. But union and company had agreed to dispense 
with proof of the guilt of the laid-off employees. Thus, the union 
deprived the employees of a hearing before an arbitrator in which, 
on the evidence adduced, they would probably have prevailed. 
Gladys Hildreth could not have been deprived of any of her 
legal rights, no matter how insignificant, by any court on the basis 
of the record in the case. Yet, she was deprived of her job, despite 
ten years of seniority, under a contract protecting her from dis-
charge except for just cause, when her union refused to insist that 
her case be reviewed on its merits. 
The court adopted three erroneous premises in reaching its 
decision. 
(1) It assumed that the union is entitled to as broad discretion 
in the administration as in the negotiation of the collective bar-
gaining contract. This assumption was made explicit by the court 
in quoting Professor Cox.158 The preceding discussion demon-
strates that the assumption is erroneous, and that the union is 
-entitled to a much narrower range of discretion in the adminis-
tration of the collective bargaining agreement than in its nego-
tiation.159 
(2) The court assumed that any limitation on the power of 
union and management to agree to the discharge of the employees 
157 See Bendix Aviation Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 480 (1956); Universal Atlas Cement Co., 
26 Lab. Arb. 529 (1956); General Refractories Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 470 (1955); Kroger Co., 
25 Lab. Arb. 906 (1955). See STESSIN, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE cb. 8 (1960). 
158 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 622 (1956). 
159 See text at note 110 supra. 
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must be found in the collective bargaining agreement.160 How-
ever, the duty of fair representation is imposed by law, not by 
contract. Agreements which violate the union's duty of fair rep-
resentation are voidable, and management may not rely on them. 
Thus, the duty of fair representation is binding on the employer 
as well as on the union.161 
(3) The court assumed that the recognition of the employee's 
rights in this case would render the collective bargaining process 
ineffective. "Unless such bilateral decisions, ... between a Union 
and an employer, be sustained in court, the bargaining process is 
a mirage, without the efficacy contemplated by the philosophy of 
the law which makes its use compulsory."162 Other courts have 
made similar statements. In Cortez v. Ford Motor Co.,163 the issue 
was whether the employer had violated the recall provisions of the 
agreement. The union had failed to press the matter, possibly 
because the aggrieved employees were all women. The contract 
provided that the union was to control the grievance procedure. 
The court said: "It is likewise obvious that for the courts to . . . 
[ determine the propriety of the refusal to process the grievance] 
would quickly bring the wheels of industry to a standstill, along 
with the wheels of justice."164 
In another case, the court approved the philosophy of union 
control over grievance processing as follows: "A contrary proce-
100 "Plaintiff's right of action, if any, must arise from the terms of the contract 
between the Union and the employer ..•. 
"The question, then, for decision here is whether such statutory power [of the 
union to bargain collectively with the employer], in combination with the terms of 
the bargaining contract, authorized the union and the defendant to mutually conclude, 
as a part of the bargaining process, that the circumstances shown by the evidence 
provided just cause for the layoff and discharge of plaintiff and other of defendant's 
employees." 295 F.2d at 663-64. 
161 See note 86 supra. Jenkins v. Wm. Schludcrberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 
144 A.2d 88 (1958), explicitly holds that an agreement with the union generally will be 
a good defense to the employer, unless the union acted unfairly toward the employee 
in making such agreement. 
It is possible to construe the Hildreth decision as implying no more than Parker 
v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959), that the agreement with 
the union will provide a complete defense to the employer regardless of whether the 
union acted fairly, and that the only remedy for unfair union behavior is an action 
against it. In Hildreth the action was only against the employer. However, the tenor 
of the Hildreth opinion suggests that the court was satisfied that the union had not 
failed in its obligations toward the employee. On the appropriate remedy in these cases, 
sec Blumroscn, supra note 139, at 658-64. 
162 295 F.2d at 664. 
103 349 Mich. 108, 184 N.W.2d 523 (1957). 
164 Id. at 126, 184 N.W.2d at 532. The action had been brought in assumpsit, and 
the court expressly put to one side considerations relating to the union's statutory duty. 
Yet, the prediction as to the consequences of recognition of individual employee actions 
would be the same whether the recognition came under a contract or a tort theory. 
1494 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
dure which would allow each individual employee to overrule and 
supersede the governing body of a Union would create a condition 
of disorder and instability which would be disastrous to labor as 
well as industry."165 
There are two difficulties with this type of statement. If it 
has validity, it is in connection with a system in which an employee 
has the legal right to press any claim of contract violation, irre-
spective of its merits or the position of the union, in an environ-
ment where this is a realistic possibility. However, these forebod-
ings have no application to a narrower rule permitting employees 
to press meritorious claims concerning critical job interests, in an 
environment where the resort to law is not common. Thus, they 
appear to be an example of "straw man rhetoric," a rejection of 
a proposition not asserted, which implicitly rejects a narrower 
proposition without independent evaluation. 
More importantly, the statements lack empirical proof. There 
is no evidence that the collective bargaining process would grind 
to a halt if individual employees were allowed legal protection 
for their critical job interests. The possibility of legal pro-
tection might make union and management officials more cau-
tious in disposing of employee claims, but this would not mean 
the ruination of collective bargaining. It is as reasonable to as-
sume that union and management would learn to accommodate 
to a rule which prohibited them from informally waiving em-
ployee rights in connection with discharge and seniority claims. 
The history of collective bargaining demonstrates the basic flexi-
bility of union and management. Management has survived the 
demise of the managerial prerogative theory of business operation. 
Unions have adapted to technological change. There is no reason 
to assume that similar flexibility would not exist in connection 
with the recognition of individual rights. The prediction that 
individual rights are incompatible with collective bargaining is 
no more than a cloak for predilection. It is a form of policy mak-
ing. But policy making should be done explicitly where possible, 
not as an implicit aspect of a prediction. Legal policy should pro-
tect employees' critical job interests unless it is demonstrated that 
such protection is incompatible with collective bargaining. No 
such demonstration has been made.166 It seems doubtful whether 
165 Bianculli v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 115 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
166 The evidence developed thus far is inconclusive. Professor Summers has analyzed 
Swedish law which permits extensive individual protection of his contract rights. See 
Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A 
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it can be made. Some unions have survived every attack which 
government, management, and even other factions in labor have 
mounted against them. Recognition of the rights of a few unjustly 
treated employees will not spell the doom of collective bargaining. 
The ultimate irony of the Hildreth decision is that the arbi-
trary action of the employer justified the equally arbitrary action 
of the union. Granting that, in the absence of unionism, the 
employer could arbitrarily discharge some members of a group 
without evidence of their guilt, the purpose of collective bargain-
ing is to destroy the arbitrary character of employer action. This 
purpose is subverted if the arbitrary employer action becomes the 
justification for the union's failure to protect the employee. The 
question is whether this was the type of employer action with 
which the union was entitled to agree under its fiduciary duty to 
represent the employees fairly. The court in Hildreth never faced 
this question. 
Because of the admixture of contract and tort and statutory obli-
gations in these cases, problems of procedure, identification of 
issues, formulation of substantive standards and appropriate reme-
dies are difficult. The forms of action still affect our conception 
of legal problems and their potential solutions. The categories of 
tort and contract supply us with ready-made procedural, substan-
tive and remedial rules for the disposition of cases. To characterize 
a case as tort or contract automatically invokes the rules related 
to those respective categories. The problems of individual rights in 
collective bargaining contract administration cannot be satisfac-
torily solved in such a mechanical fashion. An analysis of the 
specific problems which seeks desirable and realistic solutions is 
Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963). However, Swedish 
collective bargaining contracts apparently do not protect job security so most of the 
issues which would be critical in the United States do not arise. The bulk of the cases 
are wage claims. 
Under the Railway Labor Act, individuals have been afforded some minimum 
procedural protection without the destruction of collective bargaining. See Kroner, 
Disciplinary Hearings Under the Railway Labor Act: A Survey of Adjustment Board 
Awards, 46 MINN. L. REv. 277 (1961); Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor 
Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 41 (1962). 
Moreover, the courts attribute unrealistic simplicity to the grievance procedure itself. 
The infinite complexity of the process is vividly described in KUHN, BARGAINING IN 
GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT (1961). Kuhn concludes that various work groups within the 
bargaining unit exert their technologically based power through the grievance procedure 
to improve their own position with little regard for the broader interests of the union. 
This "fractional bargaining" benefits organized subgroups within the union, but not 
the individual. It works for claims held in common by coherent work groups. Kuhn 
suggests that considerable chaos is presently an expected part of grievance processing. 
Thus, the "avoidance of chaos" argument against recognition of individual rights in 
grievance processing loses some of its significance. 
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more fruitful than any attempt to characterize the employee's 
claim abstractly as sounding in tort or contract.167 
(I) The issues. To prevail, the employee must establish that 
(a) he has a valid or meritorious claim under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, (b) that it was denied by the employer with 
the assent or acquiescence of the union, and (c) that the union 
was obligated by law to press his claim on behalf of the employee. 
Since in most cases the agreement provides for arbitration of such 
disputes, this analysis means that the court must determine if the 
employee had a meritorious claim worth presenting to an arbi-
trator, and if it was the type of claim which the union should 
have pressed to arbitration. 
(2) The appropriate remedy. (a) Damages. The New York168 
and Pennsylvania169 courts have held that, in the event the union 
fails to press a grievance in violation of its duty of fair represen-
tation, the employee has a damage action against the union, but 
no remedy against the employer. The Maryland court has held 
that the employee in such a situation has an action against the em-
ployer as well as against the union.170 
At first glance, the New York-Pennsylvania rule seems to recon-
cile the individual claim with the needs of collective bargaining. 
The employee may sue the union for damages, but the employer 
who relied on the union decision is immune. Thus, collective bar-
gaining between union and employer is vindicated. This analysis 
is superficial for three reasons: 
167 In Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 83 Sup. Ct. 1423 (1963), 
the Supreme Court refused to accept the characterization of the cause of action as 
sounding in "tort" or "contract" as influential in the disposition of a pre-emption claim. 
"It is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the 
determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction." Id. at 1428. 
In McGinnis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 75 N.J. Super. 517, 183 A.2d 486 (App. 
Div. 1962), an action against union and employer for violation of seniority rights by 
failure to recall plaintiff in proper order, the court held that the contract claim rested 
in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Board, but it retained jurisdic• 
tion over the action for breach of fiduciary duty. In connection with allegations of 
conspiracy between union and employer to deprive plaintiff of his contractual rights, 
the court said, at 521, 183 A.2d at 488-89: "[T]hat pleading presents an odd mi.xture of 
tort claim and a claim of rights under the collective bargaining agreement." The court 
held that the employer was subject to liability on a conspiracy theory. 
168 Parker v. Bored<, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959). 
169 Falsetti v. Local 2026, UM\\T, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960). 
110 Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958). 
New Jersey has adopted a rule holding the employer liable for conspiracy with the 
union to ignore the employee's contract rights, O'Brien v. Dade Bros., 18 N.J. 457, 114 
A.2d 266 (1955); McGinnis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 75 N.J. Super. 517, 183 A.2d 486 
(App. Div. 1962). But it is not clear that the employer's liability is coterminous with 
that of the union. 
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First, it assumes that the employer is entitled to rely on an 
agreement made with the union which the union by definition 
had no power to make. This premise is refuted by the Steele deci-
sion.171 The argument that the employer should not be held re-
sponsible for the union's default toward the employee breaks down 
because at some point in the negotiation of the grievance the em-
ployer will become aware that the union has decided not to press 
the claim. Since the individual must exhaust such remedies under 
the contract as are open to him,172 knowledge of the conflict be-
tween individual and union will be brought home to the employer. 
Perhaps his monetary liability should not reach back prior to the 
time he acquired this knowledge, but this consideration goes to 
the details of the remedy, not its existence. 
Second, the rule assumes that damages against the union are 
an appropriate remedy in these cases. The wrong is deprivation 
of continued employment, and measurement of damages is likely 
to be very difficult. Any damage remedy is likely to be either in-
adequate, exorbitant, or both, depending on the perspective. 
Third, damages against the union do not reflect the wrong done 
to the employee. It consists of a breach of contract by the em-
ployer as well as a breach of the duty of fair representation by 
the union. It seems strange to absolve the employer of liability 
to the employee for breach of contract because the union breached 
its duty of fair representation. 
However, it is appropriate to limit the damage liability of the 
employer in such a case for the following reason: if the union had 
performed its duty, it would have pressed the employee's claim 
to arbitration. If the arbitrator decided against the employer, he 
would require the employer to comply specifically with th~ con-
tract in the future, e.g., reinstate a wrongfully discharged worker, 
and would order the employee made whole for improper loss of 
time, e.g., back pay from the time of discharge to reinstatement. 
The employer's financial liability in arbitration is normally lim-
ited to past losses which have been suffered by employees. It 
does not embrace the present value of lost future earnings. The 
future losses are avoided by requiring the employer to perform 
the agreement specifically. Thus, a back pay award by an arbi-
trator will be substantially less than a potential damage award 
for wrongful discharge. The employer, by agreeing to arbitrate, 
171 Quoted in note 86 supra. 
172 See cases cited in note 130 supra. 
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seeks to limit his financial liability for breach of contract to that 
amount which an arbitrator would impose, and he should not 
be exposed to heavier monetary penalties. 
But this argument goes not to the question of whether the 
employer should be held responsible, but to the appropriate rem-
edy. If the court were to impose the same remedy which the 
arbitrator would impose, for example, reinstatement and back 
pay in a discharge case, there is no reason to absolve the employer 
because the union breached its duty. 
(b) Specific performance of collective contract obligations. This 
analysis suggests that the courts should order specific performance 
of collective bargaining contract obligations as a remedy in these 
cases. In the normal case of discharge, this will mean reinstate-
ment, with or without back pay. These obligations have been 
successfully imposed by arbitrators for years, with ultimate court 
sanction rarely used. There is no practical or theoretical reason why 
the courts should not use the same remedies.173 
There may be cases in which, because of the peculiar circum-
stances, it is appropriate to utilize the damage remedy rather than 
reinstatement with or without back pay. In such cases, a court 
would be in a position to assess the damages against the appro-
priate parties.174 
(c) Referral to arbitration. The crux of the employee's com-
plaint in most cases is the failure of the parties to submit his 
grievance to arbitration. The New Jersey Supreme Court in the 
Donnelly case has suggested that the appropriate remedy would 
be to require the submission of the grievance to arbitration with 
sufficient judicially imposed safeguards to assure fairness in the 
arbitral process. 
(3) The standard to be applied in defining the union's duty. 
Two different points of view have been expressed on the scope 
of the union's duty to press employee claims. One is that the 
good faith test is at all times sufficient.175 The other is that certain 
173 The reluctance to use such equitable remedies because of a tradition of non-enforce-
ment of personal service contracts is not in keeping with contemporary solutions to labor 
relations problems. See Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 175 A.2d 639 
(1961); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). Compare, however, 
Mello v. Local 4408, United Steelworkers, 82 R.I. 60, 105 A.2d 806 (1954). In any event, 
if in doubt, the court could always order the matter submitted to an arbitrator and then 
enforce his awards. Compare Matter of Exercycle Corp. (Maratta), 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 
N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961). 
174 See Blumrosen, supra note 139, at 663. 
175 See Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959); 
Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Cox, supra note 158; 
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claims, such as discharge and seniority, must be administered by 
the union on their individual merits, while remaining claims are 
subject to the good faith test.176 Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
must choose between these views. Hopefully, the Court will pro-
vide a level of protection for individuals within the structure of 
the collective bargaining agreement which most lower courts have 
not heretofore developed. A factor pointing in this direction is 
the 1959 legislation concerning employee rights within the union, 
which will be discussed shortly. 
(4) The standard to be applied in interpreting the agreement 
to determine if the employee has a valid claim. The choice here 
is between a judicial construction of the agreement, or a judicial 
determination that the employee's claim is plausible enough so 
that an arbitrator might recognize it, even if the court would not. 
The gravamen of the employee's complaint is that his case did 
not get before a labor arbitrator. In some instances, arbitrators 
use a different hearing process and a different standard of judg-
ment than courts.177 The employee is not well protected if, as a 
result of a union refusal to process a grievance, his case is placed 
before a tribunal where he will lose on the merits, while, if the 
union had performed its duty, he might have prevailed. There-
fore, in cases in which the issue is failure to arbitrate, the court 
might arrange, either as a part of the remedy or as a part of its 
decisional process, to have the crucial isssues of contract construc-
tion determined by a professional labor arbitrator. The judicial 
function then would be to determine not the merits, but the meri-
torious nature of the claim. 
This consideration of some of the problems which arise in 
the context of an employee's suit suggest that the characterization 
of the employee's claim as tort or contract is inadequate to resolve 
the various specific problems which are likely to emerge. The 
Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959). 
176 See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962); Clark v. Hein-Werner 
Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 100 N.W.2d 317, cert. 
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Blumrosen, supra note 139. Possibly the cases from the 
southern states, listed in note 98 supra, could be cited in support of this view, with the 
reservation indicated in that footnote. The articles cited in note 132 supra go farther 
in the direction of protection of individual rights than the suggestion made here. 
177 The theft cases provided an illuminating illustration. Note the difference between 
judicial and arbitral approach to the problem by comparing the Union News Co. v. 
Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961) (theft by unidentified employee justified dismissal 
of employee without proof of guilt), and Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 N.J. 
541, 138 A.2d 24 (1958) (railroad entitled to discharge dining car steward if he "converted" 
a small piece of ham), with the arbitration awards cited in note 157 supra, which suggest 
that arbitrators view such matters with less severity. 
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cause of action against the employer can most conveniently be 
viewed as contractual, and allowable under section 301, only if 
the union breached its statutory duty of fairly representing the 
employees.178 The suit against the union can most conveniently 
be viewed as in tort, for breach of a duty, and in some cases for 
breach of the LMRDA, a possibility which will be discussed in 
the next section. The required combination of the two elements 
in a single litigation can, if necessary, be viewed under the con-
cept of conspiracy, provided this does not lead to a requirement 
of evil motive on the part of the employer or the union. But, 
each aspect of the rules relating to such a suit must be examined 
in light of its labor relations implications-characterization as 
tort or contract is no substitute for analysis. 
The ultimate resolution of these problems lies with the Su-
preme Court, and the time is at hand for the Court to make good 
the obligation which it assumed when it first defined the duty 
of fair representation: to accept and decide a sufficient number 
of cases in the area within a reasonable time to provide the basic 
guidance necessary for the further development and integration 
of this new field of law. In other areas of labor law, the Court 
has met this obligation in connection with the constitutional 
problem of picketing,179 the pre-emption problem,180 and the in-
terpretation of collective bargaining contracts under section 301.181 
It should now do so with respect to individual rights in the col-
lective bargaining context. 
Two additional developments will affect the immediate future 
178 The principle that collective bargaining agreements are to be interpreted as 
precluding employee rights to sue the employer for breach of contract [Procter &: 
Gamble Independent Union v. Procter&: Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1962); 
Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959)] is a rule of 
contract construction enforceable only as a federal principle under § 301 of the LMRA. 
Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). As such, it must be coordinated with other prin-
ciples of the national labor policy. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 
(1956), for an analogous case construing the language of a no-strike clause, in light 
of the rights of employees under the National Labor Relations Act. The construction 
suggested in the text would similarly harmonize the collective bargaining process with 
the protection of individual employee claims. Reaching such a result under state law 
is Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958). 
The possibility of an individual suit under § 301 was established in Smith v. Evening 
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), but the circumstances wherein such actions would be 
permitted were not identified. See Mr. Justice Black's dissent, 371 U.S. at 201. 
179 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
180 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
1s1 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 
370 U.S. 238 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); 
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). 
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of the question of individual rights in the collective bargaining 
process. They are the adoption in 1959 of the LMRDA and the 
decision of the NLRB, in late 1962, to enforce the duty of fair 
representation. 
G. The LMRDA and Individual Rights Under 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Obviously, division of the law regulating the relation of union 
and employee into three phases-political, internal and economic 
-is artificial. The behavior of union and worker does not always 
fall nicely into one of the categories. General political consider-
ations may affect the internal affairs of the union and may also 
affect its performance in collective bargaining.182 Furthermore, 
there is an intimate nexus between internal union affairs and the 
administration of the collective bargaining process. The collec-
tive bargaining agreement is administered by the union through 
a series of internal decisions relating to position in negotiation, 
the processing of grievances, and the taking of cases to arbitration. 
This basic fact of institutional life-that collective bargaining 
decisions are made through the internal mechanism of the union-
was ignored by Congress when it adopted the LMRDA. Congress 
assumed that there were two separate spheres of union activity, 
one relating to collective bargaining, the other to internal affairs, 
and it intended to regulate only the latter.183 But this intention 
is impossible to carry out. If all internal union decisions are sub-
ject to Title I of the LMRDA, this will inevitably include deci-
sions in connection with grievance and arbitration of individual 
rights. If such matters are not subject to Title I, then, to that 
extent, the protection which Congress envisioned for the individ-
ual in the area of internal union affairs will not be provided. The 
dilemma is unavoidable, and it falls to the judiciary to strike the 
balance. The courts must determine where protection of indi-
viduals, incident to internal affairs, leaves off and the union free-
dom of action, incident to collective bargaining, begins. The 
issue is clearly posed by section 10l(a)(5) of the LMRDA which 
prohibits a union from disciplining a member without affording 
him notice, opportunity to prepare his defense, and a full and 
fair hearing. When a union agrees with management that an 
employee should be disciplined, does this constitute union "dis-
182 See Part I supra. 
183 See note 104 supra. 
1502 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
cipline" within the purview of section 10l(a)(5)? If so, the griev-
ance procedure has ceased to be an informal mechanism for ad-
justment of disputes between union and employer, and must 
operate with the formalities prescribed by statute to protect the 
employee. The holding in Detroy v. American Guild of Variety 
Artists184 is important in this regard. Detroy, a union member, 
was blacklisted in the AGV A magazine after failing to abide by 
an arbitrator's finding that he had violated a contract with the 
employer. The decision to blacklist had been made summarily 
by union officials. The court rejected the contention that the 
union action was not "discipline" within the ambit of section 
10l(a)(5): 
"Nor can we agree with the union's claim that the listing 
of the appellant's name did not constitute discipline within 
the meaning of § 10l(a)(5). If a union such as the AGVA 
undertakes to enforce the contracts made by its members with 
employers, it does so because such enforcement is to the ulti-
mate benefit of all the members, in that it promotes stability 
within the industry. A breach of contract or a refusal to abide 
by an arbitration award, therefore, is not damaging merely to 
the employer but to the union as well, and the union's list-
ing of those of its members who do violate their contracts is 
an act of self-protection. In thus furthering its own ends the 
union must abide by the rules set down for it by Congress in 
§ 10l(a)(5), and any member against whom steps are taken 
by the union in the interest of promoting the welfare of the 
group is entitled to these guarantees."185 
The Detroy decision is sound on its facts. The union, far from 
merely acquiescing in management discipline, had taken affirm-
ative steps to enforce a sanction against the employee. In Gross 
v. Kennedy.,186 the employer had apparently turned his disciplinary 
power over to the union, thus creating an identity between union 
and employer disciplining which made section 10l(a)(5) appli-
cable.187 But what of the typical case, where an employee is dis-
184 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961). 
185 Id. at 81. 
186 183 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
187 Similarly, when the union voted to stop sharing work with a member, this was 
held to be "discipline" in Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, 205 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 
1962). The court stated: "Whether the action was disciplinary in nature is to be 
determined by its practical effect. By the act of the union, Plaintiff lost his then existing 
right to share work. This was of immediate consequence to him, and it was a dis-
ciplinary act." Id. at 289. See also Figueroa v. National Maritime Union, 48 L.R.R.M. 
2017 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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charged by the employer for misconduct or unfitness, and the 
union decides not to press a grievance? Is such acquiescence in the 
employer's disciplinary action subject to the notice and hearing 
requirement of section 10l(a)(5)? 
Section 10l(a)(5) should not be so construed.188 Congress did not 
intend to judicialize the collective bargaining process by requir-
ing formal proceedings before a union could agree with the dis-
charge of an inefficient or dangerous employee. If the employee 
was properly discharged under the contractual relations between 
the union and the employer, the failure of the union to press hii 
grievance cannot be termed "discipline." But if the employee 
was not properly or justly discharged, then the union action in 
refusing to assert the employee's valid claim takes on the colora-
tion of union discipline. This approach will allow the employee 
to test the union decision within the framework of section 
10l(a)(5) while preserving the union's freedom to refuse to process 
a non-meritorious claim against the employer. 
If the union takes an affirmative hand in securing the disci-
pline, the action is subject to the procedural provisions of sec-
tion 10l(a)(5). But if the union action is passive acquiescence, it 
becomes "discipline" subject to 10l(a)(5) only if the union was 
under a duty to process the grievance.189 This reading of section 
IOI(a)(5) adds little to existing law concerning the union's duty 
to process a grievance. Such a duty must be found, and violated, 
before section IOI(a)(5) comes into play. 
Congress intended that the courts would play a greater role 
in determining the relations between union and member than they 
had in the past. This conclusion is supported by section IOl(a)(4), 
which limits the duration of the required exhaustion of internal 
union processes to a maximum period of four months. Congress 
contemplated, at the end of that time, judicial decision on the 
merits of the union-member conflict.190 This enhanced role of 
188 See Rinker v. Local 24, Amalgamated Lithographers, 201 F. Supp. 204 (!.V .D. Pa. 
1962); Beauchamp v. Weeks, 48 L.R.R.M. 3048 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Allen v. Armored Car 
Chauffeurs, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960). Implications of these cases are explored in 
Aaron, The Union Member's "Bill of Rights": First Two Years, Industrial Relations, 
Feb. 1962, pp. 47, 65-67: The cases hold that loss of employment is not actionable under 
Title I, LMRDA, because of the availability of NLRA remedies. They are not fully 
consistent with the cases cited in notes 184, 186 and 187 supra. 
189 Aaron, supra note 188, supports this reading of § 101(a)(5). 
100 The suggestion in the cases cited in note 188 supra, that, where the discipline 
consists of loss of employment, federal court jurisdiction is pre-empted by the NLRA, 
seems without merit (Aaron, supra note 188, at 67), unless the NLRB, under its 
newly announced doctrine stated in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 
1962), asserts power to enforce fully the duty of fair representation. In the event 
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the courts may signal heightened protection for the interests of 
the individual in the collective bargaining process. 
This entire discussion is premised on the assumption that en-
forcement of the duty of fair representation rests with the judi-
ciary, and is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 
A recent development has placed this assumption in doubt, and 
has added a new dimension to the problem of the relationship be-
tween the individual and the collective bargaining process. 
H. The NLRB and the Duty of Fair Representation 
Since the Steele decision, it has been assumed that the primary 
responsibility for implementing the duty of fair representation 
rests with the courts. The Steele case arose under the Rail-
way Labor Act, a statute which was not administered by an agency 
capable of enforcing the duty. The duty, however, was carried 
over into the NLRA without a full examination of NLRB's power 
to enforce it.191 The NLRB participated in the implementation 
of the duty through its control over the certification of the bar-
gaining agent, and by enforcing the duty, imposed by the Taft-
Hartley Act, not to discriminate against employees because of 
Miranda is sustained, the cases in note 188 supra will tum out to state the law of the 
future correctly, although in error at the time of decision. 
101 See Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), 
discussed in Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 154-55, 174 
(1957). The duty was applied by the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 
345 U.S. 330 (1953), involving the validity of a ~niority preference for returning veterans, 
a case arising under the NLRA. The court explicitly declined to face the question of 
the NLRB's jurisdiction over the issue of fair representation. Footnote 4 of the Huffman 
opinion reads as follows: "International also questions the jurisdiction of the District 
Court. International recognizes that one issue in the case of whether it engaged in an 
unfair labor practice when it agreed to the allowance of credit for pre-employment 
military service in computations of employment seniority. It then argues that the 
National Labor Relations Act . . • vests the initial jurisdiction over such an issue 
exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board. This question was not argued in 
the Court of Appeals nor mentioned in its opinion and, in view of our position on the 
merits, it is not discussed here. Our decision interprets the statutory authority of a 
collective-bargaining representative to have such breadth that it removes all ground 
for a substantial charge that International, by exceeding its authority, committed an 
unfair labor practice." Id. at 332. 
The technique used in this note, examining the merits to determine if the NLRB 
had jurisdiction, was explicitly repudiated by the Supreme Court in San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 n.4 (1959). Under the rule of the Garmon 
case, if the matter is "arguably subject" to NLRB jurisdiction, the Board must decide 
first if it has power in the matter. 
See also, noting the lack of careful analysis at the time the duty of fair representa-
tion was transplanted from the RLA to the NLRA, Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 
F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961). 
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membership or non-membership in a union.192 Enforcement of 
this latter obligation led the NLRB, in the 1950's, to develop the 
principle that union control over hiring practices was per se an 
unfair labor practice because it inherently encouraged union 
membership in violation of the NLRA.193 This principle was 
rejected by the Supreme Court in 1961. The Court held that 
unions could enter into agreements with management which 
would give them control over hiring practices so long as they did 
not discriminate on the basis of union membership. The union 
was free to utilize such non-discriminatory hiring criteria as might 
be agreed to by the employer.194 This approach forced the NLRB 
to examine, on a case-by-case basis, the question of whether any 
particular exercise of union control over employment opportuni-
ties violated the act. When the evidence supported the conclu~ 
sion that encouragement of union membership was involved, a 
violation was declared.195 But what of cases in which the union 
simply abused its statutory powers by violating the duty of fair 
representation, with no direct relation to union membership 
considerations? Did these cases involve violations of the NLRA? 
This issue was faced by the NLRB for the first time in Mi-
randa Fuel Co.,190 decided in late 1962. By a vote of three to two, 
192 See note 112 supra. 
103 E.g., Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors, 119 N.L.R.B. 883 
(1957), rev'd, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959); Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 
837 (1954), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343 
(8th Cir. 1955). 
10-1 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. News 
Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). 
105 See Brunswick Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 574 (1962), where an employee was discharged 
for questioning a union steward's authority to determine quitting time. The Board held 
that pressure for the discharge violated § 8(b)(2) because it was based on employee's 
failure to perform obligations imposed by the union on its members. In Local 825, Int'l 
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 135 N.L.R.B. 578 (1962), an employee was discharged because 
of failure to use the union hiring hall, and the union and employer were in dispute 
as to whether the hiring hall contract was applicable to the particular job. The Board 
held that the discharge violated § 8(b)(2) because use of the hiring hall was not justified 
by any contract and the union was applying its own procedures. In Local 294, Int'l Bhd. 
of Teamsters, 137 N.L.R.B. No. 112 Qune 28, 1962), the union caused loss of seniority, 
either because employee was considered as a trouble-maker by drivers, or because the 
union wished to substitute its method of job assignments. Either basis violated § 8(b)(2). 
In Local 1070, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 137 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (May 31, 1962), an 
employee questioned a union agent as to the reason for a strike. A union official became 
angry because his authority and judgment were challenged, and used his office to bring 
about the discharge without contractual authority. This violated § 8(b)(2). See also 
M. Eskin & Son, 135 N.L.R.B. 666 (1962). 
100 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962). _Members Rodgers (term expires 1963), Leedom 
(term expires 1964) and B:own (term expires 1966) ma~e up the majority, while Chair-
man .McCulloch (te1m expires 1965) and member Fannrng (term expires 1967) dissented. 
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the Board assumed responsibility for the full enforcement of the 
duty of fair representation, regardless of whether the case involved 
any special aspect of encouragement or discouragement of union 
membership. 
Michael Lopuch had been employed for eight years as a fuel 
truck driver for Miranda. He was number eleven on a seniority 
list of twenty-one and had steady year-rounq employment. On 
April 12, 1957, Lopuch, with his employer's permission, left to 
spend the summer assisting a member of his family in another 
state, intending to return by October 15. He returned two weeks 
late, but his excuse of illness, backed by a doctor's statement, was 
accepted by the employer. 
On his return the union sought to have him dropped to the 
• bottom of the seniority list. In its argument, the union relied on 
a contract clause which designated April 15 to October 15 as a 
slack season, during which· time men who would not have been 
steadily employed were entitled to a leave of absence without loss 
of seniority, if they reported back to the union steward by Oc-
tober 15. Failure to report on time meant loss of seniority. The 
union first argued that Lopuch's late return required a forfeiture 
of all seniority. Upon verifying his illness excuse, however, the 
union shifted its ground of attack. It argued that if the employee 
left before April 15 he was not protected against loss of seniority 
by the "slack season" clause and must be placed at the bottom of 
the list. The company "reluctantly" acceded to this "interpreta-
tion" of the contract and, as a result, Lopuch lost some weekend 
work. 
The NLRB held that the "slack season" clause was inapplica-
ble to Lopuch, who would have had steady work in the summer. 
By insisting on an "interpretation" of the clause which covered 
Lopuch, the union breached its duty to represent him fairly. The 
employer, by acquiescing or participating in this action, also vio-
lated the act. The NLRB held, three to two, that it was empow-
ered to redress this statutory violation.197 The majority and dis-
senters differed on two basic aspects• of the case. 
197 This case had been decided earlier by the NLRB on the theory that any delega-
tion of control over hiring practices to the union violated the act, as well as on a 
specific finding with respect to the Lopuch case. 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959). The decision 
was enforced by the court of appeals [NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284 F.2d 861 (2d 
Cir. 1960)] solely on the ground that, since the agreement did not justify forfeiture of 
seniority rights, the action by the union "constituted a delegation of power over seniority 
rights which improperly en.couraged union membership and discriminated against the 
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The majority reasoned that the concept of fair representation, 
implicit in the majority-rule-exclusive-representation principle, 
was an aspect of the right of employees to "bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing." The right to 
bargain collectively granted by section 7 of the NLRA is the right 
to bargain through representatives who will fairly represent the 
employees. Section 7 rights are protected against a variety of 
union and management unfair labor practices by section 8.198 The 
NLRB is empowered to protect section 7 rights by enforcing the 
provisions of section 8. Therefore, the full range of NLRB power 
to protect section 7 rights is available to enforce the duty of fair 
representation. The union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) of the act 
by "restraining or coercing" Lopuch when it required the forfei-
ture of his seniority rights. The employer, by agreeing, "inter-
fered" with Lopuch's rights in violation of section 8(a)(l). 
In addition, the union, in seeking to reduce Lopuch's senior-
ity, violated section 8(b)(2), and the employer, by acquiescing, vi-
olated section 8(a)(3). These two sections prohibit the union and 
the employer from discriminating to encourage or discourage 
union membership. The majority held that any abuse of power 
by the union in violation of the duty of fair representation had 
the prohibited effect, whether or not the case involved any special 
issue of union membership.199 
employee." The court of appeals rejected the broad ground of decision proposed by 
the Board, stating that the application of contract criteria to determine seniority rights 
involving merely administrative or ministerial functions on the part of the shop steward 
did not constitute an improper grant of authority to the union. The union petitioned 
for certiorari, and the Board acquiesced. The Supreme Court, 366 U.S. 763 (1961), ulti-
mately remanded the case to the Board, for disposition in light of its decision in Local 
357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). The decision discussed in the 
text was the Board's response to the remand. 
108 Section 7 of the NLRA recognizes employee rights to organize, bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, engage in other concerted 
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, 
and also to refrain from such activities. Section 8(a) lists a series of employer unfair 
labor practices which impinge on § 7 rights. These include: (1) interference, restraint or 
coercion of employees for exercising § 7 rights; (2) domination or interference with 
union activities; (3) discrimination to encourage or discourage union membership (union 
shop permitted); (4) discrimination for invoking the act; and (5) refusal to bargain. 
Section 8(b) lists a series of union unfair labor practices which include: (1) restraint 
or coercion of employees for exercising § 7 rights; (2) causing or attempting to cause 
an employer to discriminate in violation of § 8(a)(3); and (3) refusing to bargain. Section 
9 states the principle that the union designated by the majority of employees in an 
appropriate local. union shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in the 
unit, and gives the NLRB authority to conduct representation elections. Section IO 
empowers the NLRB to prevent and redress unfair labor practices. 
100 The majority relied on the rationale of Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 
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The dissent did not challenge the crucial premise of the ma-
jority that the duty of fair representation was to be read into sec-
tion 7 and was therefore enforceable by the NLRB. The dissent, 
however, argued that the NLRB's enforcement powers were lim-
ited, and did not embrace the full scope of the duty of fair rep-
resentation. Sections 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) prohibit only union-manage-
ment conduct which specifically was intended to encourage or 
discourage union membership. No evidence of this was found in 
the facts in the Miranda case. Hence, those sections were inap-
plicable. Sections S(b)(l)(A)-S(a)(l) were not available to the em-
ployee because section S(b)(l)(A) had received a narrow construc-
tion in a recent Supreme Court decision and should not be read 
broadly.200 Therefore, the Board had no remedial authority over 
a breach of the duty, if one existed. Remedy lay, if at all, in the 
courts. The dissent also suggested that the duty of fair represen-
tation might not protect Lopuch at all. The duty, as understood 
by the dissent, protected employees only against actions by the 
union based on arbitrary classifications, such as race or union 
membership. This case was not based on such a classification, and 
involved only a union policy based on length of absence. 
Although discussion of all of the implications of the Miranda 
decision is beyond the scope of this article,201 several matters do 
(1954), for the proposition that the union violated the act when the foreseeable conse-
quence of its actions was to encourage obedience to the union. The dissent believed 
that Radio Officers had been modified on that point by Local 357, Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), which required proof of specific intent to encourage or 
discourage unionism. The extended discussion of the significance of § 8(b)(2) and 
§ 8(a)(3) in both the majority and dissenting opinions is understandable largely because 
of the history of the litigation. See note 197 supra. In earlier phases of the case, when 
the NLRB was proceeding on the theory that the violation consisted of giving the 
union control as to seniority, the §§ 8(b)(2)-(8)(a)(3) analysis was critical. But in the 
instant decision, the crucial issue was not union control but abuse of union power. 
The -majority could have rested its decision solely on § B(b)(l)(A) and § B(a)(I) without 
recourse to §§ 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3). 
The suggestion in some of these cases that the employee "violated" union rules and 
was penalized by the union in violation of §§ 7 and B(b)(l) seems only a way station 
leading to full development of the duty of fair representation. The union may enforce 
against its members those rules which it has adopted through collective bargaining 
with the employer. See NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). Therefore the 
ultimate question is whether the "rule" enforced by the union was one which it 
was entitled, through collective bargaining with the employer, to enforce against the 
employee. This question then takes us back to the basic issue of the extent of the duty 
of fair representation. 
200 The dissent relied on NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), discussed in 
note 209 infra. 
201 Discussions of NLRB implementation of the duty of fair representation prior 
to the Miranda decision may be found in Cox, supra note 191, at 172 [suggesting the 
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require examination to obtain a complete perspective on indi-
vidual rights in the collective bargaining process. 
(I) The statutory power of the NLRB to enforce the duty 
of fair representation. All five Board members who participated 
in the decision of the Miranda case accepted the premise that the 
duty of fair representation, implicit in section 9 of the NLRA, is 
subsumed to some extent under section 7 and, hence, is enforce-
able by the Board. The propriety of this basic assumption can-
not be determined by reference to the language alone, which 
guarantees to employees "the right to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing."202 
Section 7 was written largely to protect employees' organiza-
tional rights, while the problems of the breach of fiduciary duties 
often stem from the operational activities of unions once they 
have become the established bargaining representatives.203 The 
problem of individual rights in collective bargaining administra-
tion is in large measure a result of the success of the national 
labor policy in supporting the collective bargaining process. The 
NLRB has been the prime instrument of Congress in promoting 
this policy. Its charter has been written in broad language to 
permit it to come to grips with a variety of attempted limitations 
on employee rights. To confine the NLRB to the consideration 
of problems explicit at the time of formulation of the national 
labor policy would not be consistent with the broad language of 
section 7 or with previous decisions of the Supreme Court which 
have stressed the breadth of power vested in the Board.204 The 
premise of the majority in Miranda seems to flow easily from the 
language of section 7 and from the legislative judgment, which 
that language expresses, that the Board's power should be ade-
quate for the regulatory needs of the bargaining process. 
Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court have rejected 
efforts by the NLRB to expand its power into new areas of regu-
lation of labor relations. In all of these cases, the basic reason why 
the Court has rebuffed the Board was that the Board's policy 
use of § 8(b)(3)]; Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 
62 CoLUM. L. REv. 563, 587-94 (1962) [suggesting the use of §§ 8(b){l) and 8(b){2)]. 
202 Section 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). 
203 See text at note 71 supra. 
20-1 See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 83 Sup. Ct. 1139 (1963); NLRB v. Katz, 
369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
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was not adequately rooted in the NLRA.205 This cannot be said 
of the Miranda decision. Congress has indicated, in section 9(a) 
of the NLRA, its concern for individual rights in the administra-
tion of the bargaining process, as well as in other related legisla-
tion previously discussed.206 These indications of congressional 
concern justify the conclusion that the Board's claim of power 
to implement the duty of fair representation is adequately rooted 
in the NLRA, and that the courts should uphold the statutory 
authority of the NLRB. 
The determination of the scope of the duty of fair represen• 
tation enforceable by the Board is a separate question. It is pos• 
sible to adopt the premise that the duty is implicit in section 7 
without resolving the more detailed questions concerning the 
scope of the duty. These more detailed issues, as the conflict be-
tween the majority and the dissent in Miranda demonstrates, take 
two forms: 
(a) Is the duty enforceable by the Board limited to cases in 
which the union has sought to discriminate against employees on 
the basis of union membership? This was the argument of the 
dissent. While agreeing that the duty was implicit in section 7, 
they contended that it was enforceable by the NLRB only to the 
extent that it could be enforced under those sections of the NLRA 
which prohibit union-employer discrimination to encourage or 
discourage union membership. The dissenters argued persuasively 
that these sections are available only if there is some proof that 
the purpose of the union-employer action was related to union 
membership,207 and also that the evidence fails to establish such 
a purpose in Lopuch's case. However, section 7 rights are im-
plemented by sections of the act other than sections 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3). 
To argue that the section 7 rights are limited by the enforcement 
provisions of section 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) is to allow the remedial tail 
to wag the substantive dog. The dissenters recognized t4at they 
had to deal with the alternative remedial section, S(b)(l)(A), 
which prohibits union "restraint or coercion" of employees in the 
exercise of section 7 rights, and 8(a)(l), which prohibits employer 
205 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. News 
Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 
U.S. 651 (1961); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB 
v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). 
206 See text at notes 136-38 supra. 
201 See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). 
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"interference, restraint or coercion" as to the same matters. The 
dissenters, urging a narrow construction of section 8(b)(l)(A), 
relied upon the well-known Curtis Brothers-08 decision, an or-
ganizational picketing case. This reliance is misplaced. Congress 
has indicated its concern for individual rights in collective bar-
gaining, whereas the concern for the unorganized worker ex-
pressed by the Board in Curtis Brothers, and rejected by the 
Supreme Court, was of the Board's own making.200 Thus, the 
suggested narrow reading of section 8(b)(l)(A) is not persuasive. 
There is an additional pragmatic reason for rejecting the 
dissenters' contention. If it were adopted, the duty of fair repre-
sentation would be partially enforceable by the Board, and par-
tially enforceable by the courts. This fragmentization of jurisdic-
tion over the duty would create another jurisdictional puzzle, 
similar to those which have plagued labor law for the last decade 
or so. These existing puzzles seem close to resolution and there 
is no need to embark on another such venture.210 
The ultimate weakness of the dissent is that it accepts the 
premise that section 7 embraces the duty of fair representation. 
Once that has been accepted, the majority view, that the full 
scope of the duty is enforceable by the Board through the unfair 
labor practice provisions of section 8, seems impervious to the 
limiting arguments of the dissenters. Thus, section 8(b)(l)(A), 
which prohibits a union from "restraint or coercion," and section 
8(a)(l), which prohibits employers from "interference, restraint or 
coercion," are available to enforce the full scope of the duty of 
fair representation. 
(b) Does the duty require the union to protect the contract 
rights of employees, or only to refrain from destroying them on 
abstract and arbitrary grounds? The majority, as discussed earlier, 
208 NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). 
200 In NLRB v. Drivers Union, supra note 208, the Supreme Court rejected efforts 
by the Board to use § S(b)(l)(A) to prohibit organizational or recognition picketing. 
However, the case is neither dispositive of nor persuasive on the issue involved in 
Miranda because the problem of organizational picketing had not been dealt with by the 
LMRA, except in § 8(b)(4)(C), but had received significant direct congressional attention 
in § 8(b}(7) of the 1959 legislation by the time the Drivers Union case was decided by 
the Supreme Court. The Court could quite properly view § S(b)(l)(A) as a part of a 
comprehensive network of congressional regulation of organizational picketing after 
1959. There is no analogous network of legislation dealing with the duty of fair 
representation. Hence, the scope of S(b)(l)(A) may be read differently by the Supreme 
Court in the fair representation cases. 
210 See Sovern, Section :JOI and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HAR.v. L. 
R.Ev. 529 (1963). 
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considered that the union was obligated to enforce Lopuch's 
seniority rights, and that the failure to do so under the facts 
of the case violated the duty of fair representation. Presumably, 
the majority adopted the distinction between the negotiation of 
contracts and their administration, and concluded that in the 
latter area the union has a primary obligation to protect the 
individual employee's contract rights. The duty of fair representa-
tion requires that the union honor, not alter, the employee's 
seniority rights. The dissent suggested that the duty protected 
employees only against "arbitrary and invidious" discriminations 
based on union membership or race. The reduction of Lopuch's 
seniority because of his absence from work was a "far cry" from 
such discrimination. Thus, the dissent viewed the union's duty 
in the administration of the contract as no different from that in its 
negotiation, and further suggested that the duty did not extend 
beyond the cases of race and union membership. The courts have 
interpreted the duty as being much more extensive than this.211 
The importance of the distinction between negotiation and 
administration has been discussed earlier. That discussion sup-
ports the position of the majority in expanding the union's duty 
in administration to provide greater protection for the employee.212 
However, the very breadth of the protection offered by the major-
ity poses an additional problem. To determine whether the union 
had breached its duty, the Board had to interpret the contract to 
determine if Lopuch was entitled to the seniority rights which he 
claimed. The contract provided that it was to be interpreted by 
an arbitrator, and the arbitration process is itself a favored in-
strument of the national labor policy. This policy also dictates 
that if arbitrators do not interpret contracts, this task rests with 
the courts, not the NLRB. Virtually every claim of maladministra-
tion of the labor agreement, under the Miranda doctrine, will 
involve the interpretation of an agreement. Does this fact lead 
toward the conclusion that the functions involved in evaluating 
such a claim are those of the court and arbitrator and not those of 
the Board? There is precedent for this type of NLRB activity. 
The Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices is plenary,213 
and contracts have frequently been interpreted by the Board as a 
211 See notes 89 and 90 supra, and Ferro v. Rainvay Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 
847 (2d Cir. 1961). 
212 See text at note 110 supra. 
213 Section lO(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). 
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part of the process of decision of unfair labor practice cases.214 The 
Board, cognizant of a possible overlap in function with arbi-
tration, may defer to the result of arbitration decisions. This, as 
will be discussed below, may encourage arbitration. Finally, the 
fact that the Board must interpret the contract in order to protect 
the employee under the duty of fair representation suggests that 
the protection afforded by Miranda will actually be rather narrow, 
applying only in those cases where the contract construction pro-
posed by the union and the employer to defeat the employee's claim 
is clearly without merit.215 In doubtful cases, the interpretation 
of the parties may stand as a defense to a charge of breach of the 
duty of fair representation. • 
The scope of that duty is to be defined initially by the NLRB. 
That the Board has the power to define the duty of fair repre-
sentation broadly has been established; that it had the duty to 
define it so broadly remains uncertain. Time, changes in Board 
personnel (the decision in Miranda hangs by one vote), experience 
with problems as yet not understood, and subsequent decisions of 
the Board and the courts of appeals will probably reshape the 
issues in Miranda before they are finally resolved by the Supreme 
Court. 
If the issues reach the Court in the form presented in Miranda, 
it would be appropriate for the Court to permit the Board 
to embark on the regulation of this aspect of labor relations. It 
seems doubtful that the Court can rest at this point and allow 
the Board unlimited leeway to define the duty of fair representa-
tion. As long as the duty is pressed by the Board to the limits set 
by the majority in Miranda, no problem will arise. If the Board 
attempts to cut back on the duty announced in Miranda, it will 
214 See, e.g., the discussion in Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943). 
215 In Maxam Dayton, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (April 30, 1963), the Board suggested 
some qualification on the scope of protection of contract rights guaranteed by Miranda. 
There the union had failed, "ineptly" or "negligently," to file a grievance concerning 
a discharge within the time limits provided under the contract. The Board refused to 
find that this action violated the duty of fair representation. The Board adopted the 
trial examiner's statement that "the basis for their discharges was not of such an insub-
stantial nature as to preclude a good faith belief that they were for just cause." 
Evidently the trial examiner believed that the duty applied only to deliberate failures 
by the union to press a claim. The evidence supporting the discharge was examined, 
but it appears to be of the type normally presented to an arbitrator. It is not clear 
that the claim of wrongful discharge was without merit. Obviously, the diminution of 
contract rights of the employee is just as great if the union acts negligently as when 
it acts deliberately. Query whether the issue of negligence should be projected in this 
type of case. 
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force the ultimate issue of individual versus group rights into 
the hands of the Supreme Court. My predilections, favoring broad 
protection for individual rights in that eventuality, need no repe-
tition at this point. 
(2) The desirability of NLRB implementation of the duty of 
fair representation. From one interested in maximization of indi-
vidual rights in the collective bargaining process, the Miranda 
case should evoke warm support. There is no doubt that an ad-
ministrative agency sensitive to the needs of the individual in the 
bargaining process will provide more effective guarantees for his 
rights than will the judiciary. The concomitants of a~ministration 
-the power to investigate, to urge informal settlement and to pro-
vide an expeditious hearing, and the expertise of the personnel 
involved-all suggest that the NLRB is equipped to handle these 
problems more speedily and more fairly than are the courts. This 
is true even in light of the great difficulties which the Board has 
faced in keeping its dockets anywhere near current. With all of 
its overload and backlog, it provides a more effective forum for 
solution of these problems than the courts.216 For such reasons, 
legal history has seen numerous instances, particularly in this 
century, of the replacement of the judicial process by the ad-
ministrative process. 
There is another desirable dimension to the prospect of the 
exercise of NLRB power. One problem with the Miranda doctrine 
is that it requires the NLRB to interpret the contract in every 
case in which the duty of fair representation is allegedly violated. 
Contract interpretation lies, by congressional mandate, in the 
judicial, rather than in the administrative, domain.217 Construe-
216 The time element in some of the cases discussed or cited herein is interesting: 
Case Grievance Date Disposition Date 
Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., Nov. 1951 July 1957-Mich. Sup. Ct. 
349 Mich. 108, 184 
N.W.2d 523 (1957). 
Union News Co. v. Hildreth, March 1958 Nov. 1961-6th Cir. 
295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). 
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., April 1955 May 1963-N.J. Sup. Ct. 
40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 
825 (1963). 
Conley v. Gibson, May 1954 Nov. 1958-U.S. Sup. Ct., 
355 U.S. 41 (1957). D. Tex. dismissed in 1961. 
211 H. REP. No. 510 ON H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1947), dealing with LMRA 
I 301, permitting suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements to be brought 
in federal district courts [see note 101 supra], states: "Once parties have made a col-
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tion of contracts incident to the determination of issues in unfair 
labor practice cases is common for the Board, but under Miranda 
each case of alleged maladministration would involve such a prob-
lem. This argument might operate against recognition of the scope 
of the duty of fair representation suggested by the majority in 
Miranda were it not for a related Board doctrine, most fully 
developed in the Spielberg case.218 In that case, the NLRB at-
tempted to reconcile its duty to prevent unfair labor practices 
with the desirability of promoting arbitration. The Board in 
Spielberg concluded that, if an issue has been submitted to an 
arbitration which was fair and regular, if all parties agreed to be 
bound, and if the decision was not clearly repugnant to the act, 
the Board will refuse to process an unfair labor practice charge 
arising out of the same transaction. The NLRB will defer, as a 
matter of policy, to the judgment of the arbitrator, even if it 
might have reached a different decision on the same facts. This 
doctrine has since been applied in a number of cases, and may 
be considered well established, although some details involved 
in its application remain unclear.219 
Reading Miranda and Spielberg together, a union and em-
ployer would be well advised to submit important questions con-
cerning employment status to arbitration, thereby enabling the 
Spielberg doctrine to foreclose the possibility of review created 
lective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual 
processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board." 
218 Spielberg Mfg. Co., ll2 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). 
210 The doctrine was applied in I. Oscherwitz &: Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1961), 
deferring to an arbitrator's judgment which upheld a discharge. It was also applied 
in Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961), to uphold a decision of 
a teamster-trucking association joint-area committee, consisting of an equal number of 
union and employer representatives, which did not include an impartial, non-affiliated 
"public" member. Such committees are really industry-wide grievance committees. This 
decision is questionable, but may be limited to its facts. In General Motors Corp., 132 
N.L.R.B. 413 (1961), decided one month before Denver-Chicago, the Board refused to 
apply the Spielberg doctrine to the decision of a grievance committee consisting of 
union and employer representatives. One ground of distinction was that, "No impartial 
arbitrator has ruled in this case." 
The Board refused to apply Spielberg in Gateway Transportation Co., 137 N.L.R.B 
No. 186 Guly 31, 1962), because of procedural irregularities leading to the arbitration, 
including inadequate time for the employee to prepare his defense, refusal of union 
counsel to represent him, and refusal of the arbitrator to grant a continuance so that 
he might prepare the case. See also Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 84 Gan. 30, 1963); 
Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (April 4, 1963). The doctrine has been 
applied only where a matter has been resolved. It has not as yet been extended to a 
case where the parties agree to resolve a dispute by arbitration. See Jenkins, The 
Impact of Lincoln Mills on the National Labor Relations Board, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 
355 (1959). 
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by Miranda. Thus, one of the principal results of the Miranda 
decision should be the submission of more cases concerning indi-
vidual rights to an arbitrator for an impartial decision. Assuming 
that the arbitrators have the courage to act independently in such 
cases,220 this is precisely the result which should be encouraged, 
both from the standpoint of protection of individual rights and 
from the aspect of furthering the use of the arbitration process. 
On the other side of the coin are these considerations. The 
primary role of the NLRB is to encourage union-management 
cooperation. The protection of individual rights stifles such co-
operation on some matters. There will be heavy pressures on the 
Board to allow union-management agreements to stand, and hence 
to narrow the scope of NLRB protection of the right of fair rep-
resentation. Such a constriction might result from a minor shift 
in Board personnel, since Miranda was decided by a bare majority. 
However, it is arguable that a narrowly defined duty, administra-
tively enforced, is more desirable than a broadly defined duty, 
judicially enforced, and it is possible, in any event, that the Su-
preme Court will ultimately define the duty broadly. 
Secondly, there is a question of allocation of the strained re-
sources of the Board. Many cases arising under the Miranda doc-
trine will involve intricate questions of contract construction. Is 
the Board prepared to process such cases, and, if so, what other 
Board functions will be sacrificed? These cases will arise where 
collective bargaining has been established. Will the processing 
of such cases take administrative energy away from cases where 
collective bargaining is still to be achieved? If so, then perhaps 
the balance has been improperly struck, for the primary role of 
the NLRB remains the encouragement of collective bargaining. 
Only one familiar with the pattern of Board operation can an-
swer these questions, but they are important in any attempt to 
assess the desirability of the doctrine. 
There is an intriguing contrast between the simplicity of the 
majority position in Miranda and the almost infinite complexity, 
suggested in earlier parts of this article, in the construction of 
220 See Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management 
Autonomy Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631, 661-62 (1959); Fleming, 
Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN, L. 
REV. 235 (1961); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 
THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ANNUAL MEETING 1 (McKelvey 
ed. 1958). 
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theories by which the judiciary can effectively enforce the duty 
of fair representation. The courts, less directly involved in the 
problems of collective bargaining, would appear to be in a better 
position than the Board to protect individual rights. But experi-
ence has demonstrated a judicial tendency to defer to almost any 
arrangement to which union and management agree, in the inter-
est of promoting collective bargaining at the expense of the rights 
of employees. The NLRB has a better idea of the toughness of 
the bargaining process and, in this sense, is in a better position to 
protect individual employee rights. Yet, NLRB protection rests 
on thin, politically charged ground, whereas judicial protection 
would seem to rest on a more solid foundation. 
If the courts, through lack of understanding of the bargaining 
process, are unwilling to protect individual rights despite their 
advantages of tradition and lack of involvement, the only recourse 
may indeed be to the administrative process. Michael Lopuch may 
become one of the first individual employees ever actually pro-
tected by an adjudicatory tribunal's application of the duty of 
fair representation in the administration of a labor agreement.221 
(3) Pre-emption and the duty of fair representation. Under 
the doctrine of "pre-emption," developed in picketing cases, if an 
activity is "arguably" subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 
whether protected or prohibited, the NLRB has exclusive juris-
diction.222 
The principle of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction is based upon 
two factors: (a) In 1947, when Congress added restraints on 
unions to the existing restraints on employers, it adopted a com-
prehensive code of substantive law relating to labor relations. 
Rights under that code were immune from state restraint and 
obligations under that code were enforceable by the NLRB. The 
comprehensive regulation foreclosed the application of potentially 
221 The application of the duty of fair representation to the administration of the 
labor agreement was announced in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), which set aside 
the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. On remand, the case was dismissed on procedural 
grounds. 49 L.R.R.M. 2635 (S.D. Tex. 1961). The opinion on dismissal indicates that 
the ultimate complaint of employees was that they were excluded from the union 
because of their race. The Court held that this was not actionable. See Blumrosen, 
Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 21 (1961). 
222 Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962); In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); San Diego 
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Delony, State Power To Regulate 
Labor-Management Relations, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAlloR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND 
DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959 (Slovenko ed. 1960). See McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A 
Study of the "No-Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44 MINN. L. REV. 205 (1959). 
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conflicting substantive law.223 (b) Congress consciously placed 
administration of this code in the NLRB, thus evidencing a 
preference for the federal administrative enforcement of the code, 
to the exclusion of any other method of enforcement.224 
These considerations led the Court to develop the principle 
that courts, state and federal, must defer, in labor relations mat-
ters, to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRB. The 
scope of this preclusion of judicial action has not been clearly 
defined. In cases involving violence, the Court has refused to 
infer congressional intent to deprive the states of power to act.225 
In some instances, Congress has explicitly preserved the judicial 
power. These include the enforcement of collective bargaining 
contracts,226 the awarding of damages for illegal secondary boy-
cott,227 and the protection of rights of union members under Title 
I of the LMRDA.228 Before the passage of the LMRDA, the Su-
preme Court allowed a state cause of action for wrongful ex-
pulsion and loss of employment opportunities against a claim that 
the union action might violate section 8(b)(2) and, therefore, fell 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 
223 Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1953): "The detailed pre• 
scription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of picketing would seem to 
imply that other picketing is to be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For 
the policy of the National Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all 
picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall within its pro-
hibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by 
freedom of labor to use the weapon of picketing." 
224 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959): "['I']he unifying 
consideration of our decisions has been regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted 
administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, 
armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and 
cumulative experience: 
" 'Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by 
any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide 
primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted 
tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, 
and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. 
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed 
procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to 
avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures 
and attitudes towards labor controversies .••• A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity 
of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as 
are different rules of substantive law ••• .' Gamer v. Teamsters Union 346 U.S. 485, 
490-491.'' Id. at 242-43. 
225 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956). 
226 LMRA § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958). 
221 LMRA § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
228 LMRDA §· 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67, as amended, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
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In allowing the state to process a member's action against his 
union for breach of the membership ·contract, the Supreme Court, 
in Gonzales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, concluded that 
the union activity involved was a "merely peripheral concern" 
of the LMRA.220 
Since, in Gonzales, the union interfered with employment op-
portunities, its action could be characterized as a breach of the 
duty of fair representation. Under Miranda, it would be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Miranda thus makes the reason-
ing in the Gonzales case obsolete. After Miranda, the reasoning 
of the pre-emption cases requires that judicial actions to enforce 
the duty of fair representation be dismissed in deference to the 
primary original jurisdiction of the NLRB. 
Without passing on the Miranda doctrine, the Supreme Court 
in the spring of 1963 clearly indicated that actions to enforce the 
duty of fair representation are pre-empted by the LMRA. In Local 
100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden,230 the Court held 
that state power was pre-empted wherever the crux of the action 
by an employee against his union was interference with the 
220 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), as explained 
in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959). 
In Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 83 Sup. Ct. 1423 (1963) and 
Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 83 Sup. Ct. 1429 (1963), the Supreme 
Court narrowed the scope of the Gonzales case by holding that, where the "crux" of the 
employer's action against his union was interference with his employment relation, the 
judicial power was pre-empted by the LMRA. Neither Borden nor Perko was based on 
the theory that the union had violated its duty as a bargaining agent toward the plain-
tiffs. Both cases could have been so argued, because plaintiffs were members of a union 
which used its collective bargaining power to damage their employment opportunities. 
In both the Supreme Court held that the union activity was arguably protected or 
prohibited by the LMRA and hence, under the Garmon decision, was not subject to 
state court jurisdiction. The Court made footnote reference to the Miranda case, but 
did not discuss iL If Miranda is upheld, Perko and Borden suggest that state (and federal) 
judicial jurisdiction over actions against a union for breach of the fiduciary duty may be 
foreclosed. Under Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, these actions apparently may be main-
tained if they are cast in pure contractual terms. But such a conclusion would make a 
plaintiff's rights to judicial protection against breach of fiduciary duty depend on the 
skill of the pleader. If the issue of contract construction which, under Smith, is open to 
judicial consideration depends upon a balancing of conflicting values of union freedom 
to bargain away employee claims and individual rights to enforce the benefits of 
collective bargaining contracts, and if the NLRB has been given the primary function 
of striking that balance, it is doubtful whether there is justification for leaving the 
matter in the hands of the courts. The potential conflict between Smith and Borden-
Perko will probably plague us for some time to come. 
230 83 Sup. Ct. 1423 (1963). In a companion case, Local 207, Int'! Ass'n of Bridge 
Workers v. Perko, 83 Sup. Ct. 1429 (1963), the Court held that actions by supervisors 
were also pre-empted since they might fall within .the range of NLRB power. See note 
191 supra for a discussion of earlier decisions on pre-emption. 
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employee's present or potential employment relations. In such 
cases, union conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the 
LMRA and is beyond the reach of state power. 
In Borden the employee charged that a union business agent 
willfully refused to allow him to accept work to which he was 
entitled under union rules relating to the operation of hiring halls. 
Since hiring hall rules are necessarily involved in the contractual 
relation between union and employer,231 the case raises virtually 
the same problem as did Miranda, i.e., union refusal to permit 
the plaintiff to obtain the benefit of contractual provisions with 
the employer which govern his employment opportunities. Thus 
the case would have been tried on the theory that the union 
breached its duty of fair representation to the employee in the 
administration of the hiring hall rules. But this argument was not 
made. Instead, the employee's action was pleaded in "tort" for 
willful interference with the right to pursue a lawful calling, and 
(in an obvious effort to invoke the Gonzales decision) in "contract" 
for violation of a promise implicit in the membership arrangement 
not to discriminate against members unfairly. 
The Supreme Court was unimpressed. "It is not the label 
affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the 
determination of the relationship between state and federal juris-
diction. Rather ... 'our concern is with delimiting the areas of 
conduct which must be free from state regulation if national 
policy is to be left unhampered.' ... In the present case the conduct 
on which the suit is centered, whether described in terms of tort 
or contract, is conduct whose lawfulness could initially be judged 
only by the federal agency vested with exclusive primary juris-
diction to apply federal standards."232 
This approach would be equally applicable to a complaint 
denominated "action for breach of the statutory duty of fair 
representation.'' The crux of actions for breach of the duty of 
fair representation is always interference with the employee's 
present or potential employment relations. Under the reasoning 
of Borden the actions can no longer be processed in the courts 
without going through the original primary jurisdiction of the 
NLRB. 
However, this does not mean that states have no power over 
231 See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). 
232 83 Sup. Ct. at 1428. 
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such actions. It means only that they cannot exercise any power 
until the Board has decided how far it will press the Miranda 
principle, and the courts have passed on the Miranda doctrine. 
One of the issues which split the majority and dissent in Miranda 
was whether the Board should remedy all breaches of the duty of 
fair representation, or only those based on race or union member-
ship. If the view of the majority prevails and all breaches of the 
duty are to be remedied by the Board, then the pre-emption doc-
trine would be fully applicable. Union conduct which violated the 
duty would be subject to remedy by the Board. Union action in 
compliance with the duty would be protected against judicial 
interference. But if the dissenting view prevailed, and the Board 
implements only one aspect of the duty, that relating to race and 
union membership, then the courts would retain jurisdiction 
over other facets of the duty of fair representation. Otherwise, a 
new "no-man's land" would be opened in labor relations, in con-
nection with this duty, where the Board would not and, under 
Borden, the states could not act.233 But Congress, in adopting 
section 14(c) of the NLRA in 1959, made it clear that this was not 
to happen.234 If the Board will not act in the area, the courts are 
free to do so. The avoidance of this jurisdictional morass is another 
reason suporting the majority view in Miranda, albeit one which 
became apparent only in light of the post-Miranda decision in 
Borden. 
The path of protection for individual rights in the collective 
bargaining process seems inevitably strewn with legal refinements. 
The contract-tort analytical problems and remedial difficulties 
plague the courts; internal disputes divide the Labor Board; 
jurisdictional disputes threaten to paralyze action on the merits 
of an employee's claim. 
The thrust of the pre-emption doctrine will place the solution 
of these problems within the range of NLRB power. Acting under 
233 See Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). 
284 Section 14(c)(2) provides: "Nothing in this act shall be deemed to prevent or bar 
any agency or the courts of any state or territory • • • from assuming and asserting 
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines ••• to assert jurisdiction." 
See Blumrosen, The New Federalism in Labor Law, in SYMPOSWM ON THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Ac:r OF 1959 (Slovenko ed. 1960). State courts• 
jurisdiction to enforfe the federal duty of fair representation implies the presence of 
federal court jurisdiction as well under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958). See Syres v. Oil Workers 
l!50 U.S. 892 (1955). A contrary opinion, clearly erroneous, was expressed in GIBA v: 
International Union of Elec. Workers, 50 L.R.R.M. 2299 (D. Conn. 1962). 
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a broadly written charter, the Board is in a position to make the 
appropriate value judgments balancing the interests of employees 
and the union-management parties to the collective bargaining 
relation. If this opportunity is accepted by the Board, many of the 
problems previously discussed by this article will have been 
avoided. For example, the suggestion that contracts should be con-
strued to permit individual actions under LMRA, section 301, if the 
union breached its fiduciary duty was designed to protect the indi-
vidual. Such a construction might be unnecessary if the protection 
is forthcoming from the Board. Similarly, the argument that section 
9(a) allows individual enforcement of grievance and arbitration 
provisions would lose much of its force. The analysis of section 
10l(a)(5) of the LMRDA which finds union "discipline,, in any 
case where the employee breached the duty of fair representation 
could be dismissed ~f that duty was fully protected by the Board. 
If the narrower view of the NLRB's power to enforce the duty 
prevails, the courts will be free to use the available legal tools, 
section 301 of the LMRA and section 10l(a)(5) of the LMRDA, 
to protect individual rights in the collective bargaining process.235 
The Miranda decision seems to provide the best hope in years 
for the protection of individual rights to fair representation by 
the union. Until the Supreme Court has passed on the issues in 
the Miranda case, however, the existence of Board power, and its 
scope, will not be clear. To protect against the risk of losing 
a fair representation case for failure to choose the proper forum, 
counsel for the employee, besides requiring the exhaustion of all 
contract and internal union remedies, should institute suit under 
the Steele doctrine and direct the filing of charges with the 
NLRB. Only in this way can employee rights be preserved during 
the unfolding stages of this newest development. 
In summary, the protection of individual rights in the col-
lective bargaining context lags far behind the protection of the indi-
vidual in his other relations with the union. During the past year, 
decisions in the Miranda and Donnelly cases have demonstrated 
increasing judicial and administrative concern for the rights of 
employees in the administration of the collective bargaining rela-
tionship. But these decisions have created many unanswered ques-
2a5 Cf. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Lodge 12, Int'! Ass'n of 
Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 
(1958). 
1963] WORKER-UNION RELATIONSHIP 1523 
tions, which makes the search for meaningful individual rights 
difficult indeed. The Supreme Court, which has announced the 
duty of fair representation, has not developed that duty in suf-
ficient detail to provide guidance to the lower courts or admini-
strative agencies. The courts have been reluctant to protect the 
individual, and it may be that individual rights will fare better 
before the NLRB. It is now uncertain whether such protection 
will come from the courts, or the NLRB, or from both. 
Obviously, major problems in our rapidly changing economic 
system, created by automation, business reorganization, the de-
mands of national defense, and the international situation, all of 
which impinge on the employment relation, · cannot be solved 
by providing individual protection in the collective bargaining 
context. But by providing such protection, the law may help to 
shape the appropriate roles of labor, management and govern-
ment so that, in the handling of these broad problems, individuals 
will be protected to the maximum extent possible.236 
IV. CONCLUSION 
"The fullness of life must be found in the nature of work itself." Daniel Bell 
(1961).287 
The legal profession is probably more cognizant of the im-
portance of protecting individual freedoms than any other group 
in our society. Union and management counsel are in a position 
to advise their clients on decisions which will affect individual em-
ployee freedoms. Yet, the organizational objectives of union and 
management may appear to be better served by minimizing indi-
vidual employee freedoms. Thus, counsel in labor relations may 
face a conflict between their obligations toward their clients and 
toward the larger social interests which they serve by virtue of 
their professional capacity.238 The situation has its brighter side, 
236 In Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 83 Sup. Ct. 1158 (1963), Mr. Justice 
Brennan, while developing rules to protect the dissenter within the union from an 
objectionable use of dues for political purposes, urged the unions to devise appropriate 
internal procedures and formulas to accomplish the same result without litigation. 
237 BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 392 (Collier rev. ed. 1961). 
238 See Guzzo v. United Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2379 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1960), 
cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Superior Court of State of California, 365 U.S. 802 (1961). 
In his address at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, NLRB 
Chairman McCulloch said: "[T]here are still some employers and unions • • • who 
deliberately flout the law which has been on the books for many years, and then utilize 
the appellate processes of our Board and the Courts to delay its application and enforce-
ment." McCulloch, A Tale of Two Cities: or Law in Action, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
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however. Counsel, as he directs and advises his institutional client, 
may channel the institution's efforts and desires in directions 
which will reinforce, rather than subordinate, individual free-
doms. This challenge to the lawyer, who makes law informally 
as he advises his client, calls for the highest qualities of the pro-
fession. Most labor relations matters of importance involve the 
advice of counsel at some critical stage. The legal profession has 
an opportunity to help establish the conditions of individual 
freedom. It may be that employee rights can be made meaningful 
only as counsel for union and management work conscientiously 
toward this end. 
This possibility is dramatically illustrated in a situation de-
scribed recently by a respected attorney who represents manage-
ment in labor matters. He was negotiating a collective bargaining 
agreement between a union and a medium-sized firm. As negotia-
tions neared their conclusion, the parties were a few thousand 
dollars apart, a small sum considering the total amounts involved. 
At this point, the union representative called counsel for the 
employer to the side and proposed this arrangement: if the em-
ployer yielded to the union's economic demands, the union would 
not later object to the dismissal of employees A and B who were 
"troublemakers" for both union and management. The savings 
in wages resulting from the dismissal would just about equal the 
difference which then existed between union and management. 
Counsel for management made the following assumptions as 
he evaluated the proposal: (1) the employer's competitive posi-
tion was such that he would probably accept the offer; (2) the 
subsequent discharge of the employees would be done in such a 
way that they could have no recourse to the legal system; (3) this 
discharge could not be accomplished without union acquiescence 
in a contract violation; and (4) the union proposal was in viola-
tion of its fiduciary duty to employees A and B. 
How does his sense of professional responsibilty bear on the 
question of whether he should accept or reject the proposal, and, 
in either case, communicate or not communicate the existence of 
the proposal to the employer? 
The same type of illustration could be duplicated by union 
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW 14, 24 (1962). This suggests that 
the question of professional responsibility of the attorney is closely related to the 
effective application of law to labor relations problems. 
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counsel. For example, counsel has persuaded at least one Team-
sters' local to arbitrate any discharge case in which the employee 
is dissatisfied, whether or not the union believes the employee is 
correct. 
In the day-to-day world of the legal adviser, such opportunities 
to promote or minimize individual employee rights are not un-
common. Whether such opportunities are seized is a significant 
test of professionalism in this branch of the law. Undoubtedly a 
factor in the decision of counsel is the clarity of the rules of law 
relating to the union's duty to the employee. If the rule of law 
clearly protects the employee, counsel on either the union or 
management side are more likely to guide their clients along 
paths which protect individual freedom. If the rule of law does 
not clearly protect the employee, counsel may find it more difficult 
to afford him protection. This is a factor which should be con-
sidered carefully when developing the rules of law which fix the 
relationship between union and employee. The effect of the 
Hildreth decision, which sanctioned discharge of an employee 
without proof of wrongdoing, may be to reduce the likelihood 
that counsel will advise union and management against irration-
ally discharging an employee. Conversely, the Miranda decision 
may encourage counsel to submit doubtful cases to the impartial 
judgment of an arbitrator. 
The rules of law relating the individual to the union must 
reflect the preferences of the policy makers, whether they are 
legislators, administrators, or judges. These preferences for the 
protection of individual rights have been made clear in the 
political area and in connection with internal union affairs. A 
similar development has not yet taken place, although it may be 
under way, in the area of collective bargaining. 
In defining the duty of fair representation to maximize indi-
vidual rights, and then by implementing that duty in day-to-day 
advisory functions, the legal profession can play an important role 
in determining the emphasis which will be placed on individual 
freedoms in the organized society into which we are moving. The 
organization of the world which Mr. Justice Holmes saw in 1896 
is proceeding at a rapid pace. This organizing process creates the 
risk of uniformity and the reduction of the area of individual 
freedom. Perhaps diversity and freedom are inconsistent with the 
organization of society. Uniformity may be a necessary conse-
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quence of increasing complexity. But this has yet to be established. 
It may be possible in a highly organized society to have either 
uniformity or diversity; freedom or conformity. This issue may 
not be foreclosed by the external forces operating on our social-
economic system, but may be one in which man's judgment and 
political sense, expressed through law, can play a significant 
role.239 This assumption, an aspect of the "robust common 
sense"240 of the law, underlies efforts to promote individual free-
dom within the organized society. 
239 See Woodward, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from , Laissez-Faire 
to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962). 
240 "Till now the law has been guided by a robust common sense which assumes 
the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its problems." Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (Cardozo, J.). 
